

Central Research Section

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DATE 01-07-2011

Eisenhower Refuses Second Guess on Cuba

Wouldn't Probe Fiasco (or U-2) Now; Admits Involvement in Training Troops

By MARY McGRORY

Star Staff Writer

GETTYSBURG, Pa., May 1.—Former President Eisenhower told the country today he will have no part of any postmortems on the Cuban fiasco.

"Now is not the time to rake over the ashes," he said, in the presence of the full Republican leadership.

"I would say that one day history will tell the whole story," he told his first formal

press conference since he left office January 20. "But as of this moment I would say the last thing you would want was a complete investigation. Let us by no means start a witch hunt and get every secret in detail."

The former President freely admitted the involvement of his administration in the training and equipping of Cuban refugee troops. There was no planning at that stage, he said, because "there was not then any specific leader of these people. So the only progress was in the accumulation of information and in the training of these people."

Reaffirms Support

The former President reaffirmed the support he gave his young successor when Mr. Kennedy consulted him immediately after the Cuban debacle. "The United States stands firmly behind the President in his effort to prevent the solidifying of a Communist stronghold," he said. "I think they will support him unambiguously as he tries to prevent Communists from making inroads in the free world."

The former President, looking pink-cheeked and fit, appeared before the press in an abandoned theater in downtown Gettysburg near the office

where he is writing the memoirs of his administration.

The former President, who repeatedly made the point that he is at the disposition of his commander-in-chief, revealed that he has canceled the trip to Japan scheduled for the fall.

He did so at the suggestion of the State Department, he said, which advised him it was not the best time to go "because of the general condition."

Cites Importance of Issue

Gen. Eisenhower appeared on what is known as the "Ev and Charlie" show, the televised press conference which follows the Republican weekly leadership meetings.

He resisted all invitations to criticize the first 100 days of the Kennedy administration. Senate Minority Leader Dirksen of Illinois reported that he had told the former President that "members of Congress on both sides of the aisle were badly shaken by the Cuban matter."

But Gen. Eisenhower would only say this: "Like any other partisan politician, I might find some glee in talking about promises and performance, but this administration is preoccupied with the most important situation in this world—the international situation."

He refused all comment on

the Laotian crisis, and a possible decision to send troops to that country, saying he was not privy to all the information coming into the White House and that the situation was "going too rapidly."

He was reminded of the investigation that followed his own most embarrassing moment in the White House—the U-2 incident, and he said he saw no use "raking over the ashes of that incident" either.

"We have a duty, all of us, to look at the problems of this administration in keeping Communist brighheads from solidifying," he said. "I stand behind them. I might have used different methods. I might have been more particular about tactics. That might have been the result of differing personalities."

Wants Sound Currencies

Only on domestic policies did the President take issue with his successor.

"No matter how much we like to say we can afford anything we want to do, sound currency is the first backstop to free enterprise," he said.

House G. O. P. Leader Halleck reported he told the former President "the American people certainly missed his wisdom and sure hand in Washington, and if he ran for President tomorrow he would win by the biggest landslide in history."

"I think he liked that," Mr. Halleck said.

Senator Dirksen said he had informed Gen. Eisenhower that Republicans "have supported President Kennedy in the Cuban crisis, in the belief that once a Nation is committed by its President, we must present a united front to the world."

The two met with the former G. O. P. President, along with others, as part of a plan to keep in close touch with top Republicans. They and other leaders met recently with former Vice President Nixon.

Have Breakfast Together

Senator Dirksen and Mr. Halleck made their views known in statements issued while they still were conferring with Mr. Eisenhower at his office in an old brick building on the edge of the Gettysburg College campus.

Mr. Halleck and Senator Dirksen had breakfast with the former President in his office before a formal conference of Mr. Eisenhower with the group of Republican leaders, including National Chairman Thurgood B. Morton.

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Mr. Halleck said he had advised Gen. Eisenhower that the Kennedy legislative program "has laid a big egg so far."

"I think it has just about talked itself to death," Mr. Halleck said. He added that in 35 legislative messages and task force reports Mr. Kennedy had rolled up 250,000 words in addition to the 750,000 he had used in presidential campaign speeches.

Senator Dirksen said he had told Mr. Eisenhower "that not one of the Kennedy proposals has generated any enthusiasm on either the Democratic or the Republican side, nor can we find any evidence of real support for the Kennedy program by the American people."

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The Washington Post and

Times Herald

The Washington Daily News

The Evening Star

New York Herald Tribune

New York Journal-American

New York Mirror

New York Daily News

New York Post

The New York Times

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UPI-9

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON.--THE ADMINISTRATION SENT SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK TO CAPITOL HILL TODAY TO DEFEND ITS HANDLING OF THE CUBAN SITUATION AND THE U.S. ROLE IN THE ILL-FATED INVASION ATTEMPT. RUSK'S APPEARANCE BEFORE A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA (AT 10 AM) CAME AMID GROWING CONGRESSIONAL DEMANDS FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF THE SUPER-SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND SOME DEMANDS FOR A STERNER U.S. POLICY TOWARD FIDEL CASTRO.

IT ALSO FOLLOWED A NEW WARNING BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR AMERICANS STILL IN CUBA TO LEAVE "IN THE NEAR FUTURE." OFFICIALS SAID THE STEP WAS NOT PROMPTED BY ANY IMMEDIATE THREAT AGAINST AMERICANS BUT IT WAS CONSIDERED WISE TO GET AS MANY OUT AS POSSIBLE. THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING RUSK BEHIND CLOSED DOORS ALSO PLANNED TO MEET LATER IN THE WEEK WITH CIA DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES.

CHAIRMAN WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE., SAID THE SUBCOMMITTEE WANTED AN EXPLANATION OF WHY IT WAS NOT ADVISED OR CONSULTED ABOUT THE UNSUCCESSFUL CUBAN REBEL INVASION. HE SAID THE FOREIGN RELATIONS GROUP ALSO WOULD LIKE TO FIND OUT FROM RUSK AND DULLES WHAT PLANS THEY HAVE FOR FUTURE U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA.

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(CUBA)

WASHINGTON.--SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK WENT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS WITH A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE TODAY TO DEFEND THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S CUBAN POLICIES AND ITS ROLE IN THE ILL-FATED CUBAN REBEL INVASION. APPEARING A LITTLE TENSE AND TIRED, RUSK HAD NO COMMENT AS HE WENT INTO A MEETING WITH A FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA, HEADED BY SEN. WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE. THE CABINET OFFICIAL WAS THE FIRST WITNESS IN WHAT MORSE PROMISED WOULD BE A THOROUGH REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATION POLICIES ON CUBA, BOTH PAST AND PRESENT. MORSE SAID THE SUBCOMMITTEE WOULD HEAR DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOMETIME LATER IN THE WEEK, BUT NO DATE HAS BEEN SET. RUSK'S APPEARANCE CAME AMID GROWING CONGRESSIONAL DEMANDS FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF CIA AND SOME DEMANDS FOR A STERNER U.S. POLICY TOWARD FIDEL CASTRO.

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UPI-92

ADD 1 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-88)

RUSK ALSO TOLD THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA THAT THE DECISION FOR THE RECENT ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION WAS MADE BY CUBAN REFUGEES AND CARRIED OUT BY THEM, ALTHOUGH WITH SUBSTANTIAL U.S. FINANCIAL AND SUPPLY AID.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEWS, GIVEN DURING A TWO-HOUR AND 55-MINUTE SESSION BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, WERE RELAYED TO NEWSMEN BY CHAIRMAN WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE.

MORSE SAID HE WOULD NOT WITHDRAW HIS PREVIOUS CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF THE CUBAN FIASCO BUT PRAISED RUSK FOR AN "EXCEEDINGLY ABLE, OBJECTIVE, FACTUAL AND OPEN BREASTED STATEMENT" ABOUT THE ENTIRE SITUATION.

MORSE SAID HE FELT HE WAS SPEAKING FOR OTHER SENATORS PRESENT WHEN HE SAID THEY PLACED "COMPLETE CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT IN THE ABLE LEADERSHIP" OF RUSK AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

RUSK TOLD NEWSMEN IT WAS "A VERY CANDID AND USEFUL DISCUSSION." MOST OF IT, HE SAID, WAS DEVOTED TO CUBA ALTHOUGH ONE OR TWO OTHER MATTERS, WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY, WERE RAISED IN THE SESSION.

THE SECRETARY SAID THE FULL MORNING COMPLETED HIS TESTIMONY ON CUBA, ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTS TO RETURN TO THE CAPITOL WEDNESDAY FOR A DISCUSSION OF OTHER MATTERS.

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ADD 2 CUBA, WASHINGTON

AMONG OTHER THINGS, MORSE SAID, HE FELT THAT THE PROBLEM OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SOLVED. MORSE HAD COMPLAINED THAT HIS SUBCOMMITTEE HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED IN ADVANCE OF THE CUBAN INVASION.

THE OREGON DEMOCRAT TOLD NEWSMEN RUSK ASSURED THE COMMITTEE THAT "THE DECISION FOR THE ILL-FATED INVASION WAS DONE ON THE PART OF CUBAN REFUGEES, AND CONDUCTED BY CUBANS." HOWEVER, HE SAID, THE U.S. HAD SUPPLIED ADVANCE TRAINING, MONEY AND SUPPLIES.

MORSE SAID HE REGARDED THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS A "JOINT PARTNER" WITH THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE WHITE HOUSE IN THE INVASION AID PLANS. ASKED IF THE UNITED STATES LET THE CUBAN REFUGEES GO AHEAD ON THEIR OWN, MORSE SAID "I DON'T THINK WE GAVE THEM ANY WEAK COUNSEL."

THE OREGON DEMOCRAT ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT THE APPEARANCE OF CIA DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES SOMETIME LATER THIS WEEK BE EXPANDED INTO A MEETING OF THE FULL FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. HE SAID HE MADE THE SUGGESTION AND IT WAS APPROVED BY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, D-ARK.

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(EISENHOWER)

WASHINGTON.--FORMER PRESIDENT EISENHOWER HAS TOLD REPUBLICAN LEADERS HE DOUBTED IF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAD A LARGE ROLE IN PLANNING THE ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION BECAUSE IT WAS MARKED BY AT LEAST ONE ERROR WHICH PROVED COSTLY IN WORLD WAR I.

REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WHO CONFERRED WITH EISENHOWER AT HIS GETTYSBURG HOME ON MONDAY WERE FRANKLY SURPRISED THAT EISENHOWER PLACED NO BLAME FOR THE INVASION FAILURE AND WAS SO RESTRAINED IN HIS CRITICISM.

BUT THE EX-PRESIDENT, IT WAS LEARNED TODAY, DID MAKE THE POINT THAT POOR MILITARY PLANNING EVIDENTLY ENTERED INTO THE FAILURE OF THE INVASION AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO'S REGIME.

HE AGREED IT WAS A MISTAKE TO HAVE HAD ALL OF THE INVASION FORCES' COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT LOADED ON ONE OLD LIBERTY SHIP, AN EASY TARGET FOR SHORE BATTERIES. THE SHIP WAS SUNK AND THE INVADERS COMMUNICATIONS MATERIEL WENT DOWN WITH IT.

"WE LEARNED NOT TO DO THAT AGAIN AFTER GALLIPOLI," EISENHOWER REMARKED.

THIS WAS A REFERENCE TO THE WORLD WAR I BATTLE FOR GALLIPOLI IN TURKEY WHICH GUARDS THE NORTHERN END OF THE DARDANELLES STRAITS.

BUT WHEN OTHER REPUBLICANS PRESENT REFERRED TO "MISTAKES" IN THE CUBAN OPERATION, THE FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF STRESSED THAT MUCH PLANNING IS REQUIRED FOR SUCH AN OPERATION.

EISENHOWER DID NOT, IT WAS SAID, CHALLENGE THE QUALITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE WHICH WENT INTO THE INVASION PREPARATION NOR PINPOINT BLAME FOR ITS FAILURE.

THE REPUBLICANS BROUGHT UP THE MATTER OF HOW MUCH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAD TO DO WITH PLANNING THE INVASION AND REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE LOST LIBERTY SHIP. THE FORMER PRESIDENT RAISED AN EYEBROW AND INDICATED HE THOUGHT THE JOINT CHIEFS COULD NOT HAVE HAD MUCH TO DO WITH THAT.

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UPI-268

(FLIGHT)

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.--FOUR LOCAL AREA MEN, FLYING FOR ANTI-CASTRO FORCES, CRASHED IN THE CARIBBEAN LAST MONTH AND ARE PRESUMED DEAD, A MIAMI SPRINGS, FLA., ATTORNEY SAID TODAY.

HE SAID THE MEN WENT DOWN "ON OR ABOUT APRIL 19" WHILE ON "A NONE-SCHEDULED CARGO FLIGHT TO AN UNDISCLOSED POINT FROM AN UNDISCLOSED POINT, BUT PRESUMABLY CENTRAL AMERICA."

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500,000 Troops Needed to Take Cuba, Flier Says

14 By James Buchanan

Chicago Daily News Service

MIAMI, May 3—A former Cuban businessman who flew with the tiny anti-Castro air force at Cochinos Bay is convinced that a successful invasion of Cuba will require 500,000 troops.

And he says the attackers must be ready to lose 100,000 or more men in a long-gruelling fight on a superbly defended island.

Forced to speak anonymously because of a pact with fellow airmen, the pilot made these points in an interview:

Leadership — "Jose Miro Cardona's Council probably is the only organization that can serve as a rallying point for the Cubans. It has the entire to Washington officials, upon whom our hopes rest completely. It's the old story of not changing horses, and so forth."

Recruiting — Can begin again, but only if the enlistees know they will be treated as human beings in the camps. "They must not be held as prisoners; but must be given leaves of absence and other means of relieving the strain of training."

Reserves — There are none. On the invasion they took every boy, even some who had been in camp less than 10 days.

"There are no forces floating around the Caribbean on ships or held at bases out of the country. The men are either prisoners, dead, hiding in the swamps or already back in this country."

Attack — "Only a military effort, a great one, will unseat Castro. And it must come soon before the island is even more fortified—if that is possible."

Fear and Distrust —

Underground — "Fear of exposure and arrest among the Cubans, who cannot trust their own families, is too great."

"They will support the invaders, but only when the invaders are in control of their city or their area."

U. S. Guidance — "We must have it along with continuing materials, but it must be by an agency."

By an agency...

he had agents. But they were unnecessary. You don't surprise an enemy after your troops have all left from one port and have been at sea for six days."

Unbelievable Defense

Castro Defense — "Unbelievable. Every mile of the coast is guarded, all the way around the island, with gun emplacements and radar."

"The anti-aircraft fire is the most deadly anyone had ever seen. And Castro has some new equipment and new tricks that defy description."

Cuban Courage — "I never would have believed it before, but the courage of the men on the ground and in the air met every challenge."

"As our planes were shot down, two by two, we had a surplus of crews. These airmen actually fought for assignments on the remaining planes, knowing they faced almost certain death."

Castro Air Force — "Six lousy little planes won the war for Castro. He had seven, but we got one."

"And because of their speed and maneuverability the three jet trainers and the three piston fighters kept our bombers away from their gun emplacements and anti-aircraft batteries. Our transports were sitting ducks."

Premature Takeoff? — "No; the invasion went off as scheduled, carrying everything we were given. We had no reserves, no backlog of supplies. The order to 'go' came from your agency men, and not from Cuban military men."

U. S. Troop Report

U. S. Support — "Of course there were rumors of the takeoff point that we would be supported by U. S. troops. That was natural."

"What was wrong was the refusal of the agency men to kill the rumors, thereby leading us to believe our supplies and so forth were adequate to do what we believed was just a small part of the over-all job."

Publicity — "Many of the recruits were victims of false publicity. We had thousands of men in camps. Imagine how many they got there by a hundred or so."

mand—another chance, properly directed, to save our country and the men we left behind.

"We are not bitter at the U. S. Government—we realize it was the mistake of an agency, not the Government."

Future — "The future of Cuba rests solely in the hands of the United States; either


to be abandoned or saved. Any alliance of Latin American nations will have to be formed by the United States.

"It will cost men and materials, less now than later. To refuse Cuba spells political death for the United States, which never was loved but often feared. Today it is not even feared."

Gandy

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Fliers from city gambled lives, lost in Cuban attack

BY DAVE LANGEFORD

News staff writer

A MIAMI SPRINGS, Fla., lawyer, Alex E. Carlson, was in Birmingham yesterday to notify families of the four they were missing. He identified them as Riley W. Shamburger, the pilot; Thomas Illard Ray, co-pilot; Leo F. Baker, engineer; and Wade Carl Gray, radioman.

Carlson told The News his "client," Double Check Corp., contacted the men about April 1 on behalf of anti-Castro forces. The Florida secretary of state listed Carlson as president of the corporation, his wife as secretary-treasurer, and Raymond W. Cox, so of Miami Springs, as vice president.

THE MISSION of the four Birmingham men on the day their plane went down remains a mystery, but it is believed they were flying cargo in support of a Cuban invasion which had begun three days before.

They were last heard from somewhere over the Caribbean when they broke radio silence to say that one of the plane's two engines had failed and they were losing altitude. Carlson said a search of the sea turned up parts of the airplane.

He said they were flying from a secret airstrip in Central America.

The Miami source said it is generally believed the invasion force embarked from Guatemala, 600 miles from Cuba.

HE SAID IT COULD also be assumed the crash occurred on land or just off the Cuban shore. Bits of the wreckage were spotted.

How much the Birmingham ventures were paid for flying the sorties was not revealed, but it was said to be a substantial amount.

Carlson said the men's widows

They had all worked for the same aircraft firm—Hayes Corp. in Birmingham. Two had been test pilots, one a flight engineer and the other was a classified planning and technical inspector.

ALL WERE MARRIED, three of them had children and at least three were Air Force veterans.

The date of the crash was the 15th wedding anniversary for Shamburger and his wife, Marion, whom he met in high school here.

Shamburger, 36, pilot of the ill-fated plane, had more than 12,000 hours flying time as a pilot in World War II, the Korean conflict, with the Air National Guard and as a test pilot at Hayes.

The Shamburgers have a 13-year-old daughter.

Mrs. Shamburger said she kept the agonizing secret of her husband's fate for some time.

Baker's wife, pregnant with her second child, was hospitalized last week when she learned he was missing.

A native of Boston, Mass., he served in the Air Force as a technical sergeant. Now 35, he had worked with Hayes since 1957 as a flight engineer. He also operated two restaurants here.

Baker had an 11-year-old daughter by a previous marriage and a 1-year-old daughter.

Gray, radioman on that last flight, had also been a Hayes test pilot. He was 33 and married, but had no children.

"He's been gone about three months," a member of the family said. "He didn't tell anybody where he was going or why. We don't know much about this."

Ray was an inspector at Hayes for eight years before resigning last March. He was 30, a native of Birmingham and had been a staff sergeant in the Air Force. He was married and the father of two.



THOMAS W. RAY
Wgs co-pilot



LEE F. BAKER
Wife didn't know

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

How CIA Staged Cuban Fiasco

By Drew Pearson

The story has now been pieced together of the tragedy of the Bay of Pigs where 1500 Cuban freedom fighters were routed by dictator Castro's militia after a heroic two-day stand, April 17-19.



Pearson

It is a story of fumbling and bumbling by the Central Intelligence Agency, which is now trying desperately to hide its mistakes. Agents have been rushed to Florida to hush up the Cubans who know the embarrassing truth.

However, this column has dug out the facts and will publish its findings on the ground that the public is entitled to know the facts in order to prevent similar mistakes in the future. Here is the first installment:

President Eisenhower ordered the CIA a year ago to begin training Cuban refugees to invade their homeland. The first detachment, 32 eager recruits, departed for Guatemala in May, 1960.

They had been told that a training camp would be ready for them. They found only tangled, tropical, snake-infested underbrush. For the first week they lived on corn cakes and rain water. Since the rainy season had just started, there was no shortage of running water.

They had their own camp

out of the jungle on property donated by a wealthy Guatemalan landlord named Roberto Alejos. More camps sprang up as other trainees filtered in. One drawback: many of the camps, situated on Alejos' coffee plantations between the Pan American highway and a railroad to Mexico, were, in view of passing travelers, A revolutionary air force was also recruited and rushed to Guatemala where they had been promised a base would be waiting for them. Instead, they found equipment to build a base and spent the month of August manning tractors instead of planes.

By January, an ambitious young sub-chief named Manuel Artime, had become the CIA's fair-haired boy. He ingratiated himself with Frank Bender, the CIA area chief, through Bender's secretary, Macho Barker. Artime promised to make Barker the Presidente de Delegacion Deportes, sort of a glorified sports czar, in liberated Cuba.

Artime Takes Over

Finally, on Jan. 30, the persuasive Artime staged a coup in the camps. He rallied the men with speeches full of fire and glory. Of the 1500 to 1800 freedom fighters, only 200 balked at making him their leader.

He quickly arrested and isolated these, then did missionary work among them for the remaining weeks. Approximately 80 escaped into the jungle and sneaked across Mexico back to Miami. One by one, the rest rejoined the

ranks except for a stubborn core of 17 who remained in isolation until the invasion was over.

D-day was moved up from May 1 to April 17 because Russian MIGs were reported arriving in Cuba and the May rains might hamper the operation. In the haste, however, the CIA neglected to coordinate the invasion with a planned uprising. Thousands of men, waiting inside Cuba to spring into action, never got the signal.

For some unaccountable reason, the CIA also stopped its propaganda broadcasts to the Cuban people from Swan Island in the Caribbean 15 days before the invasion. It would seem this should have been the time for stirring up the Cuban people. Swan Radio finally went back on the air as the invasion began, and announced where the landing was taking place after the first small party had scarcely hit the beach.

Three ships, packed with radio-jamming equipment, were also waiting in Miami for the big moment. Under secret plan U-40, they were supposed to slip sabotage teams ashore in Cuba to blow up Castro's communication centers in advance of the invasion. Those that couldn't be sabotaged were supposed to be jammed. But on D-Day, they were still tied up at the Miami docks.

For the invasion fleet, the CIA through Charles Mills, a Miami yacht broker, had purchased a couple of motley

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LCIs (landing craft infantry). These were manned by defectors from the Cuban Navy but commanded by hired American merchant officers.

Drunken Heroes

Some of these hired heroes turned out to be drunks. Others were actually anti-Cuban and refused to bunk with the men they were supposed to lead on a crusade to free their homeland. As a result, half the Cuban crew deserted one ship at Vieques, the revolutionary naval base off the tip of Puerto Rico.

The CIA also leased three ships from the Garcia lines. The Rio Escondido, Huston and Atlantic. These carried mixed crews which weren't told until they arrived at the staging area about their dangerous destination.

Then they were given the option of staying with their ships for bonus wages or remaining in custody in Nicaragua until the invasion was over.

For all the CIA's stress on security, no one had bothered to check on the crew members. One radio operator, a Cuban, confessed that he was loyal to Castro. It was decided that the safest course would be to take him along where he could be watched.

But no one was assigned to watch him. Later, at sea, he was discovered in the radio room, sending frantic messages to Havana about the approaching invasion.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Makeshift Armada Invaded Cuba

By Drew Pearson

Careful examination of what went wrong in the Cuban rebel invasion shows that the seeds of disaster had been sown by the Central Intelligence Agency long before the Cuban freedom fighters splashed ashore at the Bay of Pigs.



Pearson

The unbelievable bungling began with the pre-invasion missions last year to smuggle arms and saboteurs into Cuba, the CIA organized a private navy and began recruiting refugee Cuban seamen.

However, the CIA did not seem to trust Cubans with the liberation of their own homeland and hired American merchant officers to command this private navy of ancient ships.

Many of these American mercenaries turned out to be drunks and derelicts. Some even refused to associate with the Cubans whom they were supposed to lead. One skipper, G. C. Julian, insisted upon naming his Cuban freedom vessel the "Barbara J." after his wife.

The American skipper of an LCI (landing craft, infantry) became roaring drunk before he reached a secret rendezvous point less than three miles from a Cuban naval sta-

tion. He was supposed to meet a small boat which approached under cover of the night.

The skipper peered into the darkness, then switched on the flood lights so he could see better. The underground leaders, who were risking their lives in the small boat, took off before they were detected from the shore. But the drunken skipper followed in pursuit, flood lights still blazing and spotlight stabbing the darkness in search of the fleeing boat.

On another night, the same skipper dropped a sabotage team near Santiago de Cuba and waited offshore for it to do its damage. Suddenly the stillness was shattered by gunfire from the shore, and tracer bullets cut patterns in the dark.

The skipper declared that he intended to abandon the saboteurs and get out of there. A Cuban medical officer, Sergio Rodriguez, however, stopped him by holding a gun at his head until the saboteurs had scrambled back on board.

The Invasion Armada

For the invasion, the CIA assembled probably the most motley, makeshift armada that has ever embarked upon conquest. It included three commercial ships—the Rio Escondido, Huston and Atlantic—leased from the Garcia lines in such haste that the crews were never checked for security. At least two members turned out to be loyal Castroites who tried to signal Cuba of the coming invasion.

There was also considerable confusion over who was commanding the invasion fleet. Eduardo Garcia, as boss of the Garcia lines, considered himself in command and made the Rio Escondido the flagship.

But his flagship developed engine trouble before it reached the staging area and could make only four knots. Hence it had to be dispatched toward Cuba four days ahead of the invasion fleet it was supposed to lead.

The Free Cuban navy, which contributed two LCIs and several landing barges to the task force, designated the LCI Blagard as the flagship. This was commanded by an American merchant officer for whose benefit the invasion plan was neatly spelled out in English.

His job as flagship commander was to direct the landing barges by radio. But in the middle of the action, he forgot the battle plan.

A Cuban underwater demolition expert, Eduardo Davaz Bazan, happened to have memorized the plan, was hustled to the skipper's side and prompted him on what orders to issue next.

Thus, the invasion started off with two flagships in command, each giving orders. In addition, several crew members would take orders from only Jesus Blanco, a former Cuban naval officer, who had recruited them.


Unfortunately, the CIA had loaded all the aviation gas, tank shells, and antitank

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


mines aboard the slow-moving Rfo Escondido. Early in the fighting, one of Castro's Sea Fury fighters hurled a bomb into her side, and she went down in flames with all her cargo.

This left the freedom fighters on the beach without the tank shells and the antitank mines so necessary to hold off Castro's tanks. The freedom fighters had managed to capture an air strip near Jaguey Grande as a forward base for their planes. But without aviation gas, the base was useless.

On D-Day, a 168-man commando force, commanded by ~~Nino~~ Diaz, was ordered to make a diversionary landing on the Cuban coast. Diaz was prepared to go ashore in Oriente Province, where he had once fought at Castro's side and where he knew the terrain intimately.

When Diaz opened his sealed orders at sea, however, he found that the CIA wanted him to land at an unfamiliar spot in Camaguey Province, not Oriente. Rather than fight on unknown terrain, he returned disgustedly to his Louisiana camp. Later he learned that 20,000 of Castro's loyal militiamen had been waiting near the site the CIA had selected for him in Camaguey Province.



Kennedy Gloom On Cuba Fading

Shaken by Invasion's Failure, He Takes Profit From the Lesson

By David Wise

WASHINGTON.

"We intend to profit from this lesson," President Kennedy told the nation's newspaper editors as the United States-backed rebel invasion of Cuba sputtered to a tragic conclusion on the Bahia de Cochinos.

Those close to the President say the shape and form of the Cuban lesson he has learned are now discernible.

The lesson falls into two parts. One result is a change in the President's personal approach to problems. The other is a change in governmental machinery.

It is now three weeks since the rebel radio broadcast the cryptic message: "Alert. Alert. Look Well at the Rainbow," that signalled the start of the invasion that failed. Some of the personal gloom that pervaded the President's mood — and the White House — during that week of disaster has now been dispelled.

There was a spring in the President's step last week, and an obviously cheerier Presidential mood, that matched the spring that has come to Washington with a bursting out of dogwood and azaleas.

Was Deeply Shaken

But during the tense days of the invasion, the President was reported deeply shaken by the tragic loss of life on the beachhead. This was brought home to him after his meeting with leaders of the Cuban Revolutionary Council at the White House.

There, he learned that the son of Jose Miro Cardona, council chairman, was among the invading force, and that Manuel Antonio de Varona, another council leader, had a son and brother on the beachhead. The relatives of both leaders were later reported captured by the forces of Premier Fidel Castro.

The personal lesson Mr. Kennedy learned is that even the best advisers can give bad advice.

Henceforth, the word is, he will tend to rely more on his own instincts and common sense, rather than on the experts. The President apparently has come to the conclusion that he listened too much to the C. I. A. and the military men and some staff aides who advised him to go into Cuba, and not enough to

the advisers who counseled against it.

One adviser who spoke up against the invasion was Arthur M. Schlesinger, now a Special Assistant to the President. Mr. Schlesinger is an historian and a professor by trade; possibly his words did not carry as much weight as the military experts who could cite the precise strength, or so they thought, of Castro's Army and Air Force.

Responsible and informed sources in the White House say that the President had grave doubts about the invasion just before it was launched and raised sharp questions about it. In the end, however, the advice of the experts, rather than his own reservations, prevailed, and the President gave the invasion the green light.

In addition to relying more on his own judgment, the President may be expected to consult more with trusted outsiders who are not part of the Administration.

Dissent Encouraged

Also, the Cuban aftermath can be expected to encourage more healthy dissent among members of the White House staff. Some may have been reluctant during the Cuban policy-making to speak up against the judgment of the experts. The President has passed the word among his staff that he wants, and expects, them to express themselves freely.

The second part of the Cuban lesson is more tangible. Mr. Kennedy has ordered a sweeping review of the intelligence gathering apparatus. He has named Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, retired, to head it. But an important member of the panel is the President's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

There is informed speculation that the President would like to place his brother, Robert Kennedy, in as head of C. I. A. However, he has made no decision to do so. Out of all this appraising and review, there could emerge drastic changes in the scope and organization of the intelligence system.

But in the long run, the personal impact of the Cuban episode on the President's thinking may prove the real profit of the lesson of Cuba.

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(NEWSMEN ON CUBA)

COLUMBUS, OHIO--HENRY RAYMONT, WHO HEADED THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL COVERAGE IN CUBA BEFORE THE RECENT INVASION, SAID TODAY HE FELT THE ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE CASTRO REGIME WAS ILL-TIMED. RAYMONT SAID THAT CASTRO'S PRESTIGE HAD BEEN SAGGING AND THERE WAS A FEELING IN HAVANA THAT IF CASTRO'S OPPONENTS HAD WAITED, THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN FERMENT IN THE COUNTRY THAT WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE OVERTHROW OF THE CUBAN DICTATOR.

THE VETERAN NEWSMAN WHO WAS HELD A PRISONER FOR SIX DAYS BY THE CASTRO FORCES DURING THE INVASION SAID THERE WAS A FEELING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD BACKED THE WRONG LEADERS IN THE ILL-FATED INVASION ATTEMPT.

HE SAID THIS HAD CREATED SOME BITTERNESS AMONG THE YOUNG CUBANS WHO WERE WILLING TO FIGHT FOR SOME OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS THAT CAME WITH CASTRO'S RISE TO POWER BUT WHO WANTED THESE REFORMS WITHOUT THE EXTREMES TO WHICH CASTRO HAD GONE.

CASTRO'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON MAY 1 THAT CUBA WAS NOW A SOCIALIST COUNTRY WAS NO SURPRISE, RAYMONT SAID, BECAUSE THE CUBAN LEADER HAD BEEN SAYING FOR SEVERAL MONTHS THAT LENIN'S PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO CUBA. RAYMONT DISCUSSED CUBA WITH THREE OTHER WASHINGTON NEWSMEN ON A LOCAL TELEVISION PROGRAM. THEY WERE WILLIAM THEIS, CHIEF OF THE PUI'S STAFF COVERING THE SENATE; PETER LISAGOR OF THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS WASHINGTON BUREAU; AND CARL DEBLOOM, HEAD OF THE COLUMBUS (OHIO) DISPATCH WASHINGTON BUREAU.

RAYMONT SAID HE THOUGHT THE TIME WAS NEAR FOR COLLECTIVE MEASURES, NOT VIOLENT, BECAUSE THE U.S. CAN WIN IN THIS HEMISPHERE ON ITS IDEOLOGICAL VALUES.

IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE, HE SAID, TO WRITE CASTRO OFF AS A LUNATIC. RAYMONT SAID THAT THE BEARDED CUBAN LEADER HAS INCREDIBLE SKILL IN MANIPULATING PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY IN PRESENTING THE PERSONALITY IN TALKS WITH LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS THAT HE KNOWS THEY LIKE TO SEE IN HIM.

RAYMONT SAID HE HAD SEEN CASTRO TO BE THE PERFECT ACTOR IN PRESENTING HIMSELF TO LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AS THE POOR, AGRARIAN REFORMER BEING CRUELLY OPPRESSED BY THE

THE USE OF U.S. TROOPS IN CUBA DURING THE INVASION WOULD HAVE BACKFIRED, RAYMONT SAID, BECAUSE THE CUBANS' NATIONAL PRIDE WOULD HAVE RISEN TO THE SUPPORT OF CASTRO EVEN BY PEOPLE WHO WERE OPPOSED BY HIM.

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HE ALSO SAID HE HAD "GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN, THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA WILL SUPPORT THE U.S."

HE SAID SUCH SUPPORT WOULD NOT COME AUTOMATICALLY. HE SAID HE FELT THIS COUNTRY NEEDED TO SHOW MORE LEADERSHIP IN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS.

RAYMONT SAID THE RECENT INVASION WAS A SURPRISE TO MOST PEOPLE IN HAVANA WHO HAD FELT THAT THE INVASION TALK WAS MERELY PSYCHOLOGICAL. HE SAID HE WONDERED IF PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD WEIGHED THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION BEING A SUCCESS.

HE SAID THERE WAS A FEELING THAT IF CASTRO HAD BEEN OVERTHROWN BY FORCE WITH THE U.S. TAKING SOME PART IN THE OPERATION, THAT CASTRO'S SUPPORTERS WOULD HAVE MADE IT VERY TOUGH FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

THE NEWSMEN AGREED THAT PERHAPS SOME GOOD HAD COME FROM THE CUBAN FIASCO IN THAT IT HAD AWAKENED CONGRESS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC TO THE IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE PROBLEMS FACED IN THAT AREA.

THEIS SAID THAT A SINCERE EFFORT WAS NOW BEING MADE IN WASHINGTON TO FIND COMPETENT DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THAT AREA.

THEIS SAID THAT ONE BIG QUESTION THIS COUNTRY FACES IS WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AROUND THE WORLD OUTWEIGHS THE RIGHT TO TAKE SOME ACTION WHEN TROUBLE ARISES.

HE SAID THIS COUNTRY SEES THE DANGER IN CASTRO BUT THAT AT THIS POINT, THE MAJORITY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES DO NOT FEEL THE SAME WAY.

LISAGOR SAID THAT THIS COUNTRY HAD MANY COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT PARTIES WOULD ACT IN UNISON, BUT HE FELT THE U.S. SHOULD PERHAPS HAVE SOME ELBOW ROOM IN SUCH ARRANGEMENTS BECAUSE THERE SHOULD BE A TIME WHEN THE U.S. COULD MOVE.

LISAGOR SAID HE FELT THERE WERE PERHAPS PROBLEMS IN LATIN AMERICA OF MORE IMPORTANCE THAN CASTRO, SUCH AS THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WHICH GAVE RISE TO CASTRO.

HE SAID THIS COUNTRY PERHAPS SHOULD GO ON TRYING TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF LATIN AMERICANS AND ISOLATE CUBA MUCH AS ONE DOES A BAD NEIGHBOR ON THE STREET. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IN TIME THIS WOULD HAVE A HEALTHY INFLUENCE ON THE CUBAN SITUATION IN THAT CUBA WOULD SEE THE VALUE OF OUR WAY OF LIFE.

THEIS PREDICTED THAT KENNEDY'S ROLE IN THE INVASION WOULD BE AN ISSUE IN THE 1964 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. HE MADE THE COMMENT IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE WANTING TO KNOW IF KENNEDY HAD SHOT FROM THE HIP IN THE CUBAN SITUATION.

THEIS SAID THAT KENNEDY HAD PICKED UP A PROJECT INITIATED IN THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND HAD ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT. HE SAID THAT IT WAS PRETTY OBVIOUS THAT KENNEDY'S BASIC INFORMATION AS TO THE STATUS OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE WAS NOT GOOD.

DEBLOOM SAID HE FELT THE PEOPLE WERE SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT BUT THAT IT WAS TIME THAT KENNEDY ASSURED THE COUNTRY THAT HE HAD A PROGRAM FOR DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS.

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CORRECTIONS

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Exiles Are Stirring Confusion

By VIRGINIA PREWETT

The anti-Castro Cuban exiles, not willing to depend on possible Organization of American States counter-intervention to topple Castro, are picking themselves up to hit him again—with an underground movement.

And even those U. S. and Latin American anti-Castroites who protested against the recent U. S.-backed invasion say the U. S. should help the new effort.

POWER STRUGGLE

This writer holds no brief for the CIA nor have I ever electioneered for any anti-Castro faction. But the whole question of who rules post-Castro Cuba is involved in planning Castro's overthrow. For months before the invasion, the anti-Castroites privately assailed the CIA, the kindest charges being favoritism and not allowing the leaders to be in direct contact with their undergrounds. Yet many of these complaints obviously arose because of CIA machinery intended to keep any one camp from gaining de facto power in the invasion.

Today we again face the CIA's dilemma: how to knock over Castro without automatically creating his successor. And anti-Castro politics, which today swirl around the merits of CIA planning, cannot be dismissed as squabbles. If is a fight for power in post-Castro Cuba.

Before the freed Cubans can choose their own government, an interim regime must allow a free press to counteract Castro's saturation propaganda and political parties must hold national debates. The plan to invade Cuba and install a handpicked coalition government was meant to guarantee this outcome.

MANEUVER

But the CIA's plan failed—thru lack of sufficient air cover, say men from the beaches. It thus deserves to have its head examined, which task the government has assumed.

If half the published and some unpublished charges indicating the handling of CIA personnel were almost stupid. And those anti-Castro exiles who can be vigorously trying to use the anti-CIA outcry to get into position to become ruler of post-Castro Cuba.

Meanwhile the public opinion stampede over the fiasco is creating popular confusion that would be laughable if it weren't dangerous.

For example, Capt. Manuel Artime, Movement of Revolutionary Recuperation leader (now in Castro's jails) and former regional chief of Castro's Agrarian Reform Institute, is now nationally billed as "right-wing." Sr. "Manolo" Ray, anti-communist leftist leader of the People's Revolutionary Movement is accused of being a far-left sleeper whose underground didn't fight.

Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango, long-time associate of Costa Rica's ex-President Jose Figueres and Venezuela's President Romulo Betancourt, liberals, both, is frontpaged as "rightist."

We're threatened with another Big Shell Game like the one that created Castro in subsequent columns on the anti-Castro Cubans, this writer will try to help this newspaper's readers straighten out their lively ponies.

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Castro Foes Reported Living High in Prison

By Jack Best
Canadian Press Correspondent

H A V A N A, May 8 (AP) — Fidel Castro may be using gentle persuasion rather than harsh treatment on prisoners taken in the Cochinos Bay invasion in an effort to convert them into supporters of his revolution.

Reports in the government-controlled press say about 1000 prisoners are living in comparative luxury at the Sports Palace in Marianao just outside Havana.

(Other accounts of prison treatment, seeping through censorship indicate thousands of Cubans arrested in post-invasion roundups have been jammed into makeshift jails with little food or sanitary facilities. Prisoners seen on television showed no effects of ill treatment.)

With a display of forgiving magnanimity, Castro may be hoping to set the stage for a dramatic announcement that a large part of the captured force has formally renounced its aim of overthrowing Castro's government and now supports his "Socialist" state.

The newspaper El Mundo


already issued a statement saying they received better food and attention in Castro's hands than at their invasion base in Guatemala. Immediately on entering the stadium, El Mundo said, each prisoner received a toothbrush, toothpaste and new clothes—shoes, shorts and shirts. The clothes were looked after by a laundry operated almost exclusively for the captives.

The newspaper gave this account of their day: Up at 7 a. m., wash, dress, do calisthenics and then breakfast. Lunch at 11 a. m., coffee and refreshments at 3 p. m. A "splendid" buffet dinner at 6 p. m. served by the Social Welfare Ministry. At 11 p. m., the prisoners go to bed on "commodious" mattresses.

The prisoners also enjoy complete barbering service and get a daily ration of tobacco, the paper said. Steps are being taken to install television sets so the prisoners may watch programs about the revolution's achievements.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

CIA Erred on Castro Air Power

By Drew Pearson

When the invasion strategy of the Cuban freedom fighters was being planned, The Bay of the Pigs was selected as the landing spot because it was surrounded by a swamp.



Pearson

Three roads penetrated that swamp. However, the strategy was to mine these roads against the advance of Castro's tanks. Then the Cuban rebels could hold out in the swamp and on the beach long enough to rouse the Cuban people to revolt.

The plan, officially labeled "Operation Pluto," was ok'd by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as entirely workable. In fact, they informed President Kennedy that it had a better chance of success than the CIA operation which overthrew the pro-Communist Arbenz regime in Guatemala.

However, success of the plan depended not only on mining the three roads against tanks, but on knocking out Castro's planes.

As reported in an earlier column, all the rebels' aviation gas, tank mines, and anti-tank shells were loaded on the SS Rio Escondido, a slow-moving Liberty ship which developed engine trouble, was able to make only four knots an hour, so was sent on in advance of the other vessels.

Arriving off the Bay of the Pigs, the Escondido was bombed by one of Castro's planes. It suffered almost a direct hit, and all the gasoline, tank mines, and anti-tank shells sank to the bottom of the Bay of the Pigs.

This made it impossible to mine the roads against Castro's tanks, also destroyed the anti-tank shells to combat them.

Castro's Planes

On top of this, Castro's planes swooped down on the beach. These were British Sea Furies and American T-33 jet trainers, previously sold to Batista and inherited by Castro.

This was a surprise. Because Castro's planes were supposed to have been knocked out by a rebel raid over Havana on April 15, the Saturday prior to the invasion on Monday, April 17. The rebels had 18 planes in their Air Force, of which eight participated in this raid. They returned with reports and photographs showing Castro's Air Force destroyed.

This was the worst intelligence error. The CIA which was supposed to know the whereabouts of Castro's entire air force had failed to report that Castro had scattered other planes at various bases around the island.

It was these planes which turned up over the rebel beachhead, sank the Escondido and turned the beach into a booby trap. The freedom fighters had to take to the swamp.

On the second day of fighting, the rebel beach commander, Roberto San Roman, pleaded over his walkie-talkie for American planes.

The U. S. destroyers and airplane carrier standing off shore were mute. They had orders not to intervene.

Finally, early on the morning of April 19, Central Intelligence officers got President Kennedy out of bed and a 3 a. m. meeting was held in the White House.

Some Kennedy advisers

urged that American planes be ordered into battle. It was not an easy decision to make. Just three hours before, at the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson had been the laughing stock of many delegates when he gave the word of President Kennedy that American armed forces were not involved. No one believed him, but what he said was true up to that point. The U. N. debate ended around midnight.

Navy Downed Plane

At the White House conference, three hours later, Kennedy finally ordered American planes into action in a last-minute effort to save the rebels from collapse.

But when Navy planes finally got off their near-by carrier, their only contribution to freedom was to help Castro. They shot down a rebel B-26.

The rebel planes had the same markings as Castro's planes except for a blue streak underneath the wing. The Navy pilot couldn't see beneath the wing, destroyed the rebel B-26.

By this time the battle was over. Kennedy's last-minute orders had been delayed by a snafu of the Navy's radio but probably would have been too late anyway. The United

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States, rebuffed by a 33-year-old bearded rabble-rouser, suffered one of its greatest defeats.

Since that defeat there have been reports that Secretary of State Rusk, together with Under Secretary Bowles and Adlai Stevenson, had vetoed the use of U. S. fighter planes between the April 15 air raid over Havana and the start of the invasion April 17.

The Joint Chiefs did come forward at the last minute with a proposal to use U. S. planes, but the President ruled that they were changing the signals too late, that their original strategy provided for no American participation. He ruled it out. Stevenson was not consulted. Chester Bowles filed a memo opposing the entire operation from the first, but there is no evidence it was given to Kennedy.

Rusk testified behind the closed doors of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he approved the invasion plan. His aides say he did so reluctantly.

After the debacle, the Joint Chiefs of Staff leaked denials that they had given their approval. But their chief, Secretary of Defense McNamara, went out of his way to tell newsmen just the opposite.

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CIA Accused of Imprisoning 17 Cubans for 11 Weeks

The Central Intelligence Agency has been charged with active in the National Revolutionary Front during the imprisoning an anti-Castro Batista regime.

Cuban leader and 16 companions for 11 weeks both before and after the Cuban "invasion" fiasco.

The New York Times, in a story from Miami, identified the Cuban as Rodolfo Nodal Paraga, 27, a lawyer who was

They were flown back to

Miami and released on the following day, he reported.

He attributed the imprisonment to their opposition to Capt. Manuel Artime and other leaders backed by the CIA for the abortive Cuban landings.

The 17 were kept in "subhuman" prison conditions, Nodal declared, accused of being Communists, and subjected to lie detector tests at gunpoint.

The Times said the fact of their imprisonment was well known among Cuban circles in Miami, but full details had not been disclosed previously.

Nodal went to Miami from Cuba last October to work for the democratic revolutionary front and later was sent to Guatemala for training. These are other details of his story.

After he and others in the camp objected to the Cuban leaders in charge, they were put under guard and shuttled from one camp to another. They were questioned constantly.

Some of the prisoners were taken away and others added as they went along. On March 30, Jose Miro Cardona, later named president of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, visited them and promised to have them set free.

When he left, he took with him the first letters they had been able to send their families since their arrest. He also told them he had nothing to do with their arrest.

Finally, a month later, they were flown to Miami in relays and released.

Nodal and his fellow prisoners have organized a new Cuban organization to be known as the 17th of April movement in memory of the Cuban landings.

They have called on Cuban groups to work together for the overthrow of Castro but without the participation of the CIA.

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
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The Washington Daily News

The Evening Star

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Cuban Rebel Survivors Reported U. S. Captives

Believed Held on Vieques Island
Behind Tight Screen of Secrecy A-1

By BEM PRICE

Associated Press Staff Writer

There is reason to believe that the United States is holding survivors of the Cuban invasion forces incommunicado—prisoners, if you will—on a Caribbean island.

And there is evidence that the United States troubles with communism in Central and South America are just beginning.

The first rumor about the United States-held survivors of the invasion, some of whom reportedly are wounded, reached the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay soon after the military effort collapsed.

The grapevine there is so efficient that reports of activities in Havana, 600 miles west, sometimes reach the base before they are broadcast by the Castro regime.

Within hours after the grapevine report reached the base, the Castro captives from the abortive invasion—who were being interrogated in Havana on television—began talking of a particular island, Vieques.

Trained at U. S. Base

They said they had been trained for the invasion at the United States Marine base at Vieques, which is just a 30-minute helicopter ride from San Juan, Puerto Rico.

While the rumor about the Vieques prisoners was seeping into Guantanamo, it was also circulating in San Juan and New York.

A Navy officer talked by radio to the naval station at San Juan, asking if newsmen wanting to check on the rumors could be admitted to Vieques.

The answer was that no one

would be admitted to the base without special permission from Washington.

On the assumption that training bases are normally open to visitors, efforts were made to gain access to Vieques through the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House.

The CIA was noncommittal. A White House spokesman said it would not assist in the matter of entry.

Doctor Held Captive

Presumably the United States wants no one to talk to these survivors until the furor over the Cuban debacle—and the CIA's role in it—has died down.


While the Vieques operation was kept secret, the New York Times has reported the story of Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Sarata, 27-year-old lawyer and member of the anti-Castro invasion forces.

Dr. Nodal said he and 16 other volunteers had been held captive at gunpoint in Guatemala by CIA agents because they refused to serve in the invasion forces under a man they described as a murderer in the regime of Dictator Fulgen-
cio Batista.

One consequence of the inva-

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~~sion, for apparently has been~~
a great upsurge in Communist
activities in Central and South
America.

Early this month a chartered
Cuban airliner landed at King-
ston, Jamaica to refuel. Out-
stepped 35 Communists, in-
cluding two women, who said
they had departed from Recife,
Brazil, for Havana.

They made no bones about
the fact that they were going
to Havana to learn how Fidel
Castro carried Cuba into the
Soviet orbit.

There are reports that Cuban
airliners are flying around the
Caribbean picking up Commu-
nists and depositing them in
Havana.

At a post-Cuban invasion
background briefing, a high
Pentagon official said the
United States could expect more
revolutions and more Castros
south of the border.

Dubious on MIGs

Other reflections in the in-
vasion aftermath.

~~the USS Diamond Head. The~~
Diamond Head brought her
sad story to Guantanamo.

Pipeline to Castro

There are roughly 3,200
Cubans working on the base
and some of them make a
pretty good pipeline to Castro.

Further, any time the Iron
Curtain countries want a good
look at whatever portion of the
United States Fleet happens to
be in Guantanamo, all they
have to do is send a ship in.

The naval base is built
around the outer bay of Guan-
tanamo. There is a Cuban-con-
trolled inner bay and access to
this bay by ships of any nation
is guaranteed by treaty.

In the last month or two, a
couple of Iron Curtain cargo
ships have sailed right down
the middle of the Guantanamo
harbor.

~~ation. jet aircraft in Cuba.~~
The Cubans do have American-
built jet trainers, but they are
incapable of supersonic flight.

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up for shipb
the Navy consisten
the Independence was any-
where about. They did, that is,
until the seagoing airfield
lacked ammunition ship.

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(CUBA)

MIAMI --HAVANA RADIO TONIGHT CALLED PRESIDENT KENNEDY "THE
PIRATE PRESIDENT OF THE 20TH CENTURY" AND WARNED "THE ROCKETS OF
THE SOVIET UNION CAN, WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT, DESTROY
ANY NATION OF THIS HEMISPHERE."

A HAVANA RADIO BROADCAST MONITORED HERE SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS
ORGANIZING "LOCAL WARS" IN LAOS, SOUTH VIETNAM, KOREA, IN THE MIDEAST,
THE CONGO, AND OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS IN CUBA.

"THE IMPERIALISTS ARE ORGANIZING THE THIRD WORLD WAR," THE
BROADCAST SAID, "WITH THE STUPID DREAM THAT HITLER ONCE HAD OF
EXTERMINATING THE INVINCIBLE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALISM, WHICH IS
ADVANCING IN UNSTOPPABLE FORM FROM VICTORY TO VICTORY."

HAVANA RADIO ALSO CLAIMED TODAY ANTI-CASTRO FORCES WERE ARRIVING
IN LARGE NUMBERS AT THE U.S. NAVAL BASE ON THE ISLAND OF VIEQUES
OFF PUERTO RICO.

A BROADCAST HEARD HERE SAID THEIR ARRIVAL "COINCIDES WITH THE
UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITY OBSERVED IN PUERTO RICO FOR THE PAST THREE
DAYS, ESPECIALLY IN THE CITY OF MAYAGUEZ."

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CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Thurs., May 11, 1961

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Tell Of Mystery Intelligence Unit In Cuban Invasion

By Charles Bartlett

Special to The Sun-Times

WASHINGTON — The existence of Operation 40, a high-secret intelligence unit apparently designed to seize control of the Cuban government, came to light in the wake of the failure by the invading army of Cuban exiles.

The fact of this unit, developed and maintained amid

at secrecy in Miami before the invasion,

s led to intense speculation among the

les—that a small core of

Cuban infiltrators planned to seize the

government and establish a dictatorship, possibly under

pt. Manuel Artime, in the wake of victory over Fidel

stro. There is no evidence of CIA involvement in its

ation.

The prospect of a terrorist

ve against the Communists on the island and against any

o might oppose the establishment of an autocratic gov-

ment was suggested by the fact that inductees into the in-

elligence unit were offered in-
struction in killing and torture.

Curious Character.

The discovery of this unit deepened suspicions as to its

ntions have led a number of the liberal Cuban leaders in

United States to fervent expressions of gratitude that the

asion failed. Some reports say that a group of Batista

roughnecks were em-

EXCLUSIVE

ployed by the leaders of Operation 40, Joaquin Sanguinis and Felix Gutierrez, for the purpose of shoring up the hold of a new regime.

The curious character of this group, the resentment which has attended its discovery, and an apparent postinvasion struggle for its control are all signs of the deep political dissent which has hampered the exiles at every stage of their move to oust Castro.

Operation 40 was conducted, according to the testimony of those involved with it, from a highly efficient office in Coral Gables, Fla. Recruits were selected with extreme care and a close scrutiny of their records. They were obliged to assert their anti-Communist position to a lie detector.

In the early phase of their association with Operation 40, the recruits were told that it was a commando outfit, but this guise suffered from the fact that some of the recruits were elderly.

After induction the recruits were taken to a school in a large private home about an hour outside of Miami. The initial lectures dealt mildly with the responsibilities of an intelligence team in the invasion and in the steps that must be taken to uncover the Communists.

The later lectures, which drove a number of the recruits to resign from the unit, were given by a Cuban who talked bluntly of the need for torture and killing, for close searches of civilian women and men,

and for a number of repressive gestures on the island.

This Cuban instructor, whose name is unknown, was shipped to Guatemala before the landing. Those who stayed in the unit reported there was no further emphasis on the harsh steps of which he talked and that the unit, as it embarked for the invasion, had all the aspects of an army intelligence group. The Batistianos reported to be ready to join the unit as the landing neared did not appear.

Went Ashore Early

Some of the Operation 40 personnel went ashore early for reconnaissance but the bulk of the intelligence recruits were destined to follow the combat troops. For this reason a great many of them were saved from death or capture.

Sanguinis has not appeared in Miami since the landings, it is reported, but the man designated by Provisional President Miro Cardona to succeed him, Capt. Ernesto Despaigue, is said to have had a difficult struggle for control of the unit and its files.

There are a number of rumors about the reason for these guerrillalike efforts to keep the intelligence material from coming into his hands, and Despaigue, at last report, had resigned the assignment.

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UPI-- (CUBAN SHIPS)
BALTIMORE, MD.--TWO
INVASION ATTACKERS WERE KILLED IN BALTIMORE TODAY
THE REMAINING SURVIVOR OF A FIVE-SHIP FLEET USED IN
BLOCK HERE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.
IMMIGRATION SERVICE SAID 16 SURVIVORS OF THE
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State Department Blundered in Cuban Crisis

Failure to Brief Congress Could Have Had Serious Consequences

By Rowland Evans Jr.
WASHINGTON.

back before it could be started in earnest.

President Kennedy did his part to consolidate the nation, and a good deal more, in the gloomy aftermath of the Cuba fiasco. He consulted more high-level Republicans than you could shake a stick at, and he stamped out the wild-fire of partisan at-

But the State Department was mesmerized, or something close to it, and couldn't seem to pick itself off the floor on the morning after. It failed utterly and dangerously to do its own job of consulting with Congress.

As a result, the Secretary, Dean Rusk, was required to go before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Latin American affairs, headed by the aggressive Wayne Morse, of Oregon, a man who knows a Senator's right when he sees it. And Allen W. Dulles, of the C. I. A., who would rather not attend meetings of that kind, was likewise compelled to spend several hours with the full Foreign Relations Committee the following day.

As it happened, both Mr. Rusk, the amateur, and Mr. Dulles, the pro, acquitted themselves well, but either might easily have slipped during his long question-and-answer session with the most powerful committee of Congress. And if they had, the Administration might then have come face to face with a full-scale investigation of the kind that the Democrats forced on former President Eisenhower last year when the U-2 fiasco torpedoed the summit conference.



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urgent telegram asking for information.

The first Morse message, a telegram to Secretary Rusk asking for a briefing "in keeping with the spirit of the advice and consent clause" of the Constitution, was not even acknowledged, so far as can be determined. And yet it never should have had to be sent. Mr. Rusk and his lieutenants should have reacted automatically to the automatic need to tell the top men of Congress what was going on. The reaction should have been reflex, not forced by a telegram asking for news of what happened.

Sen. Morse dispatched his first appeal for information on April 24. When no reply came, he sent his second on April 26, this one asking Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles to come up and talk to the subcommittee on April 28. But Mr. Bowles replied that he couldn't make it.

Until that moment, Sen. Morse was punctilious in refraining from anything resembling pressure tactics. He knew that Messrs. Rusk and Bowles had a major crisis on their hands. He did not want to obstruct or confuse or get in the way.

Almost Blew Top

But when he got Mr. Bowles' refusal, he almost blew his top—and for a very interesting reason. He knew that high officials in the Administration, including Mr. Bowles and Chip Bohlen and MacGeorge Bundy and others, had been briefing large numbers of editors in the State Department auditorium on the inside story of Cuba. He also knew that some of his Senate colleagues were seriously embarrassed when they were asked by these same editors to give their assessment of the scene behind the scene—and chairman of the subcommittee had to beg off because they had never been shown a glimpse of Latin-American affairs, until April 26, more than a week later—and then only in response to Sen. Morse's second

the Foreign Relations Committee was angry. The exceptions were the chairman, Sen. Fulbright, who was the only member of Congress let in on the secret of the invasion before it happened; and the Democratic leaders, Sen. Mansfield and Sen. Humphrey, who had gotten the word at their regular legislative breakfast with President Kennedy on April 18.

Under these circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that Sen. Morse made his speech in the Senate condemning the whole enterprise (the first member to raise the issue on the floor of either House). Nor is it surprising that he then demanded the presence of Mr. Dulles.

Most Important

The Cuban affair was the most important event ever to happen within the jurisdiction of the Morse subcommittee. Except for what they picked up in the newspapers, neither the Morse subcommittee nor the full committee had heard a word about it.

A good argument can be made, and often has been, against consulting members of Congress before an undertaking as risky and as clandestine as the Cuban invasion.

What is not accepted, and should not be acceptable in a government that divides its powers among separate branches, is failure to consult after the event, and particularly at a time when every visiting editor, and every enterprising reporter, were getting selected versions of the inside story from the top.

Relationships between the competing power blocs in Washington are sometimes decided irrevocably by errors of no larger dimension than this one, and the result can be mean for the offending party. This time, no damage was done. But, next time, it may be different.

May 14, 1961

OUR SUNDAY VISITOR

To talk of many things

Massacre at Cochinob Bay

DALE FRANCIS

ALL of the experts have solemnly made their autopsies of the tragedy at Cochinob Bay where a valiant group of Cuban Freedom Fighters was slaughtered by Castro's militiamen.

I am amazed at the explanations. They are detailed and diverse. They speak of lack of air support, of slow landing procedures, of too few men, of inadequate armament, of lack of knowledge of the strength of the armament of Castro's forces. Blame is placed on the CIA, the President, on Commander Manuel Artime.



Dale Francis

Yet everyone seems to avoid mentioning the one plain fact for the failure of the invasion, the one thing that turned what might have been a successful attack on Communist power in Cuba into a disastrous defeat for the forces of freedom.

The real explanation is simply that someone informed, someone told Castro exactly when and where the Freedom Fighters were going to land. When they landed they were already surrounded on all sides by Castro's militia. They were simply the victims of informers who set up a terrible trap for them.

There are 50 places where landings could have been made in Cuba. The Castro forces would ordinarily have been forced to disperse their defenses to protect against possible invasion at many points. Had the landings at Cochinob Bay been the surprise they should have been, 1,500 men would have been more than sufficient. Under normal circumstances, Castro would never have had sufficient defenders on hand to stop the initial landings. But knowing exactly when and where the landings were to be made, Castro was able to set up a semi-circle of withering fire that could have destroyed a landing force of 10,000 as easily as it did the force of 1,500.

There were certain disadvantages in the area around Zapata swamp. There is no real natural cover in the area. There are a few hills but nothing like the mountains of central or eastern Cuba to offer refuge for the invading forces. This was, however, a calculated risk the invaders had to take for there were real advantages in this area as a point of invasion.

One of the advantages is the relative inaccessibility of the area. In normal circumstances, Castro could not have been expected to have had any heavy fire power available. The area is not easily reached and had the informers not betrayed them, the Freedom Fighters could have quickly moved northward.

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Cut off junction

And just north of them, just west of the city of Colon, there was the most valuable target area for an invasion in all of Cuba. In this area, only a short 50 miles north, there is the junction point for the only two east-west railroads in Cuba and the only east-west highway. Had the Freedom Fighters reached this point they could have effectively cut Cuba into half.

They didn't reach this point, not because the military strategy was bad but because someone informed on them.

It turns out, too, that probably President Kennedy's statement that the U.S. would not militarily intervene, however well meant it was, simply proved another factor in discouraging the anti-Castro elements in Cuba from risking their necks.

Incidentally, let me say that had the invasion not been betrayed, the statement by President Kennedy would not have harmed the position of the Freedom Fighters at all and even might have helped them, so I am not criticizing the President — I'm just pointing out that when things go wrong other things turn out wrong, too. My personal opinion is that President Kennedy grows in stature all the time, and his willingness to assume responsibility for the failure demonstrates that this man is a man of potential greatness. Since obviously the President wasn't the one who did the informing and it was the informing that caused the defeat, he was not responsible for the tragedy, but his willingness to accept the blame demonstrates we have a real man as our president and for this we can all be thankful.

Dr. Manuel Artime

I have written often of Dr. Manuel Artime and I was shocked at the vituperative attacks on him in Time, Newsweek and some of the daily newspapers. Newsweek called him "an extreme right winger." This is an astonishing designation that leads me to believe that Newsweek's correspondent either knows nothing about Artime's views or else Newsweek is so far to the left that a moderate position seems to the extreme right.

Manuel Artime always made his dislike of anti-Communism evident. He disliked equally the viewpoint that all that needed to be done in Cuba was to eliminate the

two Castros and Che Guevara and all the rest could remain. But he recognized that Cuba could not and should not return to the old system, he wanted to see social inequities eliminated.

Time was equally harsh with Dr. Artime. This magazine referred to him as "opportunistic," which means, I suppose, that he grabbed the reins of leadership. The plain fact is that Dr. Artime was certain to stand out among the members of the revolutionary council. He offered a strong personality, strong convictions and real qualities of leadership and since most of the members of the council possess none of these it was inevitable that Artime should rise to the top.

Time says Manuel Artime is dead — according to Time he was killed while still aboard a ship in the bay before the landing. While I know for a fact this is not so — I learned directly from one of the invaders that Artime reached the beach and was fighting there when last seen.

I talked with one of his closest friends and advisors the day before writing this column. He said he was virtually convinced Manuel was killed. Latest reports say that Artime was captured two weeks after the invasion and is now in the hands of the Castro government.

Ray another Castro

But make no mistake about it, even as they are downgrading Artime the newspapermen are building up Manolo Ray as a potential leader of Cuba. And make no mistake about Manolo Ray, this man differs hardly at all from Castro in his political views. I shudder to think of a struggle in which Cuba and American lives are lost to oust Castro and then to see Castro replaced by Manolo Ray. I would like to warn you to watch closely the propaganda efforts of certain magazines and newspapers to build up Ray to a position of leadership.

What should be done now? Well, Communism must be eradicated in Cuba. This the President has pledged to do and he will do. But there should be the closest investigation of all anti-Castro groups. The identity of the informer or informers must be discovered. I would hope that we had enough sense of security to have limited advance knowledge of the point of invasion and its timing to a small enough number of persons to make investigation possible.



Manuel Artime

I have written often of my absolute certainty that men committed to Communism and Castro had infiltrated the anti-Castro movement. The tragedy of Cochinos Bay is undoubtedly the work of just such traitors.

But let there be no talk of bungling on the part of the CIA — except, as I said before an explanation from the CIA man who forced acceptance of Manolo Ray into the inner council (Life says his name is Stephen Carr). The tragedy of Cochinos Bay was caused first of all by informers who let Castro know in time to reach the area.

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UPI-61

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S SPECIAL EXPERT ON LATIN AMERICA WENT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS WITH A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE TODAY TO EXPLAIN HIS ROLE IN THE RECENT ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT.

ADOLF A. BERLE, ADVISER TO SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK AND HEAD OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA, MET WITH THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA AS CHAIRMAN WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE., RENEWED THE GROUP'S INQUIRY INTO THE CUBAN FIASCO. MORSE, HOWEVER, REJECTED THE IDEA THAT HIS GROUP WAS CONDUCTING A "PROBE" OR "INVESTIGATION." IT WAS MERELY SEEKING INFORMATION THROUGH BRIEFINGS, HE SAID.

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UPI-10

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE TODAY RENEWED ITS INQUIRY INTO THE CUBAN FIASCO BY CALLING A HIGH STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISER TO EXPLAIN HIS ROLE IN THE ILL-FATED INVASION ATTEMPT.

ADOLF A. BERLE, ADVISER TO SECRETARY RUSK AND HEAD OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA, WAS SCHEDULED TO APPEAR AT A CLOSED-DOOR HEARING (10 A.M.).

SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN WAYNE MORSE, D-ORE., SAID LAST NIGHT THE "RUSSIAN MIGS" THAT THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT WAS REPORTED TO HAVE USED TO HELP THWART THE INVASION ACTUALLY WERE U.S. PLANES SENT TO THE OLD BATISTA REGIME.

MORSE SAID HIS FOREIGN RELATIONS GROUP HAD HEARD "NOT A BIT OF EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A SINGLE SOVIET MIG IN CUBA. PREVIOUS WITNESSES INCLUDED RUSK AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES.

ASSISTANT SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, D-MINN., SAID YESTERDAY THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PLAYED A MORE POWERFUL ROLE IN THE INVASION DECISION THAN THE CIA OR ANY OTHER GROUP IN GOVERNMENT. ON THE WHOLE, HE SAID, THE CIA DID "A FAIRLY GOOD JOB."

SEN. JOSEPH S. CLARK, D-PA., SAID THE ORIGINAL INVASION PLAN AS CONCEIVED BY THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION WAS "VERY FOOLISH." HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD IT CALLED FOR U.S. LOGISTICAL HELP AND POSSIBLY AIR SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS.

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UPI-97

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE., SAID TODAY HIS LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE WILL CALL TOP PENTAGON OFFICIALS FOR DETAILED ANSWERS ON THEIR ROLE IN THE ILL-FATED CUBAN REBEL INVASION ATTEMPT.

MORSE SAID HIS GROUP HAS ASKED GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND ASSISTANT DEFENSE SEC. PAUL H. NITZE TO TESTIFY BEHIND CLOSED DOORS IN THE SENATE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE'S INQUIRY INTO THE RECENT FIASCO. NO DATE HAS BEEN SET BUT THE SESSION PROBABLY WILL BE HELD THIS WEEK, MORSE SAID.

THE OREGON DEMOCRAT ALSO SAID THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL CALL TWO AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS, HENRY RAYMONT OF UPI AND TONY LULC OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, ON THE CUBAN SITUATION. NO DATE HAS BEEN SET FOR THAT SESSION EITHER.

MORSE BEAMED THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S INQUIRY TOWARD THE PENTAGON AFTER A TWO AND ONE-HALF HOUR SESSION WITH ADVISER TO SECRETARY RUSK AND HEAD OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA.

THE OREGON DEMOCRAT SAID BERLE ANSWERED MANY OF THE GROUP'S QUESTIONS ABOUT "WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED WITH REGARD TO THE INVASION" TO THE PENTAGON FOR ANSWERS. BERLE TOLD THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT "MANY OF THOSE QUESTIONS COULD HAVE TO BE DIRECTED TO THE PENTAGON WITNESSES."

MORSE SAID THAT BERLE EMPHASIZED THE REPULSED INVASION ATTEMPT, AND THE EFFECTS OF IT.

HE SAID BERLE POINTED OUT THAT IT "WAS NOT THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM." COMMUNISTS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF LATIN AMERICA AND BROUGHT THEM INTO THE OPEN. ALSO, MORSE QUOTED BERLE AS SAYING, "THE SITUATION HAS MADE THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF FIDEL CASTRO HAS BECOME LINKED TO THE COMMUNIST PROBLEM."

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UPI-101

ADD 1 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-97)

BERLE ALSO TOLD THE SENATORS THAT CUBA'S LONG HISTORY OF UPRISINGS AGAINST DICTATORIAL RULERS WOULD NOT SEEM TO SUPPORT THE THEORY OF SOME THAT THE CUBANS WILL BUCKLE UNDER INDEFINITELY TO CASTRO'S PRO-COMMUNIST REGIME.

BERLE ALSO REVIEWED AT LENGTH WITH MORSE'S GROUP THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S FUTURE PLANS FOR CARRYING OUT THE PRESIDENT'S LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM AND FOR DEALING WITH THE CUBAN REFUGEE PROBLEM.

BERLE SAID ONLY THE SESSION WAS A "FULL, FRANK AND FRIENDLY DISCUSSION" OF THE ENTIRE LATIN AMERICAN PROBLEM, INCLUDING CUBA.

SEN. BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, R-IOWA, THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S TOP REPUBLICAN MEMBER, SAID THE SESSION WITH BERLE SHED "NO NEW LIGHT" ON THE SITUATION.

MORSE SAID HE AND BERLE SHARED HIGH HOPES THAT A FORTHCOMING MEETING OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC MINISTERS, POSSIBLY AT MONTEVIDEO IN JULY, MIGHT PROVIDE THE FIRST FORUM FOR CONCERTED HEMISPHERIC ACTION WITH REGARD TO CASTRO.

BESIDES HEARING RAYMONT AND SZULC, MORSE SAID, THE SUBCOMMITTEE MAY ALSO INVITE OTHER CORRESPONDENTS WITH EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA TO GIVE THEIR VIEWS AT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS.

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DORIS FLEESON

Senators Seek Answer on Cuba

Dulles Says Joint Chiefs Approved; So Pentagon Leaders Will Be Queried

Allen Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency director, has assured a Senate subcommittee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the luckless Cuban invasion.

One subcommittee member found the Dulles assertion so incredible he framed an inquiry about the Joint Chiefs' participation in the most direct and plainest terms. Mr. Dulles did not budge. He replied that the Joint Chiefs approved, everybody approved.

The tension was relieved when the skeptical Senator, considered by his colleagues to be pro-Pentagon, threw up his hands and insisted that if that were true the country was really in a fix. Mr. Dulles joined in the laughter.

It was decided to let the Joint Chiefs speak for themselves, so the next important witnesses to face Subcommittee Chairman Morse will be Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Army Chief of Staff, and Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Nitze, whose province is International Security Affairs.

It had been clear for some time following off-the-record

briefings at the State Department and continued inquiry on Capitol Hill that CIA was shifting the weight of the blame for Cuba to the Pentagon. Just how the military participated has not been suggested, but presumably the Army is being charged, rather than the Navy, as at first believed.

Defense sources insist they will be cleared in the end because their approval was made conditional on the accuracy of certain statements made by CIA. Whether anything in the way of proof was put in writing is not known.

One thing that has been established to the satisfaction of Senator Morse is that no Russian MIGs had been used by Premier Castro to defeat the invaders. The subcommittee, he said, has not heard one bit of evidence that the Soviets had sent some of their powerful fighter planes to the Castro government.

The subcommittee has also made it plain to Adolf Berle, head of the State Department's task force on Latin America, that they will be glad when he and his asso-

ciates relinquish their burden to a duly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for the area and an Ambassador to the Organization of American States. The task force, which was brought into the invasion discussions, is viewed by the Senators as a loose administrative device which cannot solve the urgent problems of America's present role in Latin America.

Cuba is scheduled to become an important item on President Kennedy's Canadian agenda. Canada's foreign minister has proposed that Canada mediate between the United States and the Castro government. The President now plans to reply that Canada would be welcome as a member of the OAS where it could work more effectively toward a joint effort to keep communism away from this hemisphere.

The Morse subcommittee does not expect to make a formal report of its Cuban hearings in whole or in part. However, there is nothing to prevent its member from airing their impressions on the Senate floor, and this is considered certain to happen.

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UPI-173

(CUBA)

OTTAWA--THE CANADIAN LABOR CONGRESS TODAY CONDEMNED THE U.S. FOR ITS
ROLE IN THE ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION.
IN A STATEMENT ISSUED AS PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRIME MINISTER
DIEFENBAKER BEGAN TALKS ON CUBA AND OTHER TOPICS, THE 1,100,000-
MEMBER CONGRESS SAID IT COULD NOT "JUSTIFY SUCH ACTION ON THE PART
OF ANY WESTERN STATE."
"THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE CANADIAN LABOR CONGRESS JOINS
REPRESENTATIVES AND RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL
COMMENTATORS IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE IN
CONDEMNING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS ROLE IN
THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO LAND IN CUBA ARMED GROUPS OF EXILES FOR THE
DECLARED PURPOSE OF STARTING A CIVIL WAR," THE CLC SAID.
THE CONGRESS, MAIN SPOKESMAN FOR CANADIAN LABOR, AGREED, HOWEVER,
WITH THE U.S. ASSESSMENT OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. IT ACCUSED THE
CASTRO REGIME OF TURNING A GENUINE REVOLUTION INTO "A RULE OF TERROR
AND SUPPRESSION."

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THE EXILES' STORY

Cuban Invasion Plan Altered, Leaders Say

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

There are two ways of looking at the Cuban invasion fiasco of April 17—through the eyes of Washington and through the eyes of the Cuban participants. The Washington view—or at least a murky version of it—

First of Four Articles
has been put before the public in a semi-secret briefings by officials. Informal comment by members of Congress and a great mass of journalistic speculation. It adds up to this: The Kennedy administration, pressed by circumstances and poorly advised, sponsored and gave limited support to a disastrously unsuccessful attempt to invade or infiltrate Castro Cuba.

But the details of the attempt to unseat Cuba's pro-Communist regime are still far from clear. To help round out the picture, The Star has obtained a new anti-Castro Cuban leaders' view of the invasion and the events leading up to it. This was done by interviewing most of those leaders and many of their followers in their headquarters of operation—New York, Miami and Washington. Many points in their story, which will be presented in this and three succeeding articles, are impossible to check with other sources. And at the outset it should be noted that there is a danger that they may have distorted or exaggerated for personal or political purposes.

CIA Declines Comment

The Star asked the Central Intelligence Agency, principal target of the exiles' criticism, for comment on the assertions of the Cuban exiles. A CIA spokesman, after reviewing the material, said that organization. It should maintain its traditional policy of declining to comment publicly on criticism of CIA operations.

Two main points stand out in the Cuban version of the April adventure.

First, Cuban leaders declare that the landing on April 17

was contrary to their agreed-upon strategy, which was that any such step must be synchronized with extensive operations by anti-Castro forces inside Cuba.

Second, they say that certain Americans—who they believe to have been representatives of the CIA—took over their movement so completely that when the invasion occurred many of the Cuban leaders in whose name it was being carried out didn't even know about it.

Differed on Strategy

A key element in the Cuban side of the invasion story is the fact that there had been a long-standing difference of opinion on strategy among the Cuban exiles. One theory was that a "one-shot" invasion would catalyze popular discontent in Cuba and bring about a powerful move to overthrow Fidel Castro. The other was that emphasis should be on an internal revolt directed by an underground organization capable of holding together the anti-Castro factions in a long, hard fight.

Before any effective move by Cubans in this country could occur, these two points of view had to be compromised. And, say the Cubans, those whom they believed to be representatives of the CIA acted as the "marriage broker."

Form Council

The device by which the dissident exile groups were brought together was the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which was formed on March 20 with Jose Miro Cardona as its head.

It joined the Democratic Revolutionary Front, headed by Manuel Antonio de Varona, and the People's Revolutionary Movement, headed by Manuel Antonio Ray, who had once been Castro's Minister of Public Works.

Mr. Varona was actually "coordinator" of five different groups loosely united in the "Frente," as it was called. By and large, the Cubans he represented favored the invasion approach.

Many of the Cubans assert that the "Frente" was the organization most favored by what they considered to be the CIA and that its chief liaison

with American intelligence agents on military matters was Capt. Manuel Artime, a young former Castro lieutenant.

Favored Internal Revolt

Manolo Ray and his MRP favored the slower, "internal revolt" approach. This organization reportedly had a large

underground operation in Cuba, and Mr. Ray himself had been using tactics employed when he led clandestine civil resistance for Castro in the Cuban cities. The MRP was drawn into the Council, the Cuban sources say, by a desire to get a share of the American guns, ammunition and other supplies that had been going to the Frente.

The courtship preceding the marriage of the two groups was protracted and complex. The main problem was settling on a strategy of revolt, but there also were deep political differences as to what should happen after the overthrow of the Castro regime.

Mr. Ray and his chief lieutenants—Paul Chibas and Philippe Pazos—set a high price on their participation. They were not opposed to outside invasion training camps or to invasion of the island as such. But they insisted that the whole emphasis on the training camps be changed and that the neglect of opposition forces inside Cuba cease.

Reach Agreement

They won the battle—or thought they did. At the final negotiations on the Revolutionary Council at the Congress Inn Motel in Miami on March 20-21, the Varona and Ray groups reached a three-point agreement:

1. Top priority in the anti-Castro struggle should be assigned to help for the rebel forces inside Cuba.
2. Former supporters of Gen. Batista, the Cuban dictator ousted by Castro in 1959, should be eliminated from the training camps.
3. Command of the rebel forces outside Cuba should be put exclusively into the hands of the Council.

The Cubans now say that the second and third points reflected growing concern about both exile groups that control of the rebel movement had been slipping from their control and into the control of the men they believed to be CIA agents.

Mr. Miro Cardona, who had been Fidel Castro's first premier, was charged with carrying out the agreement. He was also given authority to appoint six other members to the new Council, forming a kind of cabinet in exile. In the following days, both he and Mr. Varona toured the training camps and investigated their management.

It is significant that every public pronouncement of the Council—including a "call to arms" issued by Mr. Miro Cardona on April 8—emphasized internal revolt in Cuba. At the press conference that day, and even after rebel planes had bombed air fields in Cuba a week later, both Mr. Miro Cardona and Mr. Varona scoffed at talk of an invasion.

Order for Underground

Mr. Ray, meanwhile, believed he had received a mandate to organize the underground for a final, internal push against Castro. Several days following the "call to arms," he was named Council member in charge of "interior operations."

Mr. Ray admits that he expected an invasion to take place—but not of the type or at the time of the April 17 landings. Reportedly, he understood there were to be large diversionary landings at several different places over a period of days and that they were to be backed up by a co-ordinated campaign of sabotage and guerilla warfare by internal

- The Washington Post and Times Herald
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New York Herald Tribune
New York Journal-American
New York Mirror
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JOSE MIRO CARDONA



MANUEL ANTONIO
DE VARONA



MANUEL ANTONIO RAY

—AP Wirephotos

forces all over the island. This, of course, did not occur.

On April 12, Mr. Ray and two aides actually set out for Cuba to rally the underground after long talks at Council headquarters in New York. But their boat got stuck in the mud of Miami Bay and they had to turn back. Before they could leave again Mr. Ray was summoned to an urgent, secret Council meeting in New York on April 16, just one day before the landings.

That April 16 meeting is important in the story because the Cubans insist that not one

of the Council members took part was told what would happen the next day.

Mr. Varona was busy in Havana and couldn't attend the meeting, but he maintains he, too, did not know the details or the timing of the invasion "until shortly after it had begun"—even though he had been designated the Council's "defense co-ordinator" in charge of military planning.

Capt. Artime, who turned up as head of the rebel invaders (and who was captured by Castro forces in the swamps around Cochinos Bay), was absent—attending to his duties in the training camps it was said—at the time of the April 16 meeting.

Feel They Were Duped

In retrospect, there is a feeling among many of the Cubans that they were duped. And they blame the CIA for the duping.

They say they suspect Capt. Artime had been selected to play a role similar to that of Castillo Armas, who, with American backing, took Guatemala from the Arbenz government and the Communists in 1954.

They can't find much of a "collective leadership" ring to an Artime declaration broadcast from a patrol boat off the South Cuban coast on the day of the invasion: "I, Manuel Artime, convoke the Cuban people to revolt in fulfillment of my promise of a year ago."

They feel, in fact, that their Council was used simply as a "cover" by the Americans who ostensibly were helping them. And, again, they say they are convinced that these Americans had official status as representatives of the CIA.

(Tomorrow: The Cubans' version of the CIA's role.)

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In a "confidential memorandum" explaining his decision, Mr. Sanchez Arango charged "our allies" with manipulating the exile movement for their own ends. American agents, he said, were establishing a corrupt "bureaucracy in exile." He charged the agents had set up their own radio station on Swan Island in the Caribbean and were insisting that all communications with the underground in Cuba go through their channels.

Mr. Sanchez Arango has since joined another exile group.

Difficulties With Underground

It is now clear that the Americans had difficulties in dealing with underground groups in Cuba. There had been a gradual breakdown in actual and ideological contact between these groups and the exiles in this country. Some of the political ideas of the underground leaders, while mild in the context of what Castro was doing to turn Cuba into a Communist stronghold, seemed dangerously "radical" to many of the exiles here.

The underground groups were basically opposed to Castro's Communist connections, not to his radical reforms. It was after he imprisoned Maj. Hubert Matos — one of his most popular subordinates — in October, 1959, for anti-communism, that several members of his government turned against him and went underground.

Castro Defectors Unite

Manuel Ray, who had been Minister of Public Works and earlier the head of Castro's "civil resistance" against Batista, was one of those who went underground, forming the People's Revolutionary Movement (MRP) with other defecting leaders of the Castro "26th of July" movement.

The MRP was convinced that subversion and sabotage, directed from inside Cuba, were the key to the overthrow of Castro. What they wanted from the United States was military materiel — not money, men or exile organizations.

Mr. Ray and several of his top assistants came to the United States last November to seek such help. They say they were met with suspicion by the American agents and received many promises but little actual aid.

They insist the reason for the coolness was political. They feel they were too closely identified with the radical economic and social reforms Mr. Castro instituted during his first months in office. There were conservative exiles in Florida who charged that Mr. Ray offered "Fidelismo without Fidel."

Agents Not Informed

Throughout the Cuban version of the pre-invasion story, there runs a theme: That the American agents they worked with were trained specialists in undercover activities but had little or no knowledge of the politics and geography of Cuba.

They say that while Americans were busily training exile units in Guatemala they were persistently refusing to send large-scale aid to the guerilla fighters in the Escambray

mountains. The Americans, the Cubans assert, seemed to have been afraid that the whole Escambray operation was a Castro hoax. When they did sponsor several last-minute parachute drops, the equipment fell into the hands of Castro troops.

It is also asserted that when Nino Diaz, a former Castro officer, was dropped into the Sierra Maestra mountains in November to work with the guerillas, his kit contained equipment not designed for the mission or the terrain.

Call Bender Domineering

The Cuban leaders criticize the fact that Mr. Bender did not speak Spanish. He spoke English with a foreign accent, they say—German or Slavic. He was, they declare, domineering—giving orders rather than advice. He reportedly told some of his Cuban contacts that he had helped organize the French underground behind German lines during World War II, others that he had been operating in the Laotian jungles before the Cuban operation.

The Cubans who were most discontented about their relationship with their American "allies" say now that they saw indications of better days ahead soon after the Kennedy administration took over.

One of the first results of a re-examination of Cuban policy by the incoming administration seems to have been a drive to bring together the various anti-Castro groups in exile.

Outlook Brightens

Members of the Ray MRP movement say their fortunes seemed to rise rapidly after the end of January. They feel they gained indirect support from three key Washington advisers on Latin America—Adolf Berle, head of the new President's task force on Latin America; Arthur Schlesinger, a White House assistant, and Phillip Bonsal, who had been in contact with Manuel Ray and other former Castro leaders when he was American Ambassador in Havana in 1959-60.

All three of these policy advisers believed strongly that Fidel Castro headed and later betrayed a genuine social and economic revolution. This position lends itself to the view that Manuel Ray and "radical" opposition within Cuba offered more hope for popular Cuban support against Fidel Castro than did conservative exile forces organized, trained and financed from the outside.

Cuban leaders feel this sentiment led to a concentrated CIA effort to wed the MRP and the Frente into a common political organization.

Cubans Balk

The first American move in that direction seems to have come around February 24 during an informal gathering between Mr. Ray of the MRP and Mr. Varona of the Frente and their associates in Washington. Mr. Bender attended and, the Cubans say, presented a list of 26 names to each group separately, suggesting that they pick a council of 10 to represent them.

This the Cubans refused to do. They say they resented this attempt to restrict their choice of leaders. They assert that at least 10 of the men on the Bender list were former Cuban millionaires, including Julio Lobo—a one-time sugar czar.

Nevertheless, the negotiations continued. Meetings between three leaders of the Frente and three from the MRP took place behind closed doors at the Commodore Hotel in New York from February 28 to March 3. No Americans were present.

After four days of nearly continuous exchanges, the representatives agreed on the general outlines and program of a common revolutionary council. But they still could not agree on a military program.

The Americans appear to have come back into the picture about March 19—this time in Miami. A "Mr. Carr"—previously unknown, at least to MRP leaders—summoned the two groups to a night meeting at the Congress Inn Motel near the airport.

Nevertheless, unity negotiations continued, primarily in New York between February 28 and March 3. While agreement on broad outlines of a common revolutionary council apparently was reached, the conferees were unsuccessful in picking a leader.

Then, around March 19, according to the Cubans, a "Mr. Carr" called unity negotiators to a meeting in Miami. Mr. Carr, previously unknown to the exiles, also is believed by them to have been a CIA representative.

Participants say Mr. Carr was extremely polite and quite diplomatic. To the MRP this new approach and the disappearance of the irritating Mr. Bender seemed to signal a new American approach. Mr. Carr asked only that the two groups agree on a "provisional president" within 48 hours. He did not suggest any names.

Choose Leaders

Within 24 hours the MRP had decided to name Jose Miro Cardona, who had been Cuba's first Premier under Mr. Castro, their leader. The Frente representatives agreed, and the unity of the two groups was established in the early hours of March 21.

All the principals seemed sat-

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isfied. The MRP had exacted a secret agreement to revamp the training camps and begin large-scale military aid to their Cuban underground.

The Frente retained main leadership of the whole exile movement through the majority of appointments Mr. Miro Cardona later made to the seven-man Revolutionary Council.

And in both these groups' view, the CIA had achieved the unity of the main anti-Castro movement so urgently required by Washington.

Military preparations in the training camps do not seem to have changed substantially in the following weeks. In fact, Cuban leaders claim they were intensified. And the invasion went forward less than a month later.

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THE EXILES' STORY

Cubans Complain U. S. 'Took Control'

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

A mysterious "Mr. Bender" figures large in the political maneuvering and military preparation preceding the abortive April 17 "invasion" of Cuba by anti-Castro exiles.

Cuban exile leaders say Mr. Bender identified himself as an American businessman who wanted to help them unseat Fidel Castro. They also say they soon became convinced that he, and Americans working with him, actually represented the Central Intelligence Agency—and, therefore, the United States Government.

Bender Offers Help

Interviews with the Cubans, who are admittedly bitter over handling of the invasion and its dismal failure, uncover a profound resentment against Mr. Bender in particular and the CIA in general.

It is possible—even likely—that the bitterness colors their comments and even their recollection. But, rightly or wrongly, they feel that the Americans were out to take control of their movement and, in fact, did hold all the strings by the time the invasion occurred.

The Cubans say Mr. Bender

entered the picture last June when he approached leaders of the newly formed Democratic Revolutionary Front—the "Frente," as it became known—in New York. He told them, they say, that he and a group of colleagues wanted to help organize and finance their anti-Castro operations.

The Cubans say they agreed. The more bitter ones now claim that this informal partnership ended with the Americans in behind-the-scenes control.

The Cubans also report that Mr. Bender and his aides maintained they had only a vague "semi-official" status. They certainly never identified themselves as CIA agents, and the Cubans admit they have no proof they were.

But during months of close association, they say, the Americans spoke and acted with such authority that none of the Cuban principals doubt they were intelligence agents with official status.

No official American comment has confirmed the identity of Mr. Bender and his aides. High officials have admitted in "background briefings," however, that the CIA was involved in the early stages of the revolutionary movement. Reporters attended these briefings with the understanding

See CUBA, Page A-6

that their sources of information were not to be revealed.

From the beginning the alliance between the Cubans and Mr. Bender and his people was an uneasy one.

On the Cuban side, rival factions jockeyed for favored treatment in the way of money and arms. At the same time they resented the way the Americans moved in to settle their factional disputes. Leaders say they were never quite sure of over-all American strategy, mainly because the Americans seemed to separate political and military operations among the exiles. They feared control of their affairs was slipping out of their hands.

On the other side, the Americans seem to have been plagued by a dilemma: How to weld the exiles into a strong, unified anti-Castro movement which would gain maximum support and yet be politically reliable from the American point of view.

Mr. Bender quickly began to take an active interest in Frente affairs; the Cubans relate. And in late September, after an unsuccessful attempt to de-Americanize the movement by setting up headquarters in Mexico City, he and two colleagues met near Miami with the directors of the five groups which made up the Frente. The purpose: To name a president or "co-ordinator" for the Frente. Up to that time, each director had an equal voice in a collective leadership.

Wanted Co-ordinator

Cubans who participated in that meeting say the American agents argued that the collective arrangement was leading to anarchy. They urged a co-ordinator who could work with the Americans in a decisive way. One participant said that under the new arrangement, the directors were to meet once or twice a month to frame "general policy."

At a September 27 meeting, the Frente directors agreed to the idea and named Manuel Antonio de Varona, a former political leader in Cuba and one of the Frente directors, as co-ordinator.

The choice was clearly not unanimous. Immediately after the Varona selection, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, leader of the "Triple A" party in Cuba, resigned as a Frente director.

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UPI-19

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. WAYNE L. MORSE, D-ORE., SAID TODAY HE WAS DETERMINED TO FIND OUT WHAT ROLE THE U.S. MILITARY PLAYED IN THE ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT AND WHO ORDERED IT. MORSE MADE THE STATEMENT AS HIS FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE PREPARED TO QUESTION (10 A.M.) GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ABOUT THE PENTAGON'S ROLE AND HOW CLOSELY IT WORKED WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. "WE WANT TO KNOW WHAT THE EXTENT OF MILITARY PARTICIPATION WAS IN THE VENTURE -- AND WHY," MORSE TOLD NEWSMEN.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

CIA Covers Its Cuban Tracks

By Drew Pearson

Central Intelligence agents have been moving swiftly and discreetly to destroy tangible clues linking them to the Cuban invasion.

They appear worried sick over a Senate investigation.

CIA agents first moved to get hold of the invasion records in the hands of the Cuban Provisional Government so they could not be subpoenaed by Sen. Wayne Morse of Oregon, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs.



Pearson

Second, the CIA has taken two ships, the Blagard and the Barbara J., purchased for the invasion, and stripped them of all telltale signs that they were engaged in the invasion. So anxious were CIA agents to destroy any incriminating evidence, that they even removed standard signaling equipment. Another vessel, the Santa Anna, which the CIA rented for use by the Nino Diez Cuban group, has been sent to the West Coast, while a fourth ship, the Atlantic, has pulled into Baltimore.

In each case, all incriminating equipment has been re-

moved. If the CIA had been as thorough in organizing the invasion as it was in covering up evidence of the invasion, Castro might be out of Cuba today.

Note: The CIA doesn't really have to worry about a Senate probe. Too many solons, like Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, don't want to delve into these mistakes.

Adlai-JFK Rift

A smouldering rift inside the Kennedy Administration between the President and his No. 1 diplomat, Adlai Stevenson, has now been patched up. For a time Stevenson was considering resigning.

The rift occurred over Cuba, and the fact that neither the State Department nor the White House let Stevenson in on the secret that American CIA forces were behind the invasion and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had OK'd the battle plans.

When Stevenson went before the United Nations on the night of April 18, therefore, to assure delegates that the United States Government had nothing to do with the rebel drive, he was made to look like either a liar or a fool. With a ring of conviction in his voice, he proclaimed to the U. N. that his government knew nothing about the landing at the Bay of Pigs, that Washington was keeping hands absolutely off.

Many delegates snickered. They were better informed than the chief American delegate.

When the full facts later leaked out and it became known that the United States had backed almost every step of the invasion, Stevenson felt that his usefulness in New York had ended. His future statements before the U. N., he felt, would carry no weight. He seriously considered handing in his resignation.

Because some newspapers had predicted, last January, that Stevenson would be the first to leave the Kennedy Administration, he hesitated. Finally he came to Washington for a talk with Mr. Kennedy and the two have now patched things up. Stevenson will be kept fully informed in the future.

Sit-In for Johnson

Serving as Vice President of the United States may be glamorous, but doing its No. 1 duty, presiding over the Senate, is a bore. As a result, the job constantly goes begging. And while Vice President Johnson has been touring the Far East, freshman Senators have been drafted as sit-ins on the Senate rostrum.

Even they, however, sometimes balk. One of these was Sen. Lee Metcalf, Montana Democrat, who recently found himself stuck in the chair for

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five hours while he tried vainly to draft another freshman to replace him.

Customary procedure is to dispatch a note to a likely substitute. But Metcalf could find no fellow freshmen on the floor. They ducked out immediately after each vote. Nor was Metcalf able to induce any older Senator to take over.

"Lee, this is one of the crosses a new man has to bear," Sen. Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota told Metcalf when he tried to draft McCarthy.

"But, Gene, the mail is stacked so high in my office I can hardly see over it," pleaded Metcalf. "I can't sign it here on the floor."
"True, true," agreed McCarthy, walking off with a sympathetic smile. "I once went through the same thing myself."

Note: Sen. Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota had a sure-fire method of beating the system when he was a freshman. When he grew tired of presiding he sent urgent notes to other newly elected colleagues, saying that he wanted to go to "the washroom." This worked well until one day Humphrey looked around. Only freshman colleague on the floor was Sen. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.

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THE EXILES' STORY

Secrecy of Invasion Tightest in Training

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

The military training camps for exile units were the most secretive part of the whole Cuban rebel operation, even though their existence was well known before the April 17 invasion.

The reasons for secrecy were clear: In this country they were a violation of American

Third of Four Articles

neutrality laws. Elsewhere in the hemisphere they violated firm inter-American treaties against intervention in internal affairs of neighbors.

Little about their activity, organization or location could ever be officially confirmed. This led to exaggerated claims which only the invasion fiasco itself could explode.

One such claim was that upwards of 5,000 men were being trained in camps. But 1,300-odd men were later found in the camps. Cuban leaders admit this was of the rebel force.

Total Set at 2,0

While it is doubtful one Cuban knows the total distributed in the camps, the estimate now is 2,000 men were not included in the invasion.

At whether actually reached at military camps in this count. The Cuban consensus is no. They claim that any rebel group with money included former followers of Batista.

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The Training Story

In the weeks following the invasion, recruits who did not participate have trickled back to Miami. Here is the story they tell of their recruitment and training:

in recruiting offices were in Miami. The largest and best was that of the Dem-

ocratic Revolutionary Front, the Frente.

Enlistment was relatively simple. The recruit gave his name in the office, had a physical examination by a Cuban doctor, and received cards entitling him to blood tests, x-rays and identity photographs from American authorities.

Next he went through a security check consisting of a questionnaire on political affiliations. In the later phases of the operation, this whole process took about two days. Before induction the recruit had to take an oath to defend democracy.

Flown to Camps

From Miami the trainees were taken by station wagon in small groups to farms in the surrounding area to await air transport to Guatemala.

When transport became available they were flown to the camps.

reached along a ragged path with sentries at both ends. The about 600 feet perched on the side of a mountain. If the invasion after the invasion began a batch of about 150 Cubans arrived at this camp. They found it deserted, save for 10 American and 18 Cuban instructors, and about 20 Guatemalan civilian employees.

backdrop.

Invasion

after the invasion began a batch of about 150 Cubans arrived at this camp. They found it deserted, save for 10 American and 18 Cuban instructors, and about 20 Guatemalan civilian employees.

The head of the camp at that time was Martinez Arbona, an ex-army officer from Cuba. At a general meeting he told the newcomers they would be given a "short but intensive" training course for seven days.

After that they would relieve the Cuban bridgehead.

That promise was never kept, although formal training began. American instructors, some with nicknames like "Sam" and "Texas" and others of foreign extraction taught the Cubans to prepare explosives, to give first aid, and to assemble and shoot M-1, Browning and M-3 rifles.

The Cuban instructors many of them angry about being left behind—taught military drill and translated instructions for the Americans.

They Return

Living conditions were primitive. There was one shower for 150 men. They lived in rude shack-barracks.

All heart went out of the "intensive" training when news arrived about the defeat of the invasion.

Arbona called a meeting and explained they must continue the "struggle against communism." But he did not say how. A deluge of questions began. Who was in command of the invasion? What was the representative of the Cuban Revolutionary Council? When and where would they leave? The committee gave no answers.

Participants say they were well stocked with food and clothing. They were given a small amount of money to buy necessities. They were given a small amount of money to buy necessities.

Two of the new contingents arrived at the camp and were completely evacuated. The men returned to Miami along the same route they had come.

officers opposing his rule quietly removed from authority. The chief complaint about that rule was its political shortsightedness. Former officers in the Batista army, hated for their brutality, found their way into positions of authority. Their military experience was considered more important than their political handicap.

"When we arrived at the camp, all those with previous military experience were asked to take one step forward," explained one returnee. "Naturally the Batista soldiers stepped out. That was it. From then on they became our officers."

The result was low morale in the camps. The men felt they were volunteers, not conscripts, and had a right to oppose the politics of officers they had not chosen.

In Guatemala

Over 300 men are said to have reached a pro-Communist test. They said they would resist. Several days later the 17 "ringleaders" under Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa were arrested one by one after separate interviews in American headquarters of the camp.

Thereafter until the invasion was over they are said to have been kept under American and Guatemala guard in the wilds of the jungle of North Guatemala. Men who later returned on the same plane came out looking with matted hair and shoulders. The camps deserted. They straggled to the Guatemala border.

A secret agreement stipulated that Batistianos be eliminated from the camps and all military operations be brought to a halt.

The Training Story

Under control. The camp was never visited by exile leaders.

Labels captured in the swamps. The Bay were a Batista aide and torture and, Capt. San Roman, a Batista officer who exiles claim fought against the Castro revolutionaries in the Sierra Maestra before 1959.

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Caribbean Odyssey

Death Rides Survivors' Boat— 10 of 22 Cuban Heroes Perish

By JOHN O'ROURKE

Editor, Washington Daily News
A Scripps-Howard Newspaper

This is the story of 22 men who went to sea in a boat—a little 19-foot boat with a broken engine.

Only those who were shooting at them saw them go. But, in a very real sense, the whole world was watching them.

Then, so far as they were concerned, the whole world seemed to turn its head away.

For 17 days they never saw a plane.

By that time 10 of them had died of hunger, thirst, sun, wind and exhaustion. They need not have died, if only an air patrol or a sea search had discovered them in time.

The 12 who survived assume there was some sort of search. They don't know how far-ranging it was. And officials who know won't say if there was one, or how far it went. The United States Navy won't say. The Defense Department won't say.

It was only luck that the sea did not get them all, but on the 17th day, there was deliverance. A freighter, the Atlantic Seaman headed slowly toward them. By that time they had floated 1000 miles.

They lay in the bottom of their little boat, their throats split from thirst and their bodies bleeding from the sun. Fourteen starving men almost too weak to move.

Only an hour before the American Seaman's watch had seen them; Ernesto Hernandez Cossio had died, and his body was still in the boat. It was hard to tell the dead from the living. Actually, two more died aboard the freighter after they were "saved." That left 12.


The American Seaman put the dozen derelicts ashore in New Orleans last Thursday, and seven of them are still convalescing there.

Since then some of the men have gone to Miami. Their saga has been told in the Spanish-language paper published there, the Diario de las Americas.

Their bitter adventure started April 17, when the Cuban freedom force hit the mangrove swamps at the Bay of

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Pigs, under air attack and artillery fire.

The man who had been signed to be judge advocate general in the headquarters company when the beachhead had been secured, was Jose Enrique Dauza, 37, called The Old Man by his friends. He is a former labor lawyer. During the 15-day ordeal at sea he lost 70 pounds and his face is scarred from the burns of sun, salt and wind.

His group was outflanked, he says, on the third day of the fight (April 19) when Castro landed troops and 30 Russian tanks from the sea. A U.S.-built Sea Fury plane was spotter for the Communist artillery, and its shots were good.

* * *

ug foxholes and survived three days," says a, "but then we ran out of ammunition.

"We stood up in the knee-deep water and saw the fishing boat, lying idle in the bay. Twenty-two of us took off our uniforms and waded out. We made it, swimming about 100 yards. It was the Celia.

By way out, two shells hit me, and I could feel like electricity in my legs and body.

"There was an engine aboard the Celia, but it wouldn't start, so we hoisted sail and made for open water. The Russian tanks kept firing at us and two destroyers, not far away.

"We thought they were U.S. destroyers, which would pick us up after we left Cuban water. But they didn't. They turned out to sea when the tank guns began firing at them. We never saw them again.

"Only Vicente Garcia Rosales knew anything about sailing. We called him Uncle because he was 42. We owe our lives to Vicente; he taught us to sail our boat.

"We ran into a bank but didn't hurt the boat, and storms struck so that we had to lower sail and drift. But we had a compass and the first day we went southward. The second day we went south-westward, and by the fourth day were sailing westward."

* * *

Then men hoped to reach Guatemala or Yucatan. "We found a pail with three

fingers of water in it. We rationed that. We found some potatoes, crude rice and onions, too. We rationed it all, and ate it raw. We dipped the rice into the sea and ate that way, soaked with salt water.

"On the fifth day, and the sixth day, we caught two fish and ate them raw. That was the last time we were to eat."

Mr. Garcia Rosales, who taught them a little how to sail, was first to die of hunger, thirst and exposure, exhausted by his vigil at the tiller.

Second was Julio Cabellero, who died in the arms of his cousin, Armando Caballero, one of the survivors.

Third to die was Raul Menocal Jr., whose father was once mayor of Havana and minister of economy under President Carlos Prío Socarras.

Mr. Dauza made funeral orations for the first three, telling his companions to honor their dead comrades by maintaining discipline and by keeping firm their hope of survival.

But after three had died, there were no more funeral services; they just dropped their comrades' bodies overboard. The fourth to die, with no formalities, was Jose Garcia Montes, former Cuban ambassador to Japan.

* * *

Ruben Vera Ortiz' mind was wandering before he perished, monotonously begging for a soft drink.

As a matter of fact, says Mr. Dauza, they all were delirious before death.

After the survivors were taken aboard the freighter, Mr. Dauza ordered the Celia sunk.

"Then I ate 16 oranges," he said, "and tried to sleep."

"Asked what he was going to do now, Mr. Dauza said: 'We are going to work to overthrow Castro.'"

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(CUBAN SHIP)

MIAMI -- PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO TOLD CAUBANS TODAY THAT A NAVY PATROL CRAFT WHICH DISAPPEARED MAY 6 WITH 17 PERSONS AFTER STRIKING AN UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT 10 MILES OFF CUBA'S NORTHERN COAST COULD HAVE BEEN SUNK "BY SOME SUBMARINE OF THE (U.S.) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY."

CASTRO DISCLOSED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT PERSONNEL ABOARD THE PATROL CRAFT, IDENTIFIED AS THE R-43, AN OBSOLETE FORMER U.S. NAVY PT-BOAT, INCLUDED THE HEAD OF THE CUBAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, A CUBAN NAVY SQUADRON LEADER "AND VALUED REVOLUTIONARIES."

HE SAID "IT IS OUR DEDUCTION, ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO PRESENT CONCLUSIVE PROOF, THAT THE SHIP WAS SUNK BY A TORPEDO FIRED POSSIBLY FROM A SUBMARINE ... OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SHIP WAS SUNK BY SOME SUBMARINE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY."

HE SAID THE "GRAVE OCCURRENCE" WAS SIMILAR TO THE 1960 EXPLOSION OF THE FRENCH MUNITIONS SHIP LA COURBRE IN HAVANA HARBOR, AND A RECENT RAID BY A SWIFT AND HEAVILY ARMED MOTORBOAT ON CUBAN NAVY INSTALLATIONS IN SANTIAGO HARBOR. THE U.S. WAS PREVIOUSLY ACCUSED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR BOTH INCIDENTS.

CASTRO ALSO COMPLAINED IN HIS TWO-HOUR, 20-MINUTE SPEECH TO THE TRADE UNIONISTS THAT CUBAN TERRITORIAL WATERS WERE BEING CONSTANTLY VIOLATED BY U.S. AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE CRAFT.

DISCUSSING THE MISSING PATROL BOAT, CASTRO SAID IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT NO WRECKAGE OR SURVIVORS HAD BEEN FOUND.

HE SAID THIS STRENGTHENED HIS BELIEF IT WAS SUNK BY A SUBMARINE. THE TWO DISTRESS MESSAGES SENT OUT BY THE CUBAN WARSHIP WERE MONITORED BY UPI IN MIAMI. THEY STATED CLEARLY THE SHIP WAS SINKING AFTER STRIKING AN UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT SUBMERGED IN THE WATER.

THE MESSAGES SAID THE IMPACT IN STRIKING THE SUBMERGED OBJECT PUT A HOLE OF SUCH SIZE IN THE BOW THAT THE BOAT WAS AWASH FROM STEM TO STERN WITHIN 12 MINUTES AND THE CREW HAD TO ABANDON SHIP. ALSO CUBAN NAVY MESSAGES INTERCEPTED IN MIAMI THE SAME DAY REPORTED FLOATING DEBRIS IN THE AREA SUCH AS OIL DRUMS AND PLANKS.

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(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--NEW GOP NATIONAL CHAIRMAN WILLIAM E. MILLER SAID TODAY PRESIDENT KENNEDY "RESCINDED AND REVOKED" AN EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION PLAN TO PROTECT THE ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN INVADERS WITH U.S. AIR POWER.

MILLER TERMED KENNEDY'S ALLEGED ACTION A "TRAGIC MISTAKE."

THE GOP CHAIRMAN IS THE FIRST RANKING REPUBLICAN TO STATE THAT FORMER PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER APPROVED USE OF AMERICAN AIR POWER IN PLANNING THE ILL-FATED INVASION.

MILLER, A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE FROM NEW YORK, WAS SUPPORTED BY SEN. HUGH SCOTT, R-PA.

IN A TELEVISION-RADIO PROGRAM (PENNSYLVANIA STATIONS) WITH MILLER AND SEN. JOSEPH S. CLARK, D-PA., SCOTT HAD THIS TO SAY OF KENNEDY'S CUBAN INVASION STRATEGY:

"WHEN HE FAILED TO SUPPORT THE CUBANS WITH AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES, AMERICAN SUPPLIES AND AMERICAN AIR COVER, THAT'S WHEN THE INVASION FAILED."

CLARK REPLIED THAT EISENHOWER'S PLANS WOULD HAVE VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND INVOLVED "GOING IN WITH AMERICAN TROOPS."

NO OFFICIAL SOURCE HAS INDICATED THAT THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION PLANNED TO GIVE THE INVADERS AIR SUPPORT.

CLARK SAID KENNEDY WAS "FOLLOWING A CAREFULLY LAID OUT PLAN BY THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION WHICH, IF HE HAD GONE ALL THE WAY WITH IT, WOULD HAVE GOTTEN US ALL IN DUTCH IN LATIN AMERICA." HE SAID, "WE WOULD NEVER HAVE GOTTEN OUT OF THE DOG HOUSE."

KENNEDY HAS PUBLICLY TAKEN FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CUBAN INVASION FIASCO. INTERIOR SECRETARY STEWART L. UDALL DREW GOP CRITICISM WHEN HE SAID THE CUBAN INVASION PLANS WERE CONCEIVED DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION.

REPUBLICANS ATTACKED HIM FOR TRYING TO DUCK THE BLAME. KENNEDY THEN ORDERED CABINET MEMBERS NOT TO TRY TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY.

BUT CLARK WENT BEYOND UDALL. HE DECLARED:

"THE WHOLE CUBAN POLICY RESULTED FROM A PLAN CONCEIVED BY MR. EISENHOWER, KNOWN IN FULL BY MR. NIXON, ALTHOUGH THE KNOWLEDGE WAS DENIED BY HIM IN THE CAMPAIGN, WHICH CALLED FOR THE VIOLATION OF OUR TREATIES, THE VIOLATION OF OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND GOING IN WITH AMERICAN TROOPS TO CUBA. PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD THE WISDOM NOT TO GO IN WITH THOSE AMERICAN TROOPS."

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UPI-38

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CHAIRMAN WILLIAM E. MILLER HAS CHARGED THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY REVOKED AN EISENHOWER PLAN "TO HAVE THE CUBAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS PROTECTED BY AMERICAN AIR POWER."

MILLER SAID KENNEDY HAD MADE A "TRAGIC MISTAKE." HE MADE THE STATEMENT YESTERDAY ON A TV-RADIO PROGRAM WITH SENS. HUGH SCOTT, R-PA., AND JOSEPH S. CLARK, D-PA.

SCOTT SAID WHEN KENNEDY "FAILED TO SUPPORT THE CUBANS WITH AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES, AMERICAN SUPPLIES AND AMERICAN AIR COVER, THAT'S WHEN THE INVASION FAILED."

CLARK REPLIED THAT EISENHOWER'S PLANS WOULD HAVE VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND INVOLVED "GOING IN WITH AMERICAN TROOPS."

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- Mr. Conrad
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- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Ingram
- Miss Gandy

Capital Silent on GOP Cuba

The White House today refused to comment on a statement by Republican National Chairman Miller that President Kennedy "rescinded and revoked an Eisenhower Administration plan to provide U. S. air power for the Cuban invasion in April. This, Miller said, was the "first mistake" President Kennedy made in the abortive invasion.


The statement by Miller in a TV-radio broadcast yesterday in Pennsylvania was the first by a responsible Republican that the Eisenhower Administration had planned to help the invaders with U. S. military force.

Sen. Clark (D-Pa.), speaking on the same program, countered that such a plan—"known in full by Mr. Nixon although the knowledge was denied by him in the campaign"—would have violated our treaties.

Miller's picture of Kennedy caution or timidity contrasted with earlier Republican charges of Kennedy recklessness.

Former Vice President Nixon, campaigning last fall as the Republican Presidential candidate, had accused Kennedy of proposing a "recklessly dangerous" policy on Cuba which would be an "invitation" to the Russians to intervene and lead to World War III.

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Kennedy's proposal had been that "we must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista, democratic, anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual help in throwing Castro

Nixon
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ments not
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ter nation.

April 20, shortly after the failure of the invasion, Nixon called on President Kennedy but refused to condemn the new

ration:

good time."

In the meantime, Interior Secretary Udall charged that Nixon and Gen. Eisenhower had conceived the Cuban invasion scheme.

used Udall of
ious partisan-

President Kennedy in effect reprimanded Udall, stating that sole responsibility on Cuba rested with the White House.

On yesterday's broadcast, Sen. Scott (R-Pa.) seconded Miller's charge against President Kennedy.

"When he failed to support Cubans with American naval American supplies and

American air cover, that's when the invasion failed," Scott said.

Clark retorted that while President Kennedy had been following the Eisenhower Administration plan, he "had the wisdom not to go in with those American troops."

It had been reported that after Nixon talked with Castro in April, 1959, when the Cuban Premier visited the U. S., he prepared a memorandum urging that Cuban guerrillas should be trained to overthrow Castro.

But the State Dept. argued against the plan and it was not until March, 1960 that the invasion plan was set into motion.

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UPI-16

(CUBAN)
NEW YORK ARE BOOTHE LUCE CHARGED TODAY THAT THE CUBAN INVASION
FAILED BECAUSE PRESIDENT KENNEDY CHANGED HIS MIND AND WITHDREW U.S.
ARMED SUPPORT.

THE FORMER AMBASSADOR IN A LETTER PUBLISHED IN
THE NEW YORK TRIBUNE THAT THE CUBAN FAILURE
WAS A SPLIT IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.
SHE SAID. MOUNTED THE INVASION AND INTENDED TO SUPPORT IT
WITH "BUT AT THE LAST MINUTE HE WAS FORCIBLY REMINDED (WASHINGTON RUMOR
SAYS BY MR. (ADLAI) STEVENSON) THAT THIS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO
SCUTTLING OUR SOUTH AMERICAN POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION."

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UPI-214

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. HUGH SCOTT (R-PA.) SAID TODAY THAT U.N. AMBASSADOR ADLAI E. STEVENSON FLEW HERE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT AND SECURED A LAST-MINUTE REVERSAL OF PLANS WHICH WOULD HAVE SUPPLIED AIR COVER FOR THE ILL-FATED APRIL 17TH CUBAN INVASION. HE MADE THE STATEMENT IN A DISCUSSION ON THE SENATE FLOOR. HIS PENNSYLVANIA COLLEAGUE, SEN. JOSEPH S. CLARK, D., QUICKLY BRANDED SCOTT'S ACCOUNT "LARGELY, IF NOT ENTIRELY, FICTION." THE TWO SENATORS EXPANDED, IN EFFECT, ON THEIR WEEKEND TV REPORT TO CONSTITUENTS. AS THEIR FIRST GUEST, REP. WILLIAM E. MILLER, N.Y., THE NEW GOP NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, HAD CHARGED THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY "RESCINDED AND REVOKED" AN EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION PLAN WHICH INCLUDED AIR SUPPORT. SCOTT TOLD THE SENATE THAT HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY TO SAY THAT FORMER PRSIDENT EISENHOWER WOULD NEVER HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT TO ANY INVASION WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY AIR COVER. SCOTT SAID, HOWEVER, THAT NO INVASION PLAN HAD BEEN FORMALIZED, NO LEADER SELECTED, AND NO DECISION MADE AS TO WHOSE PLANES WOULD COVER THE OPERATION WHEN EISENHOWER STEPPED DOWN. SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., SAID HE UNDERSTANDS, FROM PARTICIPANTS IN THE LANDINGS AT THE BAY OF PIGS, THAT AIR COVER BY U.S. PLANES PLUS "NAVAL BACK UP" HAD BEEN PROMISED AND THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT "WAS UNDERSTOOD BY CUBANS TO HAVE EXISTED WHEN THEY STEPPED OFF THEIR LANDING BARGES IN THE INVASION."

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CLARK SAID HE BELIEVED GOLDWATER WAS "IN ERROR ON THE FACTS" AND DREW MISTAKEN CONCLUSIONS FROM THEM. CLARK PLEADED, HOWEVER, THAT HIS LIPS WERE SEALED ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE LANDINGS BECAUSE HE HAD READ CLASSIFIED SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THEM.

SCOTT AND CLARK AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF A WHITE PAPER WERE ISSUED TO CLARIFY THE MATTER. GOLDWATER SAID HE BELIEVES CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. HE SAID THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SHOULD KNOW WHO CALLED OFF THE U.S. SUPPORT.

"I AM NOT CONVINCED THAT IT WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY; I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WAS SOMEONE ELSE WHO WOULD BEND THE KNEE TO ANY ENEMY," GOLDWATER SAID.

ACCORDING TO SCOTT'S ACCOUNT CUBAN INVADERS WENT INTO THE BAY OF PIGS EXPECTING AIR COVER BUT STEVENSON, WHEN HE HEARD OF IT, CONTENDED THAT SUCH U.S. SUPPORT WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE U.S. POSITION IN THE U.N. WHERE HE HAD BEEN DISCLAIMING ANY SUCH PLANS ON THE PART OF THE U.S.

SCOTT SAID STEVENSON "FLEW DOWN IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT" JUST BEFORE THE INVASION WAS LAUNCHED AND COMPLAINED TO UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE CHESTER BOWLES. THE PLANS FOR AIR SUPPORT, SCOTT SAID, WERE REVOKED "AT LEAST IN PART" ON THE BASIS OF THE STEVENSON PLEA.

IN ADDITION TO STEVENSON'S ASSURANCES TO OTHER DIPLOMATS AT THE U.N. PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD STATED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE INVASION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT INTERVENE WITH ITS ARMED FORCES IN CUBA.

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UPI-19

(CASTRO)

NEW YORK--CUBAN PREMIER CASTRO SAID THE APRIL INVASION AGAINST HIS REGIME FAILED BECAUSE "THEY UNDERESTIMATED US AND THEY USED THEIR OWN FORCES INCORRECTLY."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, IN A HAVANA-DATELINED DISPATCH IN TODAY'S EDITIONS SIGNED BY TAB SZULC, ONE OF A GROUP OF U.S. NEWSMEN NOW TOURING CUBA, REPORTED THE CUBAN PREMIER'S APPRAISAL OF THE INVASION FROM U.S.-BACKED EXILES.

CASTRO TOOK NEWSMEN ON A TOUR OF PLAYA GIRO WHERE THE EXILES LANDED AND THEN WERE DEFEATED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES. FIVE REBEL SHIPS WERE SUNK AND 10 REBEL AIRPLANES WERE SHOT DOWN.

CASTRO SAID HE HAD EXPECTED SEVERAL SIMULTANEOUS LANDINGS BUT THE REBELS CONCENTRATED THEIR ATTACK AT THE BAY OF PIGS.

"THAT WAS THEIR FIRST MISTAKE," CASTRO WAS QUOTED BY SZULC. THE CUBAN PREMIER SAID THE INVADERS DROPPED THEIR PARATROOPERS TOO LATE AND NOT IN THE RIGHT PLACE. HE SAID THEY WAITED UNTIL THE MORNING OF APRIL 17, HOURS AFTER THE BEACH LANDINGS AND TOO LATE TO CUT OFF GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS AND ROADS.

CASTRO ALSO CRITICIZED THE INVADERS FOR HOLDING BACK MAJOR UNITS OF 1,500 MEN TOO LONG, ENABLING CUBAN PLANES TO SINK THE REBEL SHIPS CARRYING THE TROOPS.

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UPI-136

(PILOT)

DEBHAM, MASS.--A DEBHAM HOUSEWIFE SAID TODAY SHE WAS CONVINCED HER BROTHER WAS WORKING FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHEN HE WAS SHOT DOWN DURING THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION.

MRS. ANTHONY F. INGEMI SAID, "I JUST PUT A LOT OF LITTLE THINGS TOGETHER AND I'M SURE THAT'S WHO HE WAS WORKING FOR."

SHE IDENTIFIED HER BROTHER AS LEO FRANCIS BAKER, A NAME SIMILAR TO THAT GIVEN BY THE CASTRO FORCES FOR A "PILOT" WHO WAS SHOT DOWN APRIL 19. SHE SAID HE AND THREE OTHER MEN ON THE C46 CARGO PLANE WERE ALL FROM ALABAMA AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALABAMA AIR NATIONAL GUARD.

MRS. INGEMI SAID SHORTLY AFTERWARD A MAN WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS "ATTORNEY COOPER FROM NEW YORK" ARRIVED BY PLANE AND TAXI AT HER SUB-URBAN HOME HERE AND INFORMED HER OF HER BROTHER'S DEATH.

"HE JUST STAYED FIVE MINUTES. HE SAID THE PLANE CRASHED. HE DIDN'T SAY IF IT WAS SHOT DOWN OR WHAT. AND HE SAID THE PLANE WAS CARRYING AN UNDISCLOSED CARGO," MRS. INGEMI SAID.

SHE SAID HER BROTHER WAS HOME IN JANUARY, HAVING RECENTLY BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE AIR FORCE IN WHICH HE WAS A FLIGHT ENGINEER IN THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND.

"HE SAID HE HAD THIS FLYING JOB FOR GOOD PAY BUT HE WAS VERY QUIET ABOUT IT. THE MAN WHO HIRED HIM WAS ATTORNEY ALEX CARLSON OF MIAMI SPRINGS, FLA., AND THE COMPANY WAS DOUBLE CHECK CORP. OF MIAMI SPRINGS. I THINK THAT WAS JUST A FRONT FOR THE CIA," THE SISTER SAID.

"OF COURSE THAT'S JUST MY OPINION. I DON'T HAVE ANY INSIDE INFORMATION OR I WOULDN'T BE TALKING," SHE ADDED.

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CIA Mum on Sister's Claim

Roslindale Flier Died for Freedom

A Dedham woman revealed yesterday that an American flier killed in the abortive invasion of Cuba April 19 was her brother, Leo Francis Baker, 34, a former Roslindale resident.

Mrs. Marie Ingemi of 128 Tyl-
Ave., Dedham, said she be-
lieved Baker was on a mission for

the Central Intelligence Agency
when he met his death.

She said it was "a shame" his
death should go unrecognized
when he was fighting in the cause
of freedom.

Neither the nor the State
Department comment or
issue dic

The vernment at
Continued Twenty-Four

Alabama. He has a wife, Cather-
ine, and two children, Theresa,
11, and Catherine, a year old,
living in Birmingham, according
to the sister. Mrs. Baker, she
said, is expecting another child.

WANTS RECOGNITION

Mrs. Ingemi said her brother
returned to Massachusetts last
January to attend their father's
funeral. At that time he dis-
appeared, she related, that he was
going back into
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or Burley.


U. S. authorities
said documents

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Mrs. Ingemi
was graduate
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LEO FRANCIS BAKER



MRS. MARIE INGEMI

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UPI -29

(CUBA)

CLEVELAND--NEW ORLEANS MAYOR DE LESSEPS MORRISON YESTERDAY SAID IF AIR COVER HAD BEEN PROVIDED THE CUBAN REBELS THEY WOULD HAVE OVER-THROWN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO'S REGIME.

MORRISON, NEWLY APPOINTED U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, SAID HE WAS SPEAKING AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN BECAUSE HIS APPOINTMENT HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE U.S. SENATE.

"IF WE HAD GIVEN THE CUBAN REBELS SOME DEGREE OF AIR COVER," MORRISON SAID ON KYW-TV'S "OPEN CIRCUIT" PROGRAM, "IT WOULD HAVE SUPPORTED THE INVASION AND CASTRO WOULD HAVE BEEN TOPPLED."

MORRISON SAID HE FAVORED THE EXCHANGE OF TRACTORS FOR CUBAN PRISONERS WITH RESERVATIONS.

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Clip PROGRAM OF Anti-Castro Activity - CIA

UPI-42

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--TAD SZULC, LATIN AMERICA CORRESPONDENT FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES, TODAY BLAMED "INCREDIBLE MISMANAGEMENT" BY FIELD AGENTS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE APRIL CUBAN INVASION FIASCO. SZULC, WRITING IN THE CURRENT ISSUE OF LOOK MAGAZINE, SAID THE CIA AGENTS KEPT PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN THE DARK ON DETAILS OF THE INVASION PLANNING AND EVEN DISOBEYED THE PRESIDENT'S ORDER TO EXCLUDE FOLLOWERS OF EX-DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA FROM THE "LIBERATION ARMY."
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Story About Castro Spies Called False

By HAINES COLBERT

The Dade sheriff's office today came to the defense of federal agents who are blamed in a magazine article for the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba.

Lt. Frank Kappel, chief of the sheriff's Intelligence Squad, contradicted a statement in the current issue of Look that his records on Castro agents were ignored.

The charge was made by Tad Szulc of the New York Times in a Look article, "Cuba, Anatomy of a Failure," Szulc wrote:

by it. I think Szulc, who was poking his nose into a lot of places where he had no business, should take some of the blame for the failure of the invasion.

The statement about the Castro spies, like a number of others in the article, is untrue.

"The truth is that the federal men worked closely with us. And we didn't have 100 pictures. We had about 30 — and most of them were of people against whom we had no proof.

"We get a lot of unsubstantiated charges from one Cuban that some other Cuban is

THE MIAMI NEWS
Miami, Florida

Date: 7/10/61

● More About Invasion

"As preparations for the invasion began, at least 100 Castro spies circulated freely in the buildup area in Florida. Their photographs were on file in the Dade County sheriff's office, but no effort was made by federal authorities to remove them from the scene, or to conceal the movements of the anti-Castro fighters from these informers."

Said Kappel:

"I read the article and I was disgusted.

● U.S. Agents Defended

a Castro agent. We try to check them out, but in many cases we never do get any proof.

"There were three or four Cubans in our files who were pretty definitely identified as Castro spies. The federal agents put pressure on them before the invasion and they disappeared, presumably going back to Cuba."

Szulc, although Kappel said he spent considerable time in Florida before the abortive April 17 invasion, did get a little mixed

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
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HAVANA, July 27 (AP)—To chant: "We are socialist. Forward, forward." Castro's special guest, Soviet Spaceman Yuri Gagarin had been expected to be an added attraction at the dedication.

Castro explained Gagarin's absence by saying the spaceman and his Russian party wanted to rest before leaving tomorrow for Brazil.



A defaced copy of an American newspaper is held above umbrellas used to shade spectators from the sun as they listen to Cuban Premier Fidel Castro speak at a revolutionary anniversary program in Havana.

The Washington Post and Times Herald A-13
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star _____
New York Herald Tribune _____
New York Journal-American _____
New York Mirror _____
New York Daily News _____
New York Post _____
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up about the state's geography.

The magazine article said a boat carrying explosives for the Cuban underground was captured off Tallahassee by a Fish and Wildlife Service patrol boat.

Tallahassee, of course, is in the hills some 30 miles from the nearest coast.

Szulc's post mortem otherwise is much like that of other reporters. He tells of the miscalculations which sent a weak invading force up against Castro's unhampered army without even the support of the underground in Cuba — which wasn't told when the invasion was to take place.

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The Cuban Invasion—I

White House Decisions Cited in Study Of Why Landing in April Was a Failure

This is the first of two articles on the unsuccessful attempt by anti-Castro forces to invade Cuba last April.

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

THE celebrations in Cuba last week deliberately emphasized the increasing strength of Premier Fidel Castro's pro-Communist state.

Part of the emphasis represents propaganda, but there is some truth behind the embroidered claims.

About three months after the United States sponsored abortive invasion of Cuba, Mr. Castro's regime said it has ever and in prestige. In 1,500 to 1,600 men, with United States support, attempted to overthrow Cuban Government. Had only nine military aircraft, all except three trainers that were supplied with Russian small arms, tanks, guns and old artillery. Quantity but

men and armed, but lined up and sparsely trained. Able against a force of 15,000 men and more. That effective ability were

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Today, with the victory at the Bay of Pigs behind them, the Cuban armed forces are far more confident, less likely to defect, better armed and trained. Between twenty and thirty Soviet MIG-17 jet fighters have been delivered to Cuba and are now in operation. Heavy crates, which may contain additional disassembled planes, have been seen. Some Cuban pilots have returned from jet training in Czechoslovakia. More arms and equipment for ground troops have arrived in Cuba from Communist countries.

Guerrillas Are Inactive

The underground has been virtually quiescent; the guerrillas have been inactive; Dr. Castro's opposition is disorganized and downcast. The overthrow of Dr. Castro's Government would be far more difficult today, even if United States forces were sent into the island, than it would have been three months ago. And the United States Government apparently has no plan for eliminating what many observers have called the "cancer of communism in Cuba."

The April invasion has been widely ridiculed since its failure, and the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been made the principal whipping boys. The impossibility of overthrowing Dr. Castro with 1,500 to 1,600 men appears self-evident; the rhetorical question, "How could anyone be so stupid?" has been a popular one around Washington in the last three months. Yet the operation in its original concepts was not as stupid as it has been made to appear and the responsibility for the mistakes appears to be widely distributed.

The story of the Cuban venture, pieced together from talks with many Government officials and from other sources, postulates many lessons of major importance in the Berlin crisis.

Planning Started in 1960

Planning for the Cuban assault started in the late spring of 1960, when former President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to organize, train and equip anti-Castro Cuban refugees. Allen W. Dulles, director of the C. I. A., and his deputy for operations, Richard M. Bissell, initiated the secret operation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military were not initially given any details of the plans for employment of the Cuban refugees, but as their training progressed the Pentagon was asked to assign officers, training cadres, weapons and equipment to the C. I. A. The plan, as it developed under the Eisenhower and later the Kennedy Administration,

did not, contrary to published reports, commit United States armed forces to support of the Cuban refugees in actual military operations. Such a commitment was considered but never, as far as can be learned, officially approved, although it was not publicly and finally disapproved until a few days before the landing.

The original Eisenhower planning contemplated one or more series of relatively small landings to re-enforce the anti-Castro guerrillas in the hills. Last Nov. 30 had been, tentatively, one of the target dates for the invasion, but the impending change in Administration as a result of the November elections forced its postponement.

About December, the character of the operation appears to have changed from dispersed guerrilla landings to the establishment of one beachhead. If the beachhead appeared to be firmly established, a Cuban government in exile could be flown in, and all Cubans would then be called upon to join in the revolt against Dr. Castro. Whether the United States would recognize this government and the kind and degree of support it might give it were apparently left open.

Invasion Site Shifted

After the Kennedy Administration took office other changes were made.

The Bay of Pigs, closer to Havana but seventy-five miles from the nearest concentration of guerrillas in the Escambré Mountains, was substituted for another suggested beach, less than 100 miles to the east.

Perhaps more important, the preparations for the operation became so big and so obvious that it was no longer secret. Published stories about the refugee training camps in Guatemala and preparations in Florida plus the expectation that Soviet MIG-17's, now in Cuba, would soon arrive increased pressure on the Administration for quick action and also rallied, within the Administration, the opposition to any United States-sponsored intervention.

On April 12, five days before the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, President Kennedy announced at a press conference that United States armed forces would "in no circumstances" be used to overthrow Dr. Castro.

The Invasion Force

The Kennedy announcement meant that about 1,600 Cuban refugees—supported by sixteen American-built B-26 propeller-driven light bombers based in Central America, transported by old United States merchant ships procured with United States funds, armed with American equipment and trained by American cadres but without the help of United States armed forces—would attempt to establish a beachhead in Cuba.

A second decision of major importance was made by the White House just a short time before the invaders actually landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17. Two days before the invasion, preliminary air strikes were flown by a few B-26's, piloted by Cuban refugee fliers, against some of Dr. Castro's airfields. The planes were based on Central America and landed in Florida after their mission.

The United States asserted these planes were flown from Cuban airfields by defecting pilots. A storm arose in the United Nations, and Adlai E. Stevenson, the United States delegate, who had not been informed fully of our Cuban plans, declared publicly with great emphasis that the planes came from Cuba.

He was hastily informed by Washington of his mistake.

The invasion force left as scheduled from Central America, and was escorted at sea by United States Navy destroyers, with an aircraft carrier in the background. The naval vessels had orders to stay outside the Cuban three-mile limit, but to be prepared for anything.

On the night and early morning of the invasion a key air strike, flown by Cuban refugee pilots in B-26's, was scheduled to bomb the nine Cuban planes spotted in known positions on Cuban airfields. A few hours before the invasion was scheduled, while the ships were nearing the Bay of Pigs beaches,

the air strike was canceled by the White House.

The cancellation was apparently the result of representations by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and through him by Mr. Stevenson. Both of them were worried by the effect of a second air strike from Central America upon opinion in the United Nations and Latin America. The President ordered the C. I. A. to cancel the strike, but, according to an Administration spokesman, specified that the C. I. A. had the right to appeal to the President and left the possibility of reversal open. The appeal was not made, according to the spokesman.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not aware of the cancellation of this key air strike until after the beachhead had actually been established, according to Government sources.

By this time much of the damage had been done, for Dr. Castro's planes, alerted by the actual landings, were in the air attacking the invading ships, and were dispersed after their sorties to new airfields. Contrary to general opinion, the actual landings achieved, as Dr. Castro has since conceded, a tactical surprise, much as the Allied landings on the coast of Normandy in World War II achieved a tactical surprise. Dr. Castro knew the invasion was coming; it could not be a strategic surprise. But he did not know where or when.

After the landing, the Cuban refugee pilots were permitted to fly close support missions from Central America but with orders to touch down first at the Bay of Pigs airstrip (within the beachhead) to provide the verisimilitude of legality. But it was too late.

United States Navy pilots, flying in fast jet attack planes off the beachhead, armed and ready for action in case they should be ordered to intervene, saw the end of the invasion from the air as Cuban tanks rumbled down the roads. The invaders had run out of ammunition; there was nothing to do but surrender.

Tomorrow: Lessons of the Cuban invasion failure.

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The Cuban Invasion—II

Rebels' Defeat Is Ascribed to Errors In Plan and Execution in Washington

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

This is the second of two articles on the unsuccessful attempt by anti-Castro forces to invade Cuba last April.

THE invasion of Cuba last April, it is now clear, was lost in Washington.

The small invading force was admitted shortly before the operation, in a written report submitted by a Colonel Hawkins of the Marine Corps, to be "battleworthy" and comparably almost as well equipped as a similar United States unit. This judgment had some effect in Washington and, observers contend, was borne out by the actual fighting.

Despite the casualty statistics (some 1,200 of the 1,500 to 1,600 captured), the invaders gave a good account of themselves. Most sources agree that the refugees fought well until their ammunition ran out, that they inflicted more casualties on Fidel Castro's forces than he had conceded, and that the Cuban militia in the area of the landing almost immediately defected in scores to the invaders' side, only to defect back again to Dr. Castro after the failure of the invasion became obvious.

Like the British and French invasion of Port Said during the Suez crisis of 1956, the Cuban operational plans and their implementation were watered down and the invasion was doomed by nonmilitary considerations.

The errors made and the blame for them are widespread.

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
EDITOR: SCOTT R. CARRS

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL
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Errors Laid to Kennedy

President Kennedy, new to supreme power, showed uncertainty in one of his first tests as Commander in Chief and met the opposing opinions of his advisers by compromise instead of clear-cut decision. His announcement a few days before the invasion that "in no circumstances" would United States armed forces be used to overthrow the Cuban Government should have led to cancellation, or major revision of the operation, for use of the United States armed forces was the one factor that could absolutely insure success.

Similarly, the cancellation of the pre-invasion air strike—a key to the achievement of air superiority, a stipulated precondition for success—was the final counterweight against the invaders.

But it is also true that the President inherited the Cuban problem and a plan that had grown too big, physically and because of its political implications, for the Central Intelligence Agency.

In effect, everybody had a hand in the Cuban venture and yet nobody was clearly in charge. It was bureaucracy at its worst, with the right hand sometimes not knowing (as in the case of Adlai E. Stevenson at the United Nations) what the left hand was doing.

The close and careful liaison between political and military planning that is absolutely essential to strategic success was lacking.

In fact, neither the military nor the State Department was the primary planner or executor of the Cuban invasion.

The invasion, partly because the original plan just grew and expanded, partly in the interests of security and secrecy (which could not possibly be maintained when the operation became so large) was primarily the "baby" of the Central In-

telligence Agency. The agency made mistakes in planning, execution and judgment. Allen W. Dulles, its director, and Richard M. Bissell, the deputy for plans and operations, and in direct charge of the Cuban affair, will probably bear the burden of failure by resigning their offices.

Failures of Joint Chiefs

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made mistakes in failing to be explicit and emphatic—in not pounding the table enough and in failing to commit all their ideas and viewpoints to paper. (In the interests of secrecy much of the Cuban planning and direction was oral.)

The White House believes the military judgments were faulty and the studies inadequate, but Pentagon sources deny this.

The State Department and other advisers bear responsibility for contributing to confusion and defeat by insisting upon legalisms that the guilty conscience of a democracy so often demands, when it resorts to naked force.

McGeorge Bundy, a Presidential assistant, shares, and manfully has accepted blame for insufficiently emphasizing to the President the dangerous and negative aspects of the operation. And the President himself has assumed full responsibility for the failure.

But the assessment of fault, although essential to analysis, is far less important than the lessons learned.

The primary lesson is the importance of the principle of the objective, as it is known in military parlance, or in slang terms, "keeping your eye on the ball."

The original objective was the overthrow of Dr. Castro. Whether this was an adequate political objective, or whether there should have been another constructive long-term goal is open to question. But even this original objective was rendered impossible of accomplishment before the assault started.

A considered statement of what one is trying to accomplish, with political, military and economic factors all carefully weighed, is the essential first step for any operation.

The operational plan must be capable of accomplishing this objective. In the Cuban invasion the objective itself seems to have become fuzzy, and the invasion plan as actually modified in execution could not possibly have accomplished the overthrow of Dr. Castro.

Need for U.S. Forces

The political and military disadvantages of any given plan must be weighed against the advantages obtained by accomplishment of the objective.

The disadvantages of the Cuban invasion were so great that either it had to succeed or it should never have been attempted. To insure success, the support of United States armed forces was essential, yet this was ruled out before the start of the operation.

The world respects power successfully used to accomplish national objectives. A successful invasion of Cuba and the overthrow of Dr. Castro backed by the United States would probably have overbalanced the adverse political, legal and moral effects of our open intervention in Cuban affairs.

As it was, we suffered all the

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opprobrium that attaches to failure, and all the psychological and political disadvantages associated with the term "Yankee imperialism." And our backing of the Cuban refugees was so thinly disguised that it immediately exposed Washington to the same charges we would have faced had United States armed forces been employed.

The second great lesson of Cuba is the importance of tight policy control, direction and management of any venture involving the application of military power, no matter how small. This control and management must center in the President as Commander in Chief; each President will use the machinery of government differently, but history has shown that ordered discussions and debates and staff work, and recorded decisions may bring new insight and prevent major mistakes. These procedures were largely lacking in the Kennedy Administration prior to the time of the Cuban invasion.

Mistakes of the C. I. A.

A third lesson of Cuba is that no military or paramilitary operation should be under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency if it is of such a size and character that it is bound to become overt or open, rather than covert or secret. Operations of the size of the Cuban invasion should be managed by the Defense Department, which is far better staffed and has more expert military knowledge than the C. I. A.

Another lesson is the necessity of keeping all secret intelligence activities and operations under constant top-echelon surveillance and review. Machinery for a critical and objective analysis of all such efforts should be strengthened by the creation of a joint Congressional watchdog committee, and by a careful supervision of the C. I. A. by the National Security Council and other White House staff agencies.

But the Cuban failure offers no valid reason for dismembering the C. I. A., or for changing its name. Intelligence operations of many different kinds—"black" or concealed radio, propaganda, sabotage and so on—must be conducted by some agency of government. Most of these do not properly fit into the Pentagon, except, of course, when the operation assumes a character distinctly military and a size and complexity that make the Pentagon the obvious place to handle it.

But specialized and distinctive secret operations of various sorts are best handled by some separate, centralized agency. There is no magic in separating these specialized operations from intelligence-gathering collection and evaluation; in fact the two must work hand in hand.

One man, as Mr. Dulles now does, could well head both, but the organization must provide, as C. I. A. now does, for separate but coordinated efforts in secret operations and in intelligence.

Lesson for Intelligence

The C. I. A., whether we like it or not, is an inevitable part of the modern machinery for national survival in the nuclear age. It has made mistakes in the past and will again in the future. But it has also had great successes in the past, as in the U-2 operation. It must be improved, not made a scapegoat. It probably employs too many people and its administrative machinery could be considerably improved.

Power—the power of secret information—is insidious, and some of C. I. A.'s personnel need to relearn the lesson of humility and of human failure. But the C. I. A. is here to stay.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff similarly is a key body in our national security machinery. They, too, have human weaknesses.

and they, too, have made mistakes. But the principles they embody—differing military approaches to the same military problem; the right of dissent; collective wisdom, as opposed to the judgments of a single military mind—are essential in the future as they have been in the past.

In sum, the failure of Cuba was a failure of bureaucracy, but as in all failures it was essentially a failure of men rather than of organization.

Rear Admiral H. E. Eccles, retired, comments in "Notes on the Cuban Crisis," a paper prepared under the sponsorship of the George Washington University Logistics Research Project, that "somehow or other there seemed to be a complete divorce between the national policy and the power allotted to the task at hand."

He points out that "in great matters of state, the President simply cannot afford to leave these vital three (analysis of objectives, clear conceptual unity and careful follow-up) to his subordinates. The price of failure or of mediocre execution is too great."

And Admiral Eccles stresses that the Cuban venture again emphasizes that in "the protracted conflict with the totalitarian concept the fate of the free society will be determined much more by the understanding of human emotion and the exercise of intellectual power and moral values than by technological factors."

Brazilian Foe of Reds Has Chat With Gagarin

RIO DE JANEIRO, July 31 (UPI)—Maj. Yuri A. Gagarin, the Soviet space pioneer, spent ten minutes today with the outspoken anti-Communist Governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Carlos Lacerda.

Both men were all smiles when the visit began, but the atmosphere chilled somewhat after Senhor Lacerda brought such issues as the Berlin dispute into the conversation.

Later, the rest of Major Gagarin's appointments for the day were canceled, including a lecture at the Education Ministry and a luncheon offered by Cruzeiro magazine. Soviet officials said the major "just wants to rest and may be ride around."

Major Gagarin had complained earlier that he was "exhausted" by the demands of news photographers, who he said were "worse than the space ship." He has been besieged by photographers since he arrived in Brazil.

This I Doubt

Collective Insecurity Caused U.S. to Flounder in the Cuba Invasion

BY HENRY J. TAYLOR

If we are to know what is happening to us we have to know that fixations do grip relatively unknown men whose influence on our country is enormous. Consider the idea that America must not defend herself, any place on her own—which was at the root of the Cuban debacle. In short, our so-called collective security.

That fixation is typified by Sen. J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, and he is as wrong as a summer oyster. But ideas can get into men's minds and all circumstance and history do not seem able to blow them out. They just think something and that is all there is to it; like many flute players about their own genius.

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
Because Sen. Fulbright is chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations he affects promotions within the State Department, its congressional relations and budget prospects and, thus, most importantly, America's policies not alone through the committee's statutory authority but merely on the basis of his own thinking.

We do not have collective security. We have collective insecurity. We are wise to be attached firmly to the principle. Often it is indispensable, as in NATO. But there is no NATO in Latin America, for example, and depending on collectivity wherever this involves numerous weak and shaky countries means we flounder into exactly what happened in Cuba.

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am sure that if American armed forces were used unilaterally the reaction elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere would be so severe that we would lose more in other countries than we would gain in Cuba."

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How can he be so sure? Many much more knowing, practical and tested observers than Sen. Fulbright find we are not blamed in Latin America for the intervention but, instead, for allowing the intervention to fail.

We got slight, if any, credit for our government's self-defined morals in non-intervention, even within the Organization of American States. For all grows worse by our remedy. Everywhere southward most of our neighbors realized that both under the benefits to them of the Monroe Doctrine and because of Castro's relentless and psychopathic provocations an intervention was completely justified on moral or any other grounds. And is it, in truth, really moral not to intervene in a murder unless you can locate your cousins to walk with you? Or if you have no cousins, to turn your back?

Many down there reacted to our moral explanation as Voltaire remarked of William Tell: "All these apple stories are very suspicious." There is widespread conviction the United States failed to intervene openly in Cuba, not for a moral reason, but because our government feared that this would provoke war between the powerful Soviet Union and the United States. In short, the Yankees turned yellow. Sen. Fulbright has much to answer for in this.

★

Countless millions throughout Latin America who love freedom would have welcomed U.S. intervention in Cuba (and still would) because they fear the expansion of Castroism into their own homelands and doubt it will be stopped without intervention. These millions cannot dream in Sen. Fulbright's office and telephone thunderbolts to the State Department. They have to live (or die) with what they get. Their only test of the intervention is that it succeed; and when it did not they are the victims in all the shame and despair of this sickening tragedy along with the entire free world.

★
Sen. Fulbright opposed any kind of intervention there unless we could waltz in with a whole group of Latin-American states, as if our nation could order such a tidy state of affairs. When he found even a trickle of intervention was moving toward the beaches he, among others, insisted that the White House stop it, and rejoiced when this shabby deed was done. The Senator is on record (on Cuba) as follows: "I

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CUBA ASKS U.N. DEBATE

Again Urges Assembly to
Take Up U. S. 'Aggression'

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.

Sept. 6—Cuba has asked again
that the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly take up her
charges of United States "ag-
gression" and "intervention"
against the Government of
Premier Fidel Castro.

In a note to Secretary Gen-
eral Dag Hammarskjold, made
public here today, Cuba main-
tained that "mercenaries,"
"saboteurs" and "notorious
criminals" were being trained
for a new invasion.

The note alleged that rebels
were being trained on Vieques
Island east of Puerto Rico, in
Guatemala and at the United
States bases at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, and in Panama.

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(CUBA)

SANTA CLARA, CUBA--FIVE "WAR CRIMINALS" CAPTURED IN THE ABORTIVE
APRIL INVASION OF CUBA WERE EXECUTED BY A FIRING SQUAD SHORTLY
AFTER MIDNIGHT TODAY.

THE FIVE MEN WERE SENTENCED BY A REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL HERE LATE
LAST NIGHT. THEIR APPEALS WERE DENIED IN A MATTER OF MINUTES, AND
BARELY TWO HOURS AFTER THE COURT ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION THEY WERE SHOT.
NINE OTHERS TRIED WITH THEM WERE SENTENCED TO 30-YEAR PRISON TERMS.
TODAY'S EXECUTIONS WERE THE FIRST ANNOUNCED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

SINCE LATE APRIL, A FEW DAYS AFTER THE START OF THE INVASION,
(THERE HAVE BEEN RECURRENT REPORTS OF UNANNOUNCED EXECUTIONS IN
CUBA. IN LIMA ON THURSDAY, CUBAN REFUGEES CHARGED THAT 83 PERSONS
WERE SHOT IN THEIR HOMETOWN LAST WEEK, AND IN CARACAS TODAY IT WAS
REPORTED THAT 16 VENEZUELAN HAVE BEEN KILLED BY FIRING SQUADS
THIS YEAR.)

THE MEN EXECUTED TODAY WERE CLASSIFIED AS WAR CRIMINALS BECAUSE
THEY WERE CONVICTED OF CRIMES COMMITTED BEFORE THE APRIL ATTACK--
IN MOST CASES, BEFORE THE OVERTHROW OF EX-PRESIDENT FULGENCIO BATISTA.
THEY WERE:

--FORMER POLICE CPL. RAMON GALVINO INSUA, CONVICTED OF MURDERING,
TORTURING OR EMASCULATING CAPTIVE CASTROITE REBELS AND OF RAPING
AT LEAST TWO WOMEN.

--JORGE KING YING, FOUND GUILTY OF KILLING REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIER
RAUL PUPO MORALES AND TAKING PUPO'S WIFE AND CHILD AS HOSTAGES WHEN
HE AND SEVERAL OTHERS FLED TO THE UNITED STATES IN A STOLEN BOAT.

--EMILIO SOLER RUIZ, CONVICTED KILLER OF SOCIALIST LEADER
ARACELIO IGLESIAS IN 1948 AND DOMINICAN REFUGEE PIPI HERNANDEZ IN
1955.

--ROBERTO PEREZ CRUZATA, A FUGITIVE WHO ESCAPED FROM CABANA
PRISON WHILE SERVING A SENTENCE FOR THE 1959 KILLING OF RAFAEL
ESCALONA ALMEIDA.

--ANTONIO V. PADRON GARDENAS, FOUND GUILTY OF MISTREATING OR
MURDERING CASTROITE REBELS CAPTURED IN THE HOLGUIN AREA OF ORIENTE
PROVINCE.

THE NINE SENTENCED TO PRISON WERE PEDRO A. SANTIAGO VILLA,
JOSE FRANCO MIRA, ROGELIO MILLAN PEREZ, ANDRES DE JESUS VEGA,
JOSE R. MACHADO CONCEPCION, JOSE R. GONTE HERNANDEZ, NICOLAS
HERNANDEZ MENDEZ, PEDRO H. REYES BELLOS AND RICARDO MONTERO DUQUE.

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Cuba Invasion Strategy Denied by Eisenhower

By the Associated Press

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GETTYSBURG, Pa., Sept. 12 (AP). — Former President Eisenhower may have started a new round of post mortems on the Cuban invasion by declaring that his outgoing administration did not draw up an invasion plan.

Ever since the invasion was crushed at the Bay of Pigs last spring, it has been reported that President Kennedy inherited a detailed invasion plan with many armed units poised throughout the Caribbean area.

All that remained for Mr. Kennedy, these reports said, was to give the go-ahead signal.

But Gen. Eisenhower told a group of 38 freshman Republican Congressmen here yesterday:

"We had done nothing except to recognize that these Cuban refugees had a great desire to go back to Cuba. So we began organizing them and giving them weapons and training them. But beyond that, we could not go, because at that time there was no recognized leader among the (refugee) Cubans."

He added, "I was not a consultant or adviser to the (Kennedy) administration in any way, of course."

A reporter went back to the question later, and Gen. Eisenhower amplified: "In March, 1960, we had a little meeting in my office as to whether to go ahead and train these people. I set up a little group to keep in touch. It was never more than that."

The Central Intelligence Agency has been widely cited, without contradiction, in starting to line up the ill-fated invasion as much as a year before the landing.

Charges Secret A-Tests

Asked about his views on Russia's resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, Gen. Eisenhower said he believed the Soviet Union has been secretly testing nuclear weapons during the three-year moratorium which ended September 1 with the first shot in their new series.

He covered a wide range of subjects in a setting strongly reminiscent of the news conferences he used to hold in his White House days. One difference was that the first-term G. O. P. Congressmen asked most of the questions. News-men were allowed at the last minute to ask a few.

The luncheon program at the Gettysburg Hotel followed a morning in which Gen. Eisenhower was cast in the role of guide for the visiting Congressmen around the historic Gettysburg battlefield.

Gen. Eisenhower obviously enjoyed himself, and showed a deep knowledge of the tactics and strategy of the Confederacy's advance into Union territory. Even 90-degree heat didn't seem to faze the 70-year-old ex-President, though his younger visitors seemed to wilt.

A visit to the nearby Eisenhower farm and the lunch

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rounded out the day's excursion. The trip was billed as a way of showing the new Republican members that an elder statesman of the party was interested in them.

Denies Berlin Theory

After the luncheon, the first question Mr. Eisenhower was asked was about a recent State Department pamphlet called "Background Berlin—1961." The pamphlet implied that Gen. Eisenhower could have taken Berlin before the Russians at the end of World War II, but decided not to.

Republicans in Congress last week raised shouts of protest over this version of history.

Mr. Eisenhower replied mildly, but in great detail. In essence, he said, the political boundaries of post-war Germany were decided by higher-ups. He said he had sent his chief of staff to the Yalta conference to advise against dividing Germany, to no avail.

Besides, Gen. Eisenhower said it was not at all sure the allied forces he commanded could have reached Berlin first.

Dealing with the Berlin crisis, he said: "We shouldn't make nasty speeches like Khrushchev just to be nasty."

If the United States thought out positions on international questions properly, he said, "we would not have to respond to Mr. Khrushchev every time he says 'yap' or 'wow' or anything else."

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UPI-19

(CUBA)

MIAMI--PREMIER CASTRO CHARGED LAST NIGHT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PLOTTING NEW "AGGRESSION" AGAINST CUBA. IN A 2-1/4-HOUR SPEECH BROADCAST BY RADIO HAVANA, CASTRO SAID THE TOUGH TALK OF SOME AMERICANS AND THE "CAMPAIGNS OF THE FASCISTIC CLERGY" INDICATED A NEW ATTACK IS IN THE MAKING. IT WAS THE SECOND TIME CASTRO HAD "CRIED WOLF" IN AS MANY DAYS. LAST NIGHT'S SPEECH WAS MADE AT COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES FOR 750 ARMY POLITICAL COMMISSARS EDUCATED AT HAVANA'S OSVALDO SANCHEZ CABRERA SCHOOL.

CASTRO SAID THE U.S. ¹MIGHT MIGHT ATTACK CUBA OPENLY THIS TIME, OR IT MIGHT PROVIDE AIR AND TROOP SUPPORT FOR A NEW ATTACK BY REFUGEES LIKE APRIL'S ILL-FATED INVASION. AS A THIRD POSSIBILITY, HE SAID THE UNITED STATES MIGHT SMUGGLE CUBANS INTO THEIR HOMELAND TO WAGE A GUERRILLA WAR.

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
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UPI-262

(GUBA)

UNITED NATIONS--THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY STEERING COMMITTEE TODAY RECOMMENDED A FULL ASSEMBLY DEBATE OF CUBAN CHARGES THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PLANNING NEW AGGRESSION AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT. THE VOTE CAME AFTER CUBAN AMBASSADOR MARIO GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI CHARGED THAT "AT THESE VERY MOMENTS THE IMPERIALIST GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARING AND ORGANIZING A NEW MERCENARY INVASION OF CUBA."

THE CUBAN POSITION WAS SUPPORTED BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR VALERIAN A. ZORIN AND CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATE JIRI NOSEK.

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[Clip Program of Anti-Castro Activity - C.I.A.] (U)

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WHAT TO DO SHOULD CASTRO FALL?

Cuban Exiles Bemoan Lack of U. S. Strategy

By CHARLES KEELY
 Copley News Service

As Congress adjourned, the White House distributed a memo to Democratic senators and representatives detailing the policies and accomplishments of the Kennedy Administration. Under a section titled "Latin America" were the words:

"Objective . . . isolate communism and Castroism."

The tactics?

It has become apparent that the Administration hopes Fidel Castro's Cuban house of cards will fall of its own weight.

"Cuba" is a dirty word around the White House. Officials are doing their best to forget how they huffed and puffed, but failed to blow anything down during the April's abortive invasion attempt.

But hope for Castro's ouster is returning, and is apparently based on the increasing reports of civil unrest in Cuba.

U. S. PLAN

Did this growing optimism, however, there is no trace of a U.S. strategy event Castro does fall, also is no evidence of a front for the thousands of Cuban refugees in the U.S. Their ranks are red with 177 organizing for their allies.

med exiles here in a witches' brew is

boiling on the Caribbean island. They point to underground terrorism, food shortages, executions, anti-government demonstrations, the deportation of Catholic priests and the bishop of Havana, further curtailment of travel.

If Castro does not get some of these problems off the fire, the exiles say, the situation could boil over.

"And what then?" they ask.

They warn that the United States and the feuding exile groups may be caught further off base than they were when Dictator Fulgencio Batista fled Havana.

Since the April invasion attempt, the U. S. has followed a "hands off" policy toward Cuba. It has curtailed programs involving exiles and there is no evidence of a direct link with the underground, despite Castro's ravings about "CIA plots."

WORRY

The rise of this underground concerns many of the exiles. U. S. officials admit they know little, if anything about the leaders and their motives.

Richard Goodwin, Latin American adviser to President Kennedy, believes the next leader of Cuba is a political "unknown."

"We hope he's not unknown because he hasn't been born," growled one disgruntled exile.

Others, however, center their criticism on the passive American strategy. They urge active support for the underground.

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CUBAN TELLS U. N. U. S. STILL PLOTS

But Roa Does Not Repeat
New Invasion Charge

By RICHARD EDER
Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.,

Oct. 10.—Cuba told the General Assembly today that the United States was continuing to train mercenaries and to smuggle in arms and explosives to commit "act of terrorism."

Foreign Minister Raul Roa confined himself in a speech to a general indictment of United States policy for the most part and failed to amplify or even repeat the charges of invasion preparations issued yesterday in Havana by the Foreign Ministry.

The Cuban delegation was planning to present these charges separately in a letter to the President of the General Assembly. This letter is expected in the near future, perhaps tomorrow.

In a speech that was relatively brief and somewhat less fiery than had been expected, Señor Roa said the United States was simultaneously trying to isolate his country in the hemisphere while helping efforts to subvert the Castro Government.

Adlai E. Stevenson, the chief United States delegate, intervened in the general debate to deny that the United States was planning or preparing intervention against Cuba.

If there is any threat to the Cuban Government, he said, "it comes not from the United States but from the Cuban people."

Earlier Charges

The Cuban statement, issued yesterday by Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Olivares, charged that the United States was preparing a new invasion from bases in its territory and in Central America.

However, Dr. Roa devoted only a single sentence to these charges, saying that "the territory of the United States, the island of Vieques off Puerto Rico, the plantations of Guatemala, the farms of Nicaragua, the haciendas of the Dominican Republic and the Canal Zone of Panama were before, and are now training camps and dens for the mercenaries."

A point in Dr. Roa's speech that was of considerable interest to some Latin-American delegates, was his statement that "we advocate and we accept expressly the amicable mediation of a number of American Governments to explore the possibilities of worthy and honest negotiations with the Government of the United States."

Although he implied that these efforts had failed, Latin-American sources said that this was Cuba's first public acceptance of the idea of mediation.

United States sources here saw little likelihood that the references to mediation would come to anything. The United States takes the position that its differences with Cuba are not a bilateral matter but a hemispheric one, involving the question of Communist intervention in the affairs of the Americas.

Dr. Roa said that the United States "is pressuring the Governments of Latin America individually and collectively to break off diplomatic relations with the revolutionary Government of Cuba." Among the methods being used, he said, was "the falsifying of documents attributed to the Cuban Foreign Ministry."

Dr. Roa charged United States participation in recent plots to assassinate Premier Fidel Castro and his brother Raul. This charge was denied by Mr. Stevenson, who labeled it a "repulsive" accusation.

"Little as the United States likes Fidel Castro and his associates," he said, "it abhors assassination as a means of accomplishing political objectives."

The Cuban Foreign Minister ended his speech with a plea that seemed to be directed particularly at the other Latin American nations, that the principle of nonintervention be respected in the case of his country.

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EDITOR: JOHN B. OAKES

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL
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Cuban Charges Denounced

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 (AP)

Cuban charges that the United States is training new invasion forces at twenty United States and nine Caribbean bases were denounced today as "totally unfounded" and "ridiculous" by the State Department.

Strong denials were also voiced at Fort Worth, Tex.; Norfolk, Va.; in three Florida counties and Fort Bragg, N. C., all named by Acting Cuban res as sites for the mounting of a new assault on Cuba.

An invasion by Cuban exiles failed last April. It was aided by the United States.

Lincoln White, State Department press officer, said no protest had been received from Cuba. But, noting press reports of Señor Olivares' statement before the Cuban diplomatic corps last night, he said:

"I am told that brevity is the essence of wit. I can only say that I assure you that the reported allegations are not only totally unfounded but are ridiculous."

Señor Olivares said the Florida training sites were West Palm Beach, Pompano, Fort Lauderdale, Hollywood, Opa-Locka, Hialeah, Homestead, Tavernier, Islamorada, Long Key, Marathon Key, Big Pine, Key West, St. Petersburg, Sarasota and the Dry Tortugas, west of Key West.

"Castro's as wrong as can be about the Dry Tortugas," said Lieut. R. W. Willcox, commander of the United States Coast Guard Station in Key West. He has jurisdiction over the Tortugas.

Sheriff John M. Spottswood of Monroe County, which includes the Florida Keys, stated emphatically: "No such thing exists in the Florida Keys."



The New York Times
INDICTS U. S.: Dr. Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, accuses U. S., at United Nations General Assembly, of training mercenaries and smuggling arms into Cuba.

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UPI-39

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--PREMIER CASTRO MAY BE PLOTTING A FAKE INVASION OF CUBA AS AN EXCUSE TO "LIQUIDATE" THE IMPRISONED LEADERS OF THE UNSUCCESSFUL APRIL 17 BAY OF PIGS ATTACK, EXILE LEADERS SAID TODAY. THEY SAID THEY WERE WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH AN INTRIGUE BY FRIENDLY LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATS IN SECRET DISPATCHES FROM HAVANA. CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL PRESIDENT JOSE MIRO CARDONA SAID ONE SUCH SOURCE QUOTED CASTRO PERSONALLY AS SAYING THERE WOULD BE AN "INVASION" OF CUBA "WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM THREE PLACES." MIRO SAID IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT EXILES WERE NOT PRESENTLY IN A POSITION FOR AN "IMMEDIATE" ATTACK ON CASTRO. HE POINTED OUT THAT SIX GOVERNMENT HAD DENIED TROOPS. CUSED THIS WEEK BY CASTRO OF TRAINING INVASION TROOPS. "IT WOULD BE CASTRO TO FAKE AN INVASION TO ENABLE HIM TO FIX THE MEN WHO LED THE APRIL 17 ATTACK WHOSE OBLIGED TO RESPECT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE MEN OF WAR," MIRO SAID. MIRO SAID ALSO THAT A FAKE ATTACK WOULD GIVE CASTRO AN OPPORTUNITY TO "DIVERT" PEOPLE'S MINDS FROM DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND ALSO SPUR CRUMBLING MORALE IN THE ARMED FORCES. INFORMED SOURCES IN WASHINGTON SAID ANY BOGUS INVASION STAGED BY CASTRO PROBABLY WOULD BE INTENDED MAINLY TO DISTRACT NATIONAL ATTENTION FROM THE PROBLEMS OF CUBA'S SHORTAGE-PLAGUED ECONOMY. THEY SAID THE PLIGHT OF THE AVERAGE CUBAN, ALREADY BAD, PROBABLY WILL GROW WORSE DURING THE CURRENT DRY SEASON. A REPORT FROM UPI CORRESPONDENT BRUCE AGNEW IN GANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND, SAID THAT SOVIET RUSSIA IS DAILY MOVING "LARGE NUMBERS" OF MILITARY AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL BY AIR TO HAVANA. AGNEW QUOTED ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE SOURCES AS SAYING THERE HAD BEEN A "SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE" OF CUBANA AIRLINES FLIGHTS BETWEEN IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES AND CUBA THROUGH GANDER IN RECENT WEEKS. PASSENGERS WERE IDENTIFIED AS RUSSIANS, POLES, CZECHS AND RED CHINESE AS WELL AS CUBAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.

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NY 1-4 (JUDD)

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.--REP. WALTER JUDD, R-MINN., TODAY CHARGED ADLAI STEVENSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DELEGATE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH BEING LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CUBAN INVASION FIASCO.

JUDD ALSO TOLD AN ALL-DAY REPUBLICAN GATHERING THAT HE CONSIDERED PRESIDENT KENNEDY A WEAK AND INDECISIVE LEADER.

GEORGE ETZELL, REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEEMAN FOR MINNESOTA, WAS MORE PRONOUNCED. HE CALLED KENNEDY "EITHER DUMB OR SOFT ON COMMUNISM."

JUDD SAID STEVENSON WAS CAUGHT ON A LIMB BEFORE THE FINAL STAGE OF THE CUBAN INVASION WAS TO HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT. HE SAID THAT STEVENSON THOUGHT CUBAN PILOTS WHO COMPLETED THE FIRST PHASE OF THE INVASION BY BOMBING WITH B-52S WERE DEFECTORS FROM THE CASTRO REGIME.

JUDD SAID STEVENSON BECAME "INCENSED" WHEN HE LEARNED THEY WERE ACTUALLY EARLIER DEFECTORS FROM THE CUBAN AIR FORCE.

"IT WAS HIS PRESSURE AS FAR AS I CAN FIND OUT," JUDD SAID, "THAT CAUSED POSTPONEMENT OF THE SECOND AND CRUCIAL PHASE OF THE INVASION, THE KNOCKING OUT OF THE T33 PLANES WHICH WOULD LATER BOMB THE INVASION CRAFT."

JUDD SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BE CRITICAL OF THE PRESIDENT BECAUSE, "IN THESE DANGEROUS TIMES I WANT HIM TO BE A GREAT PRESIDENT." BUT HE SAID THAT INDECISION IS THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE OF THE ADMINISTRATION. "MR. KENNEDY WON'T LET OTHERS MAKE ANY DECISIONS AND HE WON'T MAKE ANY HIMSELF," JUDD CLAIMED.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Alperth Thrived on Railway Loan

By Drew Pearson

This column has recently been in error in reporting on the \$14,700,000 Government-owned loan granted to the New Haven Railroad, which U. S. taxpayers had to make good. It was reported that loan included \$600,000 of salary and pension payments to George Alpert, president of the New Haven.



I now find this was in partial error.

The column overlooked the fact that the Alpert law firm of Alpert & Alpert was also paid by the railroad, together with William A. Alpert, a member of the Alpert family.

Thus in 1957, in addition to \$60,000 paid to George Alpert, president, plus \$2150 in director's fees, there was also paid \$15,213 to William A. Alpert for services and disbursements. On top of this, \$76,800 was paid to Alpert & Alpert for services and disbursements.

In 1958, payments were even larger. In addition to \$60,000 salary to president George Alpert, plus \$1600 as director's fees, \$17,182 was paid to William Alpert, plus \$273,455 to Alpert & Alpert, the president's law firm.

In 1959, Alpert & Alpert was paid \$23,762, making a total for the three years of \$410,162, in addition to the \$600,000 salary and pension paid to president Alpert.

My apologies for underestimating the revenue of the

Liberia on hands and knees imitating an animal dance in the jungle, a long cigar clenched between his teeth.

Dancing President

President William Tubman of Liberia was solemn, sedate, and dignified when he was entertained by President Kennedy last week. The descendant of the Maryland slaves who founded a free republic in Africa before the Civil War enjoyed the White House hospitality, but it was a restrained type of enjoyment. It did not begin to match the manner in which President Tubman enjoyed his own inauguration when he was sworn in as President of Liberia in its capital, Monrovia.

Members of the diplomatic corps are still talking about that all-night reception, and how the President of Liberia cakewalked in top hat through the ballroom, then led the orchestra, then got out in the middle of the dance floor to do a Charleston.

Foreign ambassadors clad in white tie and tails, watched with mixed admiration and astonishment. Henry Cabot Lodge, the Boston blueblood, looking tall and dignified, edged toward the door. He was trying to escape unnoticed. By then it was 2 a. m. and most ambassadors figured they had danced long enough.

But the ebullient President of Liberia spied Lodge.

"The party isn't over yet," he admonished.

And, since this was a presidential command, Lodge had to stay.

Before the party broke up at 5 a. m., the ambassadors were treated to the unusual spectacle of the President of

Finally, as the visiting ambassadors got back to their guest house at 5:30, the Japanese Ambassador asked the Chinese Ambassador: "Do you think we have to turn up at the military review at 8 a. m.?" "Yes," replied the Chinese. "We were sent here as special ambassadors for the ceremony, and we have to show." Promptly at 8 a. m., President Tubman appeared in top hat, looking none the worse for his night of dancing.

Mission Accomplished?

Before Gen. Maxwell Taylor's departure for South Vietnam, he was sent on another secret presidential mission—to Time magazine for the purpose of straightening out publisher Henry Luce on the Cuban invasion. The general took with him a list of 17 alleged inaccuracies which he claimed had appeared in a Time report on the Cuban fiasco. Luce called in the author, Charles Murphy, who originally wrote the story for Fortune magazine. Gen. Taylor backed down in Murphy's presence and agreed that the article was substantially accurate, although he insisted it had been slanted.

The Taylor-Luce conference was the result of a long hassle between the White House and the Luce publishing empire over the Cuban affair. President Kennedy started it by calling the Time account inaccurate. Publisher Luce phoned the White House and demanded to be shown the in-

The Washington Post and Times Herald
The Washington Daily News
The Evening Star
New York Herald Tribune
New York Journal-American
New York Mirror
New York Daily News
New York Post
The New York Times
The Worker
The New Leader
The Wall Street Journal
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accuracies. The President finally sent Gen. Taylor with the list of 17 alleged errors.

Headlines and Footnotes

The American Embassy in London flatly predicts that the next Prime Minister of England will be Iain Macleod, young new chairman of the Conservative Party. At 47, Macleod is on the way up and the popularity of Prime Minister Macmillan, 67, is on the way down . . . Joe de Silva, Southern California labor leader, is urging Democrats to register Republican in order to defeat Nixon in the very hot primary battle with ex-Gov. Knight. De Silva predicts there'll be a big Democratic change-over—temporarily—to the Republicans.

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UPI-55

(VAN FLEET)

TAMPA, FLA.--THE TAMPA TRIBUNE HAS QUOTED GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET AS SAYING BERLIN AND LAOS ARE LOST TO THE COMMUNISTS AND SOUTH VIET NAM MAY BE LOST.

IN ITS TUESDAY EDITION, THE NEWSPAPER ALSO QUOTED VAN FLEET AS SAYING HE WOULD HAVE FIRED U.N. AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE CUBAN INVASION LAST APRIL.

THE TRIBUNE REPORTED VAN FLEET'S REMARKS WERE GIVEN IN A SPEECH LAST NIGHT AT LAKE LAND, NEAR HIS HOME AT AUBURNDALE. THE 69-YEAR-OLD FORMER COMMANDER OF THE U.S. EIGHTH ARMY IN KOREA WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE TODAY FOR FORT BRAGG, N.C. IN CONNECTION WITH HIS NEW DUTIES AS ADVISER IN THE ARMY'S GUERRILLA WARFARE PROGRAM.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY CALLED HIM FROM RETIREMENT TO THE POST EARLIER THIS MONTH.

VAN FLEET SAID BERLIN WAS LOST AFTER WORLD WAR II WHEN THE ALLIES DIVIDED GERMANY. HE SAID HE FAVORED PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S POLICY TO FIGHT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF BERLIN BUT SAID THE BRITISH TRADITIONALLY FEARED A STRONG GERMANY AND WOULD LIKE TO KEEP THE COUNTRY DIVIDED. "NEITHER WEST GERMANY NOR THE FRENCH WILL FIGHT WITH US IN BERLIN AND I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD FIGHT FOR THEM, THE NEWSPAPER QUOTED VAN FLEET AS SAYING.

VAN FLEET SAID LAOS WAS A LANDLOCKED NATION WITHOUT DIRECT ACCESS FOR AID AND THAT ITS PEOPLE WERE DIVIDED AND LACKED NATIONAL PRIDE. VAN FLEET, THE NEWSPAPER REPORTED, SAID THE PEOPLE OF VIET NAM HAD PLENTY OF PRIDE BUT THAT WHITE PERSONS SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HE SAID THE PRESENCE OF WHITE TROOPS IN VIET NAM WOULD GIVE THE COMMUNISTS TOOLS FOR PROPAGANDA.

THE TRIBUNE QUOTED VAN FLEET AS SAYING THE UNITED STATES SPONSORED THE CUBAN INVASION AND PLANNED TO PROVIDE AIR COVER, BUT WITHDREW THE PLANS WHEN STEVENSON REFUSED TO SUPPORT THEM.

"THAT'S WHEN I WOULD HAVE FIRED HIM," VAN FLEET SAID. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE INVASION PLANS BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

THE NEWSPAPER SAID VAN FLEET TOLD HIS AUDIENCE PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD OFFERED TO NAME HIM U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AUSTRALIA BUT THAT HE DECLINED IN FAVOR OF HIS PRESENT JOB.

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UPI-73

(VAN FLEET)

WASHINGTON--THE WHITE HOUSE SAID TODAY THAT GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET WAS EXPECTED TO BECOME A SPECIAL CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY DESPITE REPORTS THAT HE MADE SHARPLY CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

THE TAMPA, FLA., TRIBUNE REPORTED THAT VAN FLEET TOLD A LAKE LAND, FLA., AUDIENCE LAST NIGHT THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY SHOULD HAVE FIRED STEVENSON AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS AFTER THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION.

VAN FLEET IS SCHEDULED TO BECOME A PART-TIME CONSULTANT TOMORROW TO ARMY SECRETARY ELVIS J. STAHR WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON COMBAT READINESS OF CERTAIN NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE ARMY UNITS. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED VAN FLEET'S ASSIGNMENT ON OCT. 11.

ASKED ABOUT THE TRIBUNE STORY, ACTING PRESS SECRETARY JAY GILDNER SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW VAN FLEET WOULD TAKE ON THE ASSIGNMENT.

GILDNER SAID HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE VAN FLEET REMARKS EXCEPT WHAT HE READ IN A NEWS ACCOUNT. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER KENNEDY WAS AWARE OF THE REMARKS.

NEITHER THE ARMY NOR THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT WOULD COMMENT ON THE REPORT OF VAN FLEET'S REMARKS THAT BERLIN AND LAOS ARE LOST TO THE COMMUNISTS. VAN FLEET COULD NOT BE LOCATED IMMEDIATELY.

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UPI-23

(VAN FLEET)

FT. MONROE, VA.--GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET TELEGRAPHED ADLAI STEVENSON LAST NIGHT, RETRACTING AND APOLOGIZING FOR STATEMENTS HE MADE ABOUT THE U.N. AMBASSADOR'S ROLE IN THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION.

VAN FLEET SAID THE STATEMENTS HE MADE MONDAY NIGHT IN FLORIDA WERE BASED ON ERRONEOUS INFORMATION.

HE HAD BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING HE WOULD HAVE FIRED STEVENSON LAST APRIL AFTER THE REBEL INVASION WHICH THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED.

THE TELEGRAM, RELEASED HERE LAST NIGHT, SAID:

"MY INFORMATION FROM SEVERAL SOURCES REGARDING CUBA WAS EVIDENTLY ERRONEOUS. IN VIEW OF YOUR TELEGRAM, WHICH I AM GLAD TO HAVE, I STAND CORRECTED AND AM SORRY FOR PRESS STATEMENTS WHICH WERE, IN FACT, NOT ACCURATE AND COMPLETELY OUT OF CONTEXT.

"I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE MEETING WAS A SMALL GROUP IN CLOSED SESSION AND REMARKS WERE MADE IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY PERSONAL FRIENDS AFTER MY MAIN ADDRESS COVERING WATER RESOURCES IN FLORIDA, AND I WAS ASSURED THERE WOULD BE NO PRESS COVERAGE."

THE TELEGRAM WAS RELEASED HERE BY LT. COL. GEORGE MONSARATT, WHO SAID HE WAS NOT ACTING IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY. HE SAID VAN FLEET HAD ASKED HIM TO RELEASE THE STATEMENT TO LOCAL NEWS MEDIA.

VAN FLEET TOLD REPORTERS AT THE AIRPORT AT NORFOLK LAST NIGHT THAT "IF A REPORTER ASKED ME HOW THE WEATHER WAS, I'D HAVE TO SAY NO COMMENT."

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UPI-172

(VAN FLEET)

WASHINGTON.--THE ARMY DISASSOCIATED ITSELF TODAY FROM REPORTED STATEMENTS BY GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET THAT U.N. AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIRED FOR HIS PART IN THE CUBAN FIASCO AND THAT BERLIN AND LAGS ARE BOTH LOST TO THE COMMUNISTS.

IN SO DOING, THE ARMY REVEALED THAT VAN FLEET WILL ACT AS A CONSULTANT ON THE SERVICE'S GUERRILLA WARFARE PROGRAM FOR ONLY 90 DAYS DURING THE NEXT YEAR, AND THAT HE WILL RECEIVE NO PAY FOR HIS SERVICES.

"WHEN NOT ACTING IN THIS ROLE (AS A CONSULTANT) THE GENERAL'S REMARKS ARE MADE IN HIS CAPACITY AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN," THE ARMY SAID.

"TO DATE HE HAS PERFORMED NO OFFICIAL DUTIES AS SPECIAL CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY."

THE 69-YEAR-OLD VAN FLEET WAS A HERO IN THE NORMANDY LANDINGS AND LATER IN GREECE AND KOREA. HE IS A FORMER COMMANDER OF THE U.S. EIGHTH ARMY IN KOREA. VAN FLEET WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE TODAY FOR FORT BRAGG, N.C., TO TAKE UP HIS DUTIES. PRESIDENT KENNEDY CALLED HIM OUT OF RETIREMENT TO TAKE THE ASSIGNMENT ON OCT. 11.

THE TAMPA TRIBUNE QUOTED VAN FLEET THIS MORNING AS SAYING HE "WOULD HAVE FIRED" STEVENSON BECAUSE HE SAID THE AMBASSADOR REFUSED TO SUPPORT AMERICAN AIR COVER FOR THE CUBAN INVASION LAST APRIL.

THE ARMY SAID VAN FLEET'S CONSULTANT DUTIES WILL CONSIST OF INSPECTING THE 32ND NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION OF WISCONSIN, WHICH WAS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY AT FORT LEWIS, WASH.; THE 49TH NATIONAL GUARD ARMORED DIVISION FROM TEXAS, WHICH IS AT FORT POLK, LA.; AND CERTAIN NON-DIVISIONAL RESERVE AND SPECIAL ANTI-GUERRILLA FORCES.

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UPI-174

ADD 1 VAN FLEET, WASHINGTON (UPI-172)

A DIRECTIVE RECENTLY SIGNED BY DEFENSE SECRETARY MCNAMARA STATED THAT "IN PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS, ALL OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONFINE THEMSELVES TO DEFENSE MATTERS."


THE DIRECTIVE ADDED THAT "THEY SHOULD PARTICULARLY AVOID DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS, A FIELD WHICH IS RESERVED FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE."

IN DESCRIBING VAN FLEET'S DUTIES THE ARMY SAID "HE WILL ACT AS A CONSULTANT FOR A TOTAL OF 90 DAYS DURING A ONE-YEAR PERIOD ENDING NOT LATER THAN OCT. 8, 1962. HE WILL RECEIVE NO COMPENSATION FOR HIS ASSISTANCE TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY."

PRESIDENT KENNEDY, IN ANNOUNCING VAN FLEET'S RECALL FROM RETIREMENT TO AID THE ARMY ESPECIALLY IN ANTI-GUERRILLA TACTICS, DID NOT MENTION THESE LIMITATIONS ON HIS SERVICES. HE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO RECEIVE RETIREMENT PAY.

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UPI-87

(CUBA)

HAVANA--PREMIER CASTRO CHARGED AGAIN TODAY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARING NEW AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA.

"IF THEY ATTACK," CASTRO SAID, "THEY WILL FIND ONCE MORE THAT THE CUBAN REVOLUTION IS MORE FIRMLY IN THE FATHERLAND ROOTS (AND) THAT IT HAS THE COURAGE AND WILL TO RESIST AND WIN."

CASTRO MADE THE STATEMENT IN A MESSAGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL STUDENT UNION.

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
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UPI-80

(STEVENSON)

NEW IBERIA, LA.--LABOR COLUMNIST VICTOR RIESEL, HAS ACCUSED UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON OF MAKING "A LOT OF NOISE" AND THEN LYING ABOUT THE USE OF AIR COVER DURING THE CUBAN INVASION. RIESEL SAID STEVENSON "LIED WHEN HE SAID HE DID NOT INSIST ON THE REMOVAL OF AIR COVER."

THE BLIND COLUMNIST SAID THE CUBAN INVASION "FLOPPED BECAUSE STEVENSON MADE A LOT OF NOISE AND THREATENED TO RESIGN FROM THE UNITED NATIONS IF THE AIR COVER WAS NOT CALLED OFF."

RIESEL CHARGED THAT THE PEOPLE OF CUBA "WERE BETRAYED." HE SAID CASTRO MILITIA BEGAN DESERTING TO "OUR SIDE, BUT WHEN NO AIR COVER CAME, THEY REVERTED BACK TO THE SIDE OF CASTRO."

HE SPOKE TO 180 MEMBERS OF THE NEW IBERIA EXECUTIVES DINNER CLUB.
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Latin America Alarmed by New Invasion Threat Against Cuba

By JOSEPH NORTH

HAVANA — Storm signals are flying all over Latin America, not of Caribbean hurricanes, but of political storms and portents of new armed aggressions on Cuba.

The newspaper "Ultimas Horas" in Brazil has warned its readers and the nation that all Latin America's destiny is involved, and that all must defend Cuba's right to self-determination and freedom from intervention. It said a new invasion was imminent. Some think it is a matter of days.

The newspaper "Diario de la Tarde" of Mexico City and the Partido Popular Socialista Mexicano said the landings may be launched within the first two weeks of this month.

Julio Valladores Castillo, a Guatemalan deputy, denounced the Ydigoras government for "compromising" itself by helping the projected invasion which he said is directed by U. S. authorities.

All point out that the sovereignty of each Latin American country is at stake and that world peace is jeopardized.

A number of days ago word came from Central America that various ports facing Cuba have been closed to the public and that unprecedented activity was taking place on the docks where troop-ships are anchored.

Many Latin American observers in Havana believe that CIA and State Department officials are ready to explode this new aggression against world peace while the peoples have their attention focused on Germany.

Whatever the design and possible camouflage, one thing is

certain, Cuba is not letting its guard down. The government has said publicly many times that the architects of Playa Giron last April have refused to learn their lesson.

Well-grounded prediction is that the invasion this time may see puppet Central American governments in a more direct and open role. They may mount a phony attack on themselves, using airplanes painted with Cuban air-force markings, set some men clad in the olive-green uniforms marching in their own territories, and claim they are Fidel's Cuban forces. Faked confessions may be broadcast, followed by a declaration of war upon Cuba. This may take place in Guatemala or in Nicaragua or in any of the countries where stooge regimes maintain power.

It is felt that trigger-happy interventionists are stepping up their time schedule throughout

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the continent.

A few weeks ago it was Brazil. This week it was Ecuador. In both places the peoples handed the desperate counter-revolutionists and domestic reactionaries historic setbacks. Should Cuba be invaded, as all indications are that it will, the resultant political storm throughout Latin America will far surpass anything ever seen before, observers here are predicting.

The revelations over Cuba's television network this past week were carefully heeded throughout the continent.

A high-placed Cuban counter-revolutionist named Reinel Gonzalez, arrested recently by the security forces, described in detail how arms and weapons of sabotage and terrorism arrive here from the states — by airplane, by ship and from the U. S. naval base at Guantanamo. He implicated the CIA, the State

Department and Guantanamo officials. He named as accomplices Jose Elguera, former president of Costa Rica; Munoz Mariz, of Puerto Rico; Haya de la Torre, of Peru; and Romulo Betancourt, president of Venezuela. In addition he told how most of the salangate clergy — "95 percent were in it up to their necks. He gave names and addresses where the stuff was stored and who was in charge.

Gonzalez told exactly who was responsible for burning down the big department store "El Encanto," and how new fires of big public places were being planned. Ten days ago an effort was made to burn down the national trade-union headquarters. Coolly, he told how the counter-revolution expected that Fidel Castro would call a mass protest meeting before the Presidential Palace on which the plotters would rain

hand grenades and explosives from weapons as big as the latest modern bazooka and how the planned the assassination of the prime minister at that time.

He confessed that an apartment had been rented in a building on the north side of the presidential square. The apartment was filled with arms sent by the CIA, he said — not only the bazooka but machine-guns, a supply of hand grenades, and even some faked militia and army uniforms were stored there for the conspirators to don and escape in the crowds during the expected tumult after the attempt on Castro's life. The security forces had raided the apartment and found the arms and materials in question.

The fact is, as Gonzalez admitted, the Cuban security knew all about this, followed his activities the previous six months. They not only rounded him up but scores of agents who were in the network formerly directed by Manuel Fay, a leading Cuban renegade. Fay, Gonzalez said, fell out with the CIA authorities because they appointed somebody they regarded as more "reliable" to head the inner works of sabotage. (They are all in jail now, Gonzalez said.)

All this was prelude to the forthcoming invasion, Gonzalez declared. He had been head of the Catholic youth organization here, but, as Cubans say, he not only betrayed his country but the millions of Catholics who are dedicated to support of the Castro government and the revolution.

Gonzalez sadly admitted that not only were the security authorities "scientifically efficient" but the civilian, voluntary "committees in defense of the revolution" had nipped every plot in the bud, gathering up the fire bombs before they exploded.

He said that the U. S. embassy personnel here — before the break in relations — were in-

volved in "anti-terrorist" activities, paying the participants off and shielding them on embassy ground." And that the Venezuelan embassy, with the specific knowledge of president Betancourt, continued to work with the plotters after the U. S. officials packed up and left.

All this is on the record, names, places, dates. The proofs, Cubans say, are available to anybody who truly wants the evidence.

Several weeks ago Dr. Raul Roa, foreign minister, warned the world at the United Nations of preparations for another invasion.

TRAINING BASES

Dr. Carlos Oliveres, another leading foreign office authority, gave the names of twenty-nine specific sites in the U. S. as well as in other lands where training was taking place.

The Cuban people know the facts. It is a revelation to see how calmly they go about their daily rounds, fully aware of the dangers. They know that their government is doing all it can. They know that their army is totally dedicated and is part of the people. And that their army

is totally dedicated and is part of the people. But most of all they know they are a people in arms, through the popular militia formations which number in the hundreds of thousands.


So they work hard to step up production in the factories, with sights on the goals set forth by Fidel Castro in his recent speech on the four year plan.

This correspondent has seen the calm of the farmers busy on their cooperatives, state, and private holdings. He has seen the student at their books, studying into all hours to catch up fast, in science, in technology, in political economy, in the humanities, in the arts.

As this is written the employees of this hotel — elevator operators, waiters, chambermaids, black and white, young and old, women, and men, are on the street below marching and counter-marching in drill formation. Some do not yet wear the militia uniform, but drill in the clothes they wear at work. One waitress still has her apron on.

A people in arms, certain of their cause, knowing, most of the world is with them.

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UPI-27

(CUBA)

MOSCOW--MOSCOW RADIO CHARGED IN A BROADCAST BEAMED AT NORTH AMERICA TODAY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARING TO "SUPPRESS THE CUBAN REVOLUTION BY FORCE OF ARMS."

"IT SEEMS THE AGGRESSORS HAVE LEARNED NOTHING FROM THE LESSON THEY WERE GIVEN IN THE SPRING OF THIS YEAR BY THE CUBAN PEOPLE," THE RADIO SAID.

11/15--GE952A ✓

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UPI-112

(BURKE)

CHICAGO--ADMIRAL ARLEIGH A. BURKE, FORMER CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, SAID TODAY THAT HE WAS RESTRICTED IN WHAT HE COULD SAY BEFORE HE RETIRED.

"I HAD SEVERAL SPEECHES THAT WEREN'T GIVEN," BURKE TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE, "BUT I DIDN'T PROTEST. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO HAVING SPEECHES CENSORED."

BURKE EXPLAINED THAT AN OFFICER OFTEN IS NOT IN A POSITION TO HAVE COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT A SITUATION. HE SAID AN OFFICER SHOULD SUBMIT SPEECHES TO OFFICIALS WITH MORE INFORMATION TO "MAKE SURE HE WASN'T SAYING SOMETHING DISRUPTING."

BURKE SAID THAT CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AT TOP POLICY-MAKING LEVELS WAS A GOOD THING, BUT ADDED THAT IT IS "IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE MILITARY AND POLITICAL THINGS."

SINCE THE KOREAN CONFLICT, BURKE SAID, THE NAVY HAS EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM TO MAKE FIGHTING MEN REALIZE WHAT OUR GOVERNMENT STANDS FOR AND WHAT DEMOCRACY MEANS. HE SAID THAT U.S. SOLDIERS IN KOREA "HAD NO STRONG CONVICTIONS," BUT THAT THE MORALE IS "MUCH BETTER" NOW.

BURKE, WHO HAD A PART OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTIVE INVASION OF CUBA LAST APRIL, REFUSED TO COMMENT IN DETAIL ON THE FIASCO. HE DID SAY THAT U.S. JETS WERE IN THE AIR DURING THE INVASION, BUT THEY DID NOT FLY OVER CUBAN TERRITORY "EXCEPT FOR ONE SHORT PERIOD."

ASKED IF THE FULL STORY OF THE CUBAN INVASION IS GOING TO BE RELEASED, BURKE REPLIED: "NOT FROM ME IT AIN'T!"

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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U.S. Investigators Checking Them

Records of Cuban Invasion Fought Over in Court Here

By DOM BONA FEDE
Herald Staff Writer

A legal battle for possession of complete records of the April 17 Cuban invasion, including information heretofore undisclosed, was waged at a Dade Circuit Court hearing Friday.

Some 13,000 pounds of documents sought in the court wrangle contains personnel records, intelligence data, sabotage background and counter-revolutionary information.

For the past several months, State Department investigators have been secretly combing through the mountainous material kept under lock and key in a Miami warehouse by the anti-Castro Democratic Revolutionary Front.

The hearing, before Judge Lucien C. Proby Jr., involved action by the Front to retain possession of the files, which

organization members maintain belong to them.

But Felix Gutierrez Fernandez, an ex-Cuban businessman and former officer in Batista's secret army intelligence corps, disputed the claim. The documents, he said, are his. He said they comprised his business records, as well as private data he collected on the anti-Castro movement.

Gutierrez, a heavyset, clean-shaven man, asked that the records be turned over to him. The request was denied by Judge Proby.

Cuban revolutionary leaders, led by Dr. Antonio de Vazquez, later declared that the material would be of inestimable value to Fidel Castro.

They said the records listed anti-Castro strongholds in Cuba, the names of underground members, and confidential intelligence, which would enable the Cuban government to strangle the counter-revolutionary fight in Cuba.

Several witnesses, including members of the Front, testified that Gutierrez was a high-ranking member of the Front's intelligence service, working directly under Joaquin Sanjens, longtime chief of the section.

They said that Gutierrez leased a house on behalf of the Front at 3155 Ponce de

Leon, Coral Gables. The house was used as a records center and recruiting depot for the Cuban Liberation Army from Dec. 17, 1960, to shortly after the invasion last April, they said.

One witness, Candido Molinet, said that Gutierrez investigated recruits enlisted in the anti-Castro army prior to their departure for training in Guatemala.

Under questioning by Carlos Fernandez, attorney for the Front, Gutierrez vigorously de-

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Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
Date 12/9/61

FPM - CUBA
ANTI-CASTO ACTIVITIES
(BUfile 109-584)
(MMfile 105-1742)

Submitted by the
Miami Division

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nied that he had ever worked for the Front or Sanjenis.

"I never had anything to do with the Front," he declared.

He said that Sanjenis was a friend and that he had allowed him to use the office, which he (Guterrez) rented for his personal business.

He added that he collected counter-revolutionary information on his own initiative because he was interested in attempts to overthrow Castro "like any other Cuban."

The dispute over the records broke on April 21, 1961, four days after the invasion was launched, when Ernesto Despaigne was sent by the Front to take possession of the material stored at the house on Ponce de Leon.

Guterrez, however, charged Despaigne with trespassing and he was jailed for eight hours by police before being released.

Despaigne is presently the chief military adviser for the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the principal anti-Castro organization in Miami.

On May 3, Attorney Fernandez, armed with a sheriff's order, visited the house and attached the files and furniture. They have since remained in the warehouse, unavailable to anyone but the State Department investigators.

Efforts, meanwhile, to find Sanjenis, purportedly Guterrez's onetime boss, have been unsuccessful. According to Cuban revolutionary sources he has gone into hiding.

Owen Freed, attorney for Guterrez, said he will appeal the court's decision.

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Cuba Invasion Planned By Castro, Welch Says

BOSTON, Dec. 20 (AP)—The United States-supported invasion of Cuba was planned by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and his friends in our Government," Robert Welch, founder of the controversial John Birch Society, said in a copyrighted interview today in the Boston Herald.

The Herald quoted Welch as saying: "All we did in Cuba was help Castro. The Cuba invasion was planned by Castro and his friends in our Government to make Castro stronger throughout Latin America, to reduce United States prestige, and to expose prematurely thousands of patriotic Cuban citizens for the purpose of killing off future resistance."

"We butted in and we messed it up."

Welch offered no documentation for his statements.

"All we have to do to stop the Communists from taking over the world and have it disappear and have freedom revived, is to stop helping them," Welch said. "If our Government would stop, the Communist advance would be stopped in six months; in another six months, the Communist movement would blow up."

Welch admitted in the question-and-answer interview that the Birch Society hasn't attained its goal of one million members.

"While the Society is larger and stronger than a year ago, it hasn't increased in numbers over the past three or four months as it did in the preceding months."

He said his magazine "American Opinion," to which many Birch members subscribe, now has a circulation of nearly 20,000, while it had 4,000 paid subscribers 18 months ago.

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
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
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UPI-37

(CUBA)

SAVANNAH, GA.--REP. ELLIOTT HAGAN, D-GA., ^{DC} SAID YESTERDAY HE
 WOULD SUPPORT A MILITARY INVASION OF CUBA TO OUST PREMIER CASTRO.
 "WE SHOULD BE FIRM AND POSITIVE AND REMOVE THIS FEVER BLISTER OF
 COMMUNISM FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE," HE SAID.

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Guatemala Admits Invasion Role Against Cuba, Hints U. S. 'Sequel'

GUATEMALA, Jan. 1 (AP) — President Miguel Ydigoras has acknowledged for the first time that Guatemala aided counter-revolutionaries who tried to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba last April.

In a New Year's message to the nation by radio and TV last night, he sharply criticized those who called the crushed April invasion a debacle, saying it frightened Castro so much "that his warlike activities outside Cuba ceased since that date." And, he added:

"President Kennedy still has the responsibility of a sequel."

He did not elaborate, but implied he was talking about something that may come from a meeting of Hemisphere foreign ministers in Uruguay later this month.

As to the April invasion, he said, "We encouraged thousands of exiled Cubans to fight to regain their own homeland instead of lamenting their ill fortune."

"This is the first time my government has spoken of training armed Cuban contingents of sound anti-Castro faith in Guatemala. We reached an understanding with exiled Cuban leaders and they entered into arrangements with a friendly government able to give arms and sustain training and a military campaign."

He said a secret training base was set up near the town of Retalhuleu and another operated openly, and when the "climactic hour ar-

rived Cuban troops were sent into combat on April 17, 1961, and the battle of Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) developed."

Ydigoras said the outcome of the fight at Bay of Pigs was a debacle only from the point of view of "pro-Communists embedded in the press and some public offices in the United States," but it was a great victory from the point of view of those who really has acknowledged for the first cause it scared Fidel Castro so much "that his warlike activities outside Cuba ceased since that date."


He also said the Guatemalan government maintained the reserve which is proper in such cases but the North Americans became "hysterical as happens to them when they suffer a setback" and "their noisy press and the Gringo pro-Communists" stirred things up and created an atmosphere of "defeatism and debacle." This, he said, led to ungentlemanly recriminations from journalists and officials and they forgot themselves to the point of naming Guatemala as the source of the invasion.

"Such brazenness had never been seen," Ydigoras said. "However, as was to be expected, President Kennedy, with the gesture of a great statesman, shouldered the responsibility, but President Kennedy still has the responsibility of a sequel neither cleared up nor fulfilled. The commitment made to Guatemala."

It is not clear what com-

mitment he meant, but presumably it is this:

"The Bay of Pigs was a victory, not a defeat, and he who begins under such auspices must go on with the great task of de-communicating that part of the American territory. There are signed commitments in South America."



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U. S. Denies Deal with Guatemala On British Honduras, Cuban Exiles

Associated Press

A State Department spokesman yesterday denied that the United States made a deal with Guatemala concerning British Honduras in return for Guatemala's help in training Cuban exiles for last year's invasion of Cuba.

State Department press officer Lincoln White issued the denial when asked about a press report quoting Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras as asking President Kennedy to comply with an agreement that he said had been made with Washington.

The question concerned a dispatch in the New York Times quoting Ydigoras as saying that in return for the Guatemalan aid in preparing for the unsuccessful Cuban invasion, the United States had agreed to offer its good offices in Guatemala's dispute with Britain over British Honduras. The Guatemalans call the territory Belize and say the Central American land should rightfully belong to them.

White said, "We have not made any offer of good offices." As to "whether, in turn for something Guatemala had done, we had undertaken

a commitment on our part, no we have not," White said.

White declined further comment on remarks attributed to Ydigoras in a New Year's radio-television message in Guatemala.

One such comment was a reported Ydigoras statement that Mr. Kennedy "still has the responsibility of a sequel" to the ill-fated Cuban invasion.

Other officials, speaking privately, said earlier that they do not consider the United States to have any unfulfilled duty regarding the Cuban situation.

[In Guatemala City, Foreign Minister Jesus Undamurillo said Tuesday he knew of no agreement with President Kennedy to mediate in the dispute with Britain, Reuters reported.]

In Palm Beach, Fla., Presi-

dential press secretary Pierre Salinger referred all questions on the matter to the State Department.

White said he was declining comment because the full text of Ydigoras' remarks has not been received by the Department—only press accounts that are not entirely in agreement.

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UPI-137

(CUBA)

MIAMI--THE FIDEL CASTRO REGIME TODAY ADMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME HEAVY LOSSES IN BEATING OFF LAST APRIL'S ABORTIVE PIG'S BAY INVASION ATTEMPT.

CUBAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJ. SERGIO DEL VALLE IN A SPEECH OVER HANA RADIO, MONITORED HERE, CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT'S DEFENSE AGAINST THE ATTACK FOR WHICH HE BLAMED "OUR HEAVY LOSSES." HIS TALK WAS SURPRISINGLY BLUNT.

"GOVERNMENT FORCES PLANNED (DEFENSE) VERY BADLY," HE SAID. "WE HAD HEAVY LOSSES BECAUSE OUR COUNTER-ATTACK PLANNING WAS BAD AND WE USED TOO MANY SOLDIERS."

"I'M SURE THAT IF THE INVADERS CAME TODAY THEY WOULD NOT LAST 24 HOURS."

IT WAS 72 HOURS LAST APRIL BEFORE LACK OF AIR SUPPORT, LOSS OF AN AMMUNITION SUPPLY SHIP AND A SHORTAGE OF DRINKING WATER FORCED THE MASS SURRENDER OF SOME 1,200 TROOPS IN THE INVASION FORCE.

MEMBERS OF THE INVASION FORCE WHO ESCAPED AND REACHED THE UNITED STATES ESTIMATED CASTRO'S LOSSES AT THE TIME AT AROUND 1,000. THE INVADERS LOST FEWER THAN 100.

CASTRO AT THE TIME MINIMIZED HIS LOSSES. BUT GOVERNMENT PENSION LISTS PUBLISHED SINCE HAVE CITED SEVERAL HUNDRED FAMILIES AS DESERVING AID BECAUSE OF BATTLE CASUALTIES.

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Nixon Says U.S. Needs a Policy To Oust Castro

Richard M. Nixon said last night this country needs "a determination that Castro has to go, and a policy to bring that about."

In a 50-minute taped interview on the Jack Paar television show (NBC), the former Vice President ran the gamut of topics, from Castro to the John Birch Society to Robert Kennedy's Japanese visit, to his feeling about "muzzling" military brass.

At the end of his appearance, Mr. Nixon played the Missouri Waltz on the piano.

Asked to evaluate President Kennedy's action in Cuba, Mr. Nixon said criticism of the President for approving the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion last year was out of order. Mr. Kennedy's mistake, Mr. Nixon said, was that he did not "follow through as he could have with air support which would have insured success."

ONLY CHOICE: SUCCESS

"Once the U.S. had committed its prestige," Mr. Nixon said, "then there was no choice but to see that it succeeded."

The former Vice President said the United States needed a three-part policy to unseat Castro—legal means to stop the flow of arms and munitions into Cuba; a legal way of stopping flow of arms and Communist agents out of Cuba and into the rest of Latin America; and a means to "bring the Monroe Doctrine up to date," to prevent other subversive inroads into the Latin American countries.

Mr. Nixon also said that John Birch Society members, Minutemen and others who embrace "totalitarian means" play into Communist hands.

He said those political candidates "who seek support from the John Birch Society are not serving America."

As for the Attorney General's goodwill trip and the attendant demonstrations, Mr. Nixon said: "A minority are embarrassing the great majority of Japanese." He said most Japanese were friendly to the U. S.

"TOUGH, INTELLIGENT"

He described the Attorney General as a "tough minded, quick and intelligent" individual with qualities which should make him, with experience, a good Secretary of State.

"He is one who has a tremendous will to win," Mr. Nixon said.

"Looking at Robert Kennedy you have here a man who, except for the lack of experience which he is now gaining, has many of the qualifications that would make him a very effective leader in the field of foreign policy," Mr. Nixon said.


Mr. Nixon said military officers should not speak on a "partisan" basis.

He said, however, that American soldiers "should be indoctrinated on the world struggle and on the dangers of Communism."

Touching briefly on his personal impression of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Mr. Nixon said he "uses his temper, doesn't lose it."

He said contrary to the opinion of many, Khrushchev was not a man apt to lose control of himself, but a cold, calculating leader.

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Nixon on TV Offers Ways To Beat Castro

NEW YORK, Feb. 8 (UPI). Richard M. Nixon said tonight this country needs "a determination that Castro has to go, and a policy to bring that about."

In a 50-minute taped interview on the Jack Paar television show (NBC), the former Vice President ran the gamut of topics, from Castro to the John Birch Society to Robert Kennedy's Japanese visit, to his feeling about "muzzling" military brass.

Asked to evaluate President Kennedy's action in Cuba, Nixon said criticism of the President for approving the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion last year was out of order. Mr. Kennedy's mistake, Nixon said, was that he did not "follow through as he could have with air support which would have insured success."

"Once the United States had committed its prestige, Nixon said, "then there was no choice but to see that it succeeded."

Nixon said the United States needed a three-part policy to unseat Castro—legal means to stop the flow of arms and munitions into Cuba; a legal way of stopping flow of arms and Communist agents out of Cuba and into the rest of Latin America; and a means to "bring the Monroe Doctrine up to date."

Nixon also said that John Birch Society members, Minutemen and others who embrace "totalitarian means... play into Communist hands."

As for the Attorney General's goodwill trip and the attendant demonstrations, Nixon said: "A minority are embarrassing the great majority of Japanese."

He said military officers should not speak on a "partisan" basis.

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Nixon Raps Kennedy On Invasion of Cuba

NEW YORK, Feb. 9 (AP).—Former Vice President Richard M. Nixon has attacked President Kennedy's handling of the abortive Cuban invasion—especially for failure to give the invaders air support.

Appearing for almost an hour last night on the nationally televised Jack Paar Show (NBC-TV), Mr. Nixon said he had been unable to discuss the Cuban situation as freely as he wanted to during the 1960 presidential campaign because he knew the United States was training rebels to mount last year's invasion.

Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Nixon said, apparently "took the advice of some people around him" when he failed to follow through with air support.

"Once the United States has committed its prestige to the overthrow of a Communist regime, and once the decision was made, and once the troops sailed, there was no choice but to make it succeed," Mr. Nixon said.

"Castro Must Go"

What is needed, he added, "is a determination: Castro must go, and the development of a policy to see that it happens."

In discussing the present administration's foreign policies, Mr. Nixon said: "If all the United States does is what the weak and timid will approve, we might as well cash in our chips right now."

Mr. Nixon discussed Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the President's brother.

"In looking at Robert Kennedy," Mr. Nixon said, "you have a man who, except for lack of experience which he is now gaining, has many qualities of leadership in foreign policy."

Mr. Nixon noted published reports hinting that the younger Kennedy is being considered for a foreign policy post—possibly even Secretary of State.

Raps Birch Society

Mr. Kennedy, currently in Japan, first foreign stop in a trip around the world, said in Tokyo he had no comment.

Commenting on the ultra-conservative John Birch Society and the Minuteman organiza-

tions, Mr. Nixon said that neither the Republicans nor the Democrats can afford candidates who seek the support of such groups.

"We need good, strong anti-Communists in this country," Mr. Nixon said, "but I realize that those who exaggerate, those who make a racket of it, hurt the cause. When you overstate your case, you are playing into their (Communist's) hands."

"I know from experience," Mr. Nixon continued, "that in fighting the Communists in this country, as they should be fought, one of the things that is most essential is that you have every regard for the use of American principles in fighting them."


Backs Troop Indoctrination

Concerning the current controversy over "muzzling" the military, Mr. Nixon said top-ranking officers must be well-informed on the menace of communism and that troops overseas should be indoctrinated.

Asked how he felt about the series of television debates between himself and President Kennedy during the last presidential campaign, Mr. Nixon said:

"That is moot at this point, and by that I mean if I was sorry I wouldn't say so."

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
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UPI-47

(U.N.)

UNITED NATIONS--THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES PLANNED TO ASK THE
 GENERAL ASSEMBLY TODAY TO IGNORE CUBA'S CHARGES OF U.S. AGGRESSION.
 INFORMED SOURCES SAID THE LATIN AMERICANS WOULD MOVE THAT THE
 ASSEMBLY TAKE NO VOTE ON A COMMUNIST RESOLUTION THAT WOULD GIVE NOMINAL
 RECOGNITION TO THE CHARGES BROUGHT BY PREMIER CASTRO'S GOVERNMENT.
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UPI-32

(CUBA)

MOSCOW--THE SOVIET UNION CHARGED YESTERDAY THAT U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA IS A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.

ACCUSING THE U.S. OF PLANNING AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA, THE KREMLIN WARNED OF POSSIBLE RETALIATORY MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN COUNTRIES WHERE U.S. MILITARY BASES ARE LOCATED.

THE STATEMENT, PUBLISHED BY TASS, SAID:

"IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THREATENS CUBA, LET IT DRAW THE PROPER CONCLUSION WITH REGARD TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE U.S. MILITARY BASES ARE SITUATED."

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| Mr. Holmes | |
| Miss Gandy | |

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Cuban Fiasco Poorly

Planned

Dulles' Group Is First in

Line for Censure

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N . Y. WORLD TELEGRAM
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DATED 2/23/62
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FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION
EDITOR: LEE B. WOOD
RE: "CIA: THE INSIDE STORY"
BY ANDREW TULLY
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One of the darkest chapters in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency is its role in the unsuccessful invasion of Cuba in 1961. Prize-winning writer Andrew Tully gives the full story today in the concluding installment from his newly published book, *"CIA: The Inside Story"* (William Morrow & Co.).

By **ANDREW TULLY** N.Y.

THE second guessers who ply their opinions so vigorously in Washington are always in agreement on one point: The April, 1961, landing at the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, was one of the most poorly planned and executed military adventures in history.

President Kennedy is prone to dismiss any discussion of a scapegoat with the curt suggestion that "There's enough blame to go around." After all, he did not get much of a performance either from the Pentagon or from his close White House advisers.

Nevertheless, the Central Intelligence Agency remains first in line for censure, for a variety of reasons. Chief among these is CIA's apparently traditional unwillingness to do business with any but the forces of the far right.

Because CIA insisted in maintaining that an invasion by 1400 men could seriously threaten a regime with a military force of upwards to 400,000, perhaps nothing could have saved the day. But at least the adventure would have had a better chance if Allen Dulles and his aides had availed themselves of a moderately liberal organization that not only had the most popular appeal among Cubans but also controlled the highly effective anti-Castro underground.

CIA now maintains that actually the invasion was designed exclusively for this purpose — the establishment of a guerrilla force in Cuba — but there is no record that Mr. Dulles explained it in this fashion to the President beforehand.

CIA Was Given Task Of Ousting Castro

To understand all the blunders which went into the manufacture of the Cuban fiasco, it is necessary to go back to the late spring of

1960 when the Eisenhower Administration decided to take a hand in the liquidation of the Castro regime. Castro had to go, and the CIA was given the assignment of sending him on his way.

The first step was to try to make sense out of the various warring factions organized by Cuban exiles to regain power in their homeland. Foremost among these were the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR), a moderately right-wing outfit composed of former Castro supporters and military officers and Cuban business and professional men, and Manolo Ray's People's Revolutionary Movement (MRP).

Mr. Ray, who had been Castro's Minister of Public Works, was the boss of the resistance movement inside Cuba. But to CIA, Mr. Ray was an anathema almost from the start.

In Miami, where the exile leaders spent their days in long-winded plotting, Mr. Ray became the target of reactionary Cuban businessmen and politicians, including the notorious Rolando Masferrer, who had been Batista's chief executioner in Oriente Province.

CIA did manage to get the exile factions united in something called the Revolutionary



JOSE MIRO CARDONA
Fated.

Democratic Front, which included Mr. Ray's effective and, among people of Cuba, highly popular MRP.

Farms Acquired For Training Grounds

Several isolated farms in Florida were leased or purchased and used as training grounds for recruits who flocked to the Liberation Army. CIA helped finance this training and so did various Cuban and American corporations with Cuban interests. In overall command was CIA's Richard M. Bissel, Mr. Dulles' top deputy.

The U.S. government worked out an agreement with Guatemala's President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes shortly after he broke relations with the Castro government by which Guatemala furnished training fields for the Liberation Army.

Airstrips were built and American pilots arrived to train the rebels' fliers.

The time was nearing when CIA had to pick a leader of the invasion force. CIA's choice was 29-year-old Manuel Artima Buesa, a onetime Castro soldier.

By January, 1961, Capt. Artima was ready to take over. After a series of speeches to

B. APPROX.

the freedom fighters, Capt. Artime changed a number of the commanders. The troops were shocked, but all of the some 1500 went along with the persuasive Artime except for about 200, who refused to fight under their new commander, Capt. Robert San Roman, because he had served as an officer under Batista.

List of 38 Names Submitted for Post

The stubborn 200 were arrested and isolated from the rest of the troops, under guard.

Just before Dr. Jose Miro Cardona was named chairman of the Joint Cuban Revolutionary Council, CIA submitted to the council a list of 38 names of Cubans for the post. The list contained the names of 12 former Batista supporters.

President Kennedy had issued an order excluding Batistianos from the Liberation Army, and in the last days of the preparation for the landing he ordered the Immigration and Naturalization Service to arrest Masferrer. But unknown to the President, CIA refused to put into effect Kennedy's Batistiano ban.

Meanwhile, Mr. Ray ordered his followers to report to the Guatemalan training camps, but they never got there. In Miami, 120 of them

were detained by CIA agents, along with some officers who had escaped from a Cuban prison in December, 1960.

CIA's plans were reviewed and indorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Kennedy could not be blamed if he felt he had to go along with the decision. His experts recommended it, and time was of the essence.

As envisaged by President Eisenhower, every effort was to have been made to avoid overt American intervention, except on a "contingency basis." That is, American planes would intervene if necessary to maintain control over the beachhead and prevent the destruction of the invaders.

Mr. Kennedy did not like the idea; instead he proposed and had adopted a plan for air strikes against the Castro air force by Cuban pilots flying from Guatemalan bases.

Then Mr. Kennedy ruled that under no circumstances whatever were American forces to become involved.

The Joint Chiefs advised Mr. Kennedy that without American air support the rebels might not be able to hold the beachhead. But in that case, they said, the invaders could make their way to the Escambray Mountains, 50 miles away, and form guerrilla bands to harass the Castro regime.

Fifty miles is a far piece for defeated soldiers to travel.

But this might have been possible had CIA not snubbed Mr. Ray's underground. For, although Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell relented in the last two weeks and sent supplies of explosives to the resistance movement, neither Mr. Ray nor any other leader of the underground was told the exact date of the invasion.

Dulles Favored Bay of Pigs Site

Consequently, the resistance movement was as surprised as Castro when the rebels hit the beach.

Mr. Dulles since has claimed that the swampy coast of Cienaga de Zapata in the Bay of Pigs was an ideal landing place, since it had three airstrips and was difficult to approach because it had only three bad roads. But Mr. Ray's military leader, Col. Ramon Barquin, had protested in vain the choice of the landing place.

By the time the troops took to their invasion ships, CIA was listening to nobody—and making sure that even the Cuban exile leaders would have nothing to do with the operation.

Beginning at midnight, April 16, five Liberty ships chartered by dummy operators for CIA disgorged the invaders in the Bay of Pigs. When dawn came, some C-54 and C-46 transport planes from Guatemala and Nicaragua flew over the beachhead and dropped paratroopers. The air cover was provided

by eight old B-26 bombers and a few obsolete P-51 Mustang fighter planes.

Without opposition to speak of, units of the invaders marched forward, penetrating 20 miles inland. But this column was halted by a battalion of Castro militia and then forced to surrender by the arrival of heavy reinforcements.

CIA had informed the President that the Cuban air force had been rendered ineffective. The information was not quite accurate. Three American T-33 jet trainers, originally shipped to the Batista regime, suddenly appeared over the beachhead and went into action. The slow and awkward B-26s did not have a chance and were shot down.

By noon of invasion day, the Castro planes had sunk the Liberty ship loaded with ammunition and a second one carrying all the communications equipment. Soviet tanks and heavy guns carried on trucks were transported over the roads which the underground had not been ordered to cut and wheeled into action to complete the debacle.

If Mr. Kennedy were to change his mind and permit American intervention, the time had come for action. On the night of Tuesday, April 18, the President was called from a formal dinner and joined a White House meeting whose conferees included Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell. The men stayed up all night trying to decide whether

American forces should be sent to Cuba, but reached no conclusion. Next morning a similar meeting was held, and Mr. Kennedy decided to do nothing, largely because it was too late.

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WILLIAM S. WHITE

Richard Bissell Takes the Rap

Finger of Blame Too Easily Pointed
At One Involved in Cuban Fiasco

Twice in a long career of unselfish and courageous service to his country the name of Richard Bissell has been in the headlines.

The first time, was last spring, in the aftermath of the patriots' invasion of Castro-Communist Cuba. On that occasion kind friends and associates in government, with those eager and girlishly gossiping leaks to certain sympathetic correspondents which typify a sort of civil servant who is strong most of all in the sterling quality of self-preservation, most kindly pointed the finger at Richard Bissell.

No sooner had the great search of "Who done it?" begun over the corpse of the lost action than there began to appear curious pieces in the papers, springing as from nowhere, in which the name "Bissell" led all the rest. What on earth had been wrong with the planning? Well, whatever it was, it was Bissell who was to blame. It was Bissell who had unwisely advised the administration to enter this hapless enterprise—and, of course, it was also pointed out that those who leaked this

deathless information, were themselves wholly blameless. They, of course, had opposed it all along.

From their standpoint the fall guy was well chosen. For Richard Bissell, apart from the natural personal reserve of a desperately shy man, was an old-fashioned professional in government who knew that civil servants at his level were supposed to keep their minds open and their mouths shut. They were intended to be advisers to superiors, not press contact men for themselves.

Moreover, Bissell's own particular job enjoined silence upon him in a special way. For he was a high—and up to this point a highly anonymous—official doing the most hush-hush sort of work in the Central Intelligence Agency. In a word, he would not have defended himself by counter-leaks if he could, being the kind of man he is, and he could not have even if he would.

John F. Kennedy himself sought no scapegoats for the failure in Cuba, rightly realizing that this action had been approved by the President of the United States and that the responsibility of that person can be shared by no one. Lesser people within the administration, however, were not so generous. Scapegoats had to be found; and so Bissell was there to fill the bill.

Thus, recently, his resignation was announced—and along with this, his appointment as executive vice president of the Institute for Defense Analyses, a university-supported group which is seeking to assist this Government in the cold war.

My small salute to the departing Richard Bissell is not intended to say that he did not make mistakes in his recommendations for the Cuban action. Nor is it intended to suggest even that in the hard, tough game of public affairs he should not have had to pay the price of error.

It is intended, however, to pay a left-handed compliment to the highly effective nature of the whispering campaign by leak which other bureaucrats so gladly and quickly loosed against the one man who had no means—or taste—to answer back.

And, finally, it is intended to raise a most melancholy point: Bissell, whatever his mistakes, was one bureaucrat who was repeatedly willing to risk mistakes—to risk his whole future, as in Cuba—in order actually to do something. Bureaucracy tends to play it safe, and let George do it—and take the rap. Bissell played it dangerous, and let Richard do it—and take the rap.

It hardly overstates the matter, does it, to suggest that it seems a pity that when the ghost does walk among the bureaucrats, handing out the spectral blue slips of dismissal, it walks so often among the men of decision and of courage—and of taste?

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By **WARD CANNEL**

One Year After Cuban Fiasco

THE FIRST anniversary of the mangled Cuban invasion nears. And two Cubans talking quietly over their coffee in a steaming lunchroom in Miami meet face to face a year late.

The young man, Fernandez, talks in a low, rapid monotone, as though he were trying to elude some omnipresent wiretap.

"I had great difficulty with your name," he said. "I am not a trained radio operator. My specialty is demolition. But the radio man was shot when we parachuted into Cuba. So the job fell to me. Your name is very hard for me in wireless code."

The other man, Casagrande, laughed. "If I had only known, I would have let a man with a shorter name volunteer for my job. But they told me that everything was fine and that I would be met on the beach by somebody who knew my name."

Fernandez nodded. "Yes. That is correct. We were ready. There were 100 in that town who knew your name. Perhaps 200. It was the best town our team ever worked. Everybody was with us from the minute we set up an underground headquarters. Even the police. I was sent once to burn a department store in the next town. I went both ways by police car. It was perfect."

Casagrande asked, "How perfect was it? It is never perfect for revolutionaries—even former revolutionaries." Casagrande had been a captain with Fidel Castro during the days of Batista.



Ward Cannel

CLIPPING FROM THE

N. Y. WORLD TELEGRAM

EDITION 7th SPORTS

DATED 3/15/62

PAGE 21

FORWARDED BY NY DIVISION

EDITOR: LEE B. WOOD

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-CUBA

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"I don't know about politics," Fernandez said. "I don't believe in politics. I don't take sides. I only do my job. Tactically it was perfect."

Casagrande shrugged. "Well, for us it was not so perfect. We were 200 men in 125 feet of boat. They say the man who rented that boat to the invasion is now rich. I can believe it. Even the dingy I took to the shore was too small and too wet. I am still a little surprised I made it back to the ship that night."

Fernandez said, "We had received no message. We knew nothing of that night. Except that a dead miliciano was found on the beach. He was yours?"

Casagrande nodded. "The second night, of course, the game was up. Only a blind man would not have seen us lying off shore all day in that convoy."

Fernandez said, "We got the message on the second night. There was no regular message period from any of our contacts. So I switched to the emergency frequency. I could have got the same news by tuning to radio Havana. Everybody seemed to know it was the invasion except the people who were supposed to know."

Casagrande laughed. "Yes. Our radio went out. We knew nothing. And so, for nine days, we patrolled the Cuba shore by day, and tried to stake out a beachhead by night. By then, of course, we were out of food and nearly out of water. Can you see it? Two hundred men dying of starvation and thirst in plain sight of their homeland?"

Fernandez said, "I would have traded places with you anyhow. All I could do was pack up my gear and begin to walk the 80 miles to Havana. You could not stop anywhere because the invasion had smoked out all your contacts. You simply had to keep walking."

Casagrande said, "Finally we made for Key West. But they turned us away—some reason about not interfering in Cuban affairs. They turned us away from Mexico, too. It was maddening. At least if I had been in your shoes I could have burned something or blown something up."

For the first time Fernandez smiled happily. "Oh, I did," he said. "Two tractors. Two trucks. A stretch of railroad track. I'm very good at that sort of thing. But there's not much call for it in the hotel kitchen where I'm working now."

Quadros Claims U. S. Asked for Help on Cuba

SAO PAULO, Brazil, March 16 (AP)—Janio Quadros declared last night that a U.S. State Department official had implied to him that the United States wanted Latin American nations to join in some kind of military action against Cuba.

Quadros, in his first public address since he resigned the presidency last August, said the implication came from Adolph Berle Jr. a month before the abortive Cuban invasion last April. Berle was then the State Department's coordinator of Latin American affairs.


Quadros said Berle visited him last March and "he implied the United States was interested in joint action by the continental family of a political, economic and even military nature against the Caribbean nation. I rejected him politely but firmly."

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DISTRESSING CAMPAIGN

Nixon Says JFK Put Cuba Revolt in Peril

Richard M. Nixon says that President Kennedy endangered the secrecy of the Cuban invasion when he was campaigning for the White House.

Mr. Nixon, in his book, "Six Crises," wrote that the Central Intelligence Agency briefed Mr. Kennedy on plans for the invasion during the 1960 campaign.

INTERVENTION

But the former Vice President said his Democratic rival came out publicly on Oct. 20 for U. S. intervention in Cuba.

"I thought that Mr. Kennedy, with full knowledge of the facts, was jeopardizing the security of a United States foreign policy operation," Mr. Nixon wrote.

The Republican candidate said this was the only time he personally got angry at Mr. Kennedy during the campaign. He said it particularly disturbed him because he had been advocating for nine months inside the Eisenhower Administration that the anti-Castro forces be armed, but could not say so publicly.

Mr. Nixon's book, published by Doubleday and now on sale, recounts crises he faced during his Washington career, from the Hiss-Chambers case to his losing fight for the presidency.



RICHARD M. NIXON

OTHERS

Other crises he related were the political fund incident in 1952, President Eisenhower's heart attack, the attack on him by communist-led mobs in Latin America in 1958, and his "kitchen debate" with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1959.

Mr. Nixon's longest charter, on the 1960 campaign, includes these points:

• After his defeat, he vetoed a GOP move to demand recounts in Illinois and Texas, altho he felt there was "real substance" to vote fraud charges. He said if he had demanded a recount, the change in administrations would have become chaotic with "incalculable and lasting damage thruout the country."

• He refused his advisers' unanimous recommendation to make a late campaign speech about the religious issue engendered by Mr. Kennedy's Catholicism. He said Mr. Kennedy's associates accused him of "deliberate religious bigotry," but he does not regret keeping the lid on the "boiling cauldron of embittered anti-Catholicism."

• Mr. Nixon thinks he won the last three of the four televised debates with Mr. Kennedy, losing the first one because he was underweight, hurting his image. Nevertheless, he said, Mr. Kennedy gained more from the debates because 20 million persons who watched the first debate did not watch the last three. (UPI)

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The Washington Daily News
The Evening Star
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(TEXT)

WASHINGTON--TEXT OF PRESS SECRETARY SALINGER'S STATEMENT ON
 FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S PUBLISHED COMMENTS ABOUT CUBA:

"THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS ARE
 PROPER SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DEBATE BUT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACCOUNT IN
 NIXON'S BOOK IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THE THEN SEN. KENNEDY WAS
 TOLD BEFORE THE ELECTION OF 1960 OF THE TRAINING OF TROOPS OUTSIDE
 CUBA OR OF ANY PLANS FOR 'SUPPORTING AN INVASION OF CUBA.'

"MR. NIXON'S ACCOUNT IS APPARENTLY BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING.
 KENNEDY RECEIVED TWO BRIEFINGS FROM MR. ALLEN DULLES OF THE CIA.
 FIRST ON JULY 23, 1960, AND THE SECOND ON SEPT. 19, 1960. THE TWO
 BRIEFINGS COVERED AN OVERALL REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION DURING
 CUBA WAS MENTIONED. BUT SEN. KENNEDY WAS FIRST INFORMED OF THE
 OPERATION TO WHICH MR. NIXON REFERS IN A BRIEFING BY ALLEN DULLES,
 RICHARD BISSEL OF THE CIA GIVEN IN PALM BEACH, FLA., ON NOV. 18, 1960.

(END TEXT)

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ADD A NIXON, WASHINGTON

(IN WHITTIER, CALIF., NIXON WAS ADVISED OF THE PRESIDENT'S CHALLENGE WHILE ATTENDING A CHURCH CONVOCATION.

"I HAVE NO COMMENT AT THIS TIME, UNTIL I HAVE A CHANCE TO READ THE STATEMENT," NIXON SAID. "THERE WILL BE A LOT OF CONTROVERSY OVER THE BOOK, I IMAGINE.")

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UPI-132

ADD 3 NIXON, WASHINGTON

FORMER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES ALSO
 SAID IN A STATEMENT RELEASED THROUGH THE CIA THAT KENNEDY WAS NOT GIVEN
 ANY INFORMATION DURING THE CAMPAIGN CONCERNING ANY "OVERT OR COVERT"
 ACTION SUCH AS THE CUBAN INVASION.

DULLES SAID THERE APPARENTLY HAD BEEN "AN HONEST MISUNDERSTANDING" BY
 NIXON CONCERNING THE CONTENT OF THE BRIEFINGS GIVEN KENNEDY.

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Nixon Replies To Kennedy's Cuba Denial

LOS ANGELES, Mar. 22 (AP).—President Kennedy says the issue is closed as far as he is concerned, but former Vice President Nixon has a final word on the secret preparations for a Cuban invasion attempt.

Mr. Nixon issued a statement yesterday in reply to the White House denial that Mr. Kennedy knew, during the 1960 campaign that the United States was training Cubans for the invasion.

Mr. Nixon's book, "Six Crises," says Mr. Kennedy was aware of the training and endangered United States security by advocating drastic opposition to Fidel Castro.

"President Eisenhower has authorized me to state that he gave instructions that Senator Kennedy was to be as fully briefed on our foreign problems as I was," Mr. Nixon's statement said.

"The statements in my book were based not only on public press accounts of the briefings President Kennedy received, but on personal conversations with responsible individuals who had knowledge of the facts.

"Because the Cuban issue was such an important one in the campaign, I personally researched the facts relating to it. Beyond that I have no further comment. My book speaks for itself."

The White House denial has been supported by Allen W. Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who briefed Senator Kennedy. He said Mr. Nixon was in error, but that he believes the charge was the result of "an honest misunderstanding."

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REPORT TO READERS

The Bay of Pigs

TEN DAYS BEFORE THE ANNIVERSARY of the abortive invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba—April 17, 1961—an incident took place which illuminates the obtuseness of Washington's policy toward Latin America. The National Broadcasting Co. had scheduled an hour-long debate April 7 on its program, *The Nation's Future*, on the subject: "How Can Progress Be Best Achieved in Latin America?" Participants were to be Richard N. Goodwin, Deputy Asst. Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, and Carlos Fuentes, one of Mexico's leading novelists whose books have been best sellers in the U.S. The debate, according to an NBC release, was "to focus on the controversy underlying the popular unrest in virtually all Latin American countries today."

On April 6 NBC announced that the debate had been canceled. The reason: The State Department had denied Fuentes a visa on the ground that his appearance on TV "was not in the national interest." Whether the department regarded its own representative as a poor match for Fuentes, or whether it was worried that the American public might learn some truths about Latin America, this fact emerges: Washington no longer adheres to the American tradition of a free exchange of opinion.

IT MAY HAVE BEEN COINCIDENCE, but a week before the anniversary also, the 1,179 invaders taken prisoner at the Bay of Pigs were found guilty after trial in Havana and each sentenced to 30 years in prison for treason. A collective fine of \$62 million was levied; if it is paid, all will go free. Immediately the fine was labeled "blackmail" and "ransom" in the U.S. press which for days had been forecasting sentences of death. "The feeling of revulsion" which the New York Times regarded as "the natural first reaction to the sentences" might with greater accuracy be attributed—but was not—to the actual invasion attempt.


What the Cuban government was saying in the sentences was this: Take your poor misled sons out of our country. We do not want them. Rather, we will take the fine money and buy food for our people whom you seek to starve into submission by economic blackmail. But remember one thing: If you try again, there will be no such mercy.

Will there be another attempt? At the United Nations, Ambassador Stevenson "for the eleventh time" on March 16 denied the U.S. was planning a new invasion which Dr. Milton Eisenhower, on March 28, said "would be disastrous." But a year is not so long a time to forget Stevenson's first denial, even as the invasion was taking place. Add these items too: In Florida, Dr. Miro Cardona, U.S. candidate to replace Castro, openly describes new invasion plans; recruiting goes on in public and the Chicago Daily News says there are "unmistakable signs" that training centers are in operation in Guatemala and Colombia, with U.S. veterans of the Korean War on hand; in Guatemala, President Ydigoras, after denying for months that the Bay of Pigs invaders trained in his country, blithely concedes his lie and says: "President Kennedy has the responsibility for a sequel."

IN ITS RECAPITULATION of the April 17 fiasco last spring, the GUARDIAN reported the Soviet Union had warned it would take action if U.S. forces invaded Cuba. Last November Prof. Leo Szilard, the famed nuclear physicist, said it was reported to him on "good authority" that if America had intervened in Cuba with her own armed forces, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

The consequences of such moves need no elaboration. Yet there is no evidence of a change of attitude—let alone policy—on Washington's part. The Washington Post and Times Herald, in an editorial on April 3, the Washington Post quoted an unnamed Justice Department spokesman as saying: "According to published accounts, Nixon has made a mistake and there is no evidence of a change of attitude—let alone policy—on Washington's part." The Washington Post and Times Herald, in an editorial on April 3, the Washington Post quoted an unnamed Justice Department spokesman as saying: "According to published accounts, Nixon has made a mistake and there is no evidence of a change of attitude—let alone policy—on Washington's part." The Washington Post and Times Herald, in an editorial on April 3, the Washington Post quoted an unnamed Justice Department spokesman as saying: "According to published accounts, Nixon has made a mistake and there is no evidence of a change of attitude—let alone policy—on Washington's part."

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The New York Times _____

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National Guardian

Page 2

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57 APR 25 1962

Drubbing at Pigs Bay Dramatized Red Peril

By DOM BONAFEDE
Of Our Latin America Staff

WASHINGTON — "This is the day we would like to forget."

Speaking was a State Department official.

"After all," he added, "it's not a chapter in our history which we are proud of."

Throughout Washington, other officials from President Kennedy on down are triggered by the same thought: this first anniversary of the April 17 Cuban invasion.

But the historical debacle is being revived in their minds by 60 sick and disabled prisoners released by Fidel Castro last Saturday as part of a ransom deal whetted by his hunger for U.S. dollars.

As if to rub salt in the United States' wounds, the Soviet Union took this occasion to upgrade Castro's Cuba in the ranks of its Socialist satellites. In an official Communist party communique, Cuba was rated ahead of Yugoslavia.

And just last week, Pravda called Castro "comrade" for the first time, indicating his rise in stature in the Communist hierarchy.

This, of course, gives birth to the notion that if the Bay of Pigs invasion had succeeded, Castro and his regime might not be around today to serve as Moscow's emissary in the Caribbean.

Yet, the invasion flopped with a thud heard around the world. Today, the argument still rages over who was responsible.

Inept judgment by the CIA? President Kennedy's withdrawal of air support? Faulty military advice by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Actually, the dispute has about as much significance now as a medieval debate

One Year
Ago
Today

among philosophers over how many angels can stand on the head of a pin.

It is conceded the invasion collapsed because of a host of errors rooted in military and political miscalculations. The expedition, unprecedented in U.S. history, was from our point of view masked in lies and deceptions and doomed to failure from the beginning.

The salient issue at the moment is: How has the fiasco affected U.S. policy?

Instead of ridding the hemisphere of Castro, it fattened his ego, distorted his image as a giant-killer throughout Latin America, and drove him deeper into the Communist camp.

As for the United States, it made the Colossus of the North appear as a clumsy, breast-beating bully. It punctured the invulnerability of President Kennedy, then a fresh hero in office.

Nonetheless, Kennedy in a show of courage assumed "full responsibility" for the defeat.

"There are," he said, "from this sobering episode useful lessons for all to learn."

A year later, Kennedy indicates he has learned his lessons.

Miami Herald

Miami, Florida

Date 4/17/62

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(BUfile 109-584)

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Submitted by the
Miami Division

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The United States has regained its equilibrium in its attitude toward Castro and has convinced most of the other Latin American countries of the threat to all emanating from Cuba.

No longer is the United States so enraged by Castro that it waves its arms in all directions, hoping one blow will topple him. Instead, through economic and diplomatic pressures, it is gradually isolating Cuba from the hemispheric family of nations.

These measures are admittedly slower and less dramatic than military action. Another armed expedition is definitely ruled out at this time, providing Castro does not make the first wrong move, such as tinkering with the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo.

Some success for our side is reflected in Castro's waning popularity in Latin America and the internal troubles plaguing him at home.

This does not assure that the end of Castro is in sight. It merely means that the United States thinks it can proceed against Castro in a way befitting a great power. It also means that the Bay of Pigs is not forgotten, and the sacrifices of the invaders have not been in vain.

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
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"That's just what I told Chairman Bill Miller — too many Republicans think the party can live on peanuts!"

The Magazine Rack

By Al Horne

THE EDITORS of *Esquire* must have great faith in the sophistication of their readers to offer, in their May, issue, the tongue-in-cheek treatises of Malcolm Muggeridge and Richard H. Rovere on two most solemn subjects, religion and politics. Muggeridge is hardly the first writer to point out that Christian principles of austerity conflict with the modern drive to earthly affluence, but he carries the paradox to its limit, proposing a new religion in which money is grace, God is "the Great Teller" and poverty is sin. This, he suggests, would give Christianity new strength to fight communism, since "the Marxist train is a gravy train."



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
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(HARTKE)

NEW YORK--SEN. VANCE HARTKE, D-IND., SAID IN A BOOK RELEASED TODAY THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY GOT BAD ADVICE FROM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ALLEN DULLES PRIOR TO THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION.

THE BOOK, ENTITLED "INSIDE THE NEW FRONTIER," WAS WRITTEN BY HARE, HEAD OF THE SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE. HE WAS ASSISTED IN THE WRITING BY FORMER DEPUTY NATIONAL CHAIRMAN JACK REDDING.

"PRESIDENT KENNEDY, MISLED BY ALLEN DULLES AND OTHERS, HAD BEEN PLED TO BELIEVE THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION WOULD BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY A REVOLUTION," HARTKE SAID.

"THE BAY OF PIGS CHANGED THE ATTITUDE OF MANY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TOWARD THE NEW PRESIDENT. DULLES SAID THAT THE CIA EXPECTED THE CUBAN PEOPLE WOULD RISE AGAINST CASTRO WHEN THE INVADERS WADED ASHORE...THUS MISLED, KENNEDY SENT THE INVADERS OFF ON THEIR MISSION OF FAILURE.

"IT WAS AT THIS POINT THE PRESIDENT SHOWED HIS MATURITY AND HIS CHARACTER...KENNEDY SAID SIMPLY... 'IT WAS MY FAULT. THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY BELONGS TO THE PRESIDENT. I ACCEPT IT.'"

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Cuba's Progress Since The Invaders' Defeat

By JOSEPH NORTH *Cuba*

HAVANA—It is just about a year ago this week when I heard a strange booming noise, like thunder, which woke me.

Looking out the window toward the sea, the dawn had risen clear and bright like the Caribbean dawn will, and there was no place for thunder. I looked out the window and saw, several miles off, a plane wheeling at a right angle and nosing downward toward an area where thick black smoke was already rising.

Down below, on the pavement of my hotel, a young miliciano knelt and pointed his rifle at the sky as another plane streaked overhead. He shot five times and then rose, running. He was running after the plane to get more shots at it. This was the air-raid on the eve of the invasion.

It was down at the place where the bombs had fallen, about twenty minutes afterward. They hit homes and killed non-combatants, seven in Havana. How many more in the other two cities bombed I don't remember now.

At the vast funeral of the seven, in the cemetery of Cristóbal Colon, Fidel said Cuba had entered the Socialist phase of the revolution. The army and the militias went into battle knowing that. They put on red kerchiefs before going into line.

It's a year now, since the invaders landed and suffered ignominious defeat. Many had come with sacks full of Lucky Strikes, chocolate bars, goodies of all sorts, as though they were going on a camping trip.

There is much to write about that has happened in this year. Vast experience has been gained. Headway was registered in the countryside; industrialization has begun, but like all beginnings, there are birth-pains. Cuba is a land of many beginnings today and has its share of the pain. The people know — what with the past to overcome, what with embargo piled on that, you don't stroll into socialism like you go to hear Benny More sing. No, it

is hard work, and you plan, and you make errors, you take some steps forward, and at times you slip back. But you're learning all the time.

That's about the way Carmen García put it. She is 33 years old, a small, quiet, black woman with large, bright eyes who runs the elevator in our building.

She was reading today's copy of *Revolucion*, with the page opened to the article on *Pravda* about Fidel's recent speech exhorting wrong ways of building Cuba.

The waiter who brought me a cup of black coffee and a roll had a copy of *Hoy* opened to the article. I noticed a third person reading it on the way downtown. I got the impression it was generally read. I heard from others it was read with quiet satisfaction. Of course they liked it that the Soviet people understood and agreed with what Fidel had done. They had agreed with Fidel. And a fellow likes his best friend to understand him and to agree with what he's doing.


But it was all Cuban done, and along the lines that Cuba understands. Marxism-Leninism. It was just as Cuban as Fidel landing on the coast of Oriente on the leaky old *Granma* and heading up into the palm-covered mountains.

And Carmen García liked it that the article concluded with another affirmation that Cuba, as Premier Khrushchev has said, can always count on the aid and support of the Soviet people.

Carmen García, 33 years old, Negro, runs the elevator. She is in the nucleus of the ORI here. When she isn't reading the news-paper editorials, or the accounts of how things are going on the farms or in the factories, she is writing notes in one or another book she is studying. They include, as I have seen, Politzer's book on Marxist philosophy, a book on political economy, Blas Roca's "Socialism in Cuba" and other political science textbooks.

Carmen García washed floors

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in the building before the revolution.

You might think running an elevator is a humble occupation. But she is up from washing floors.

And whoever thought—three short years ago—that the washerwoman would be studying dialectical materialism, surplus value, wages, prices and profits, the history of Cuba...

She is a quiet woman, doesn't say much, but what she lacks in garrulity she makes up in industry. She is an industrious student, and Carmen Garcia is Cuba. Go where you will, and you will find the same—this single year after Fidel said the revolution has headed toward socialism.

Talk to Carmen and she will know what's happening in Guatemala, in Venezuela, in Argentina, in Algeria. The initials OAS are no mystery to her. She follows everything that's happening, and she has her ideas about everything.

Cubans are people with decided ideas. Scratch a Cuban and you will find an editorial writer. He has opinions, and they are strong and often as not, obdurate. He is avid, parched, for learning.

Maybe, after a year since the speech at the funeral of the seven martyrs, on the eve of Playa Ciron, this is what strikes you most. You have heard of the homes springing up in the coun-

tryside; of the improved fare of the average citizen despite the shortages in this, or that, and the dislocations that are now being overcome.

I don't know if you read it, but Cuba reads more books than all the rest of Latin America combined. It may sound incredible—but if you have a chance come and see for yourself. There may be plenty of problems as industrialization gets underway. But there is sure no lack of production over at Imprenta Nacional. The presses are rolling day and night and the people are clamoring for more.

In addition to technical books of every type, literary classics are being read by young and old alike. This week it was Balzac's "Papa Goriot" for the first time in popular editions. Last week it was Ostrovsky's "Tempering of the Steel."

I met four young artillery men, the oldest of whom was 20. We got to talking political economy, history, philosophy.

The 17-year-old said he had read Plato. "The Father of Idealism" he said. "There must have been materialists, too," he mused. "There's always an opposite tendency."

I mentioned Thales, Anaximander, Democritus and his atom. "Where can I find out about them?" he asked eagerly. Pulling a fountain pen and a notebook out of his green-olive jacket to jot down the names.

Artillery men who don't want to let it go at cannon.

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(CUBA)

NEW YORK--THE U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT SAID TONIGHT A POLITICAL DECISION BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO WITHHOLD AIR SUPPORT FROM THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION FORCE DOOMED THE VENTURE AND PERMITTED CASTRO TO DELIVER CUBA TO THE COMMUNISTS.

THE MAGAZINE MADE HIS STATEMENT IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "KENNEDY'S FATEFUL DECISION: THE NIGHT THE REDS CLINCHED CUBA." "AMERICAN MILITARY OFFICIALS WHO FOLLOWED THIS OPERATION CLOSELY SAY THAT IT CAME WITHIN A HAIR' BREADTH OF SUCCESS," THE MAGAZINE SAID: "THEY SAY: GIVEN EARLY AIR SUPPORT, THE INVADERS COULD HAVE DESTROYED CASTRO'S AIR FORCE AND TANKS.

"DEFECTIONS FROM HIS MILITIA, WHICH HAD STARTED, WOULD HAVE SPREAD. UNDERGROUND FORCES, WAITING FOR WORD OF SUCCESS BEFORE RISING AGAINST CASTRO, WOULD HAVE SPRUNG INTO ACTION. WHEN THAT WORD DID NOT COME, THE REMAINED UNDERGROUND.

THE MAGAZINE SAID THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAD RECOMMENDED THE USE OF U.S. AIR SUPPORT, BUT KENNEDY VETOED THE IDEA INSISTING THAT THERE WAS TO BE NO DIRECT AMERICAN PARTICIPATION.

"THE FATEFUL DECISION WAS A POLITICAL DECISION--NOT A MILITARY DECISION," THE MAGAZINE SAID.

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These Days

The Bay of Pigs

By George E. Sokolsky



Sokolsky

IT IS NOW clear beyond doubt that the venture of the Bay of Pigs was an error. It should not have been started; if started it should have been carried to a logical conclusion which would have meant, ultimately if temporarily, an American occupation of Cuba. The Marines are more thorough than refugees, or even reserves.

Ostensibly, we withdrew from the Bay of Pigs expedition after it had started because such an event would have been offensive to the Organization of American States and might have disrupted that body. It might even have been a violation of the Rio Treaty. Also, and this was the gamble, it might have resulted in Russian intervention. Although five American Ambassadors, reputable and able men, had informed the State Department of the Castro political orientation, neither the White House nor the State Department in either the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administrations acknowledged the Communist affiliation of the Castro Revolution.

Today, there is no doubt on that subject, except apparently in The New York Times, which obdurately defends an untenable position.

POLITICIANS rarely risk acknowledging errors. They

may be used against them. Nevertheless, President Kennedy must sooner or later recognize that his decision concerning the Bay of Pigs was a grievous error. It is true that Khrushchev might have said that if you object to my being 90 miles from your coast, I object to your being in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and West Berlin—places even nearer to my border.

But had Khrushchev said that, our answer could have been that our propinquity to the Russian border is the result of World War II which we entered mistakenly to rescue Soviet Russia as well as other countries from the Nazi terror. On the other hand, the United States policy in Latin America is based on the Monroe Doctrine which Russia, as a continuing nation, has incontrovertibly accepted since 1823.

If such conversations ever occurred, they are not recorded. Instead, we appear to be on the verge of war with Soviet Russia over Cuba. One of the factors for optimism is that in the past, Soviet Russia has played on two fronts, expecting the West to fall into a trap. This happened during the Berlin Airlift when Soviet Russia established Red China as a satellite. It could be that in the Soviet mind, the United States can be led to compromise by giving up Berlin, or possibly Iran, on condition that Russia gave up Cuba.

THE AMERICAN difficulty arises from two phases:

1. It seems quite impossible for most Americans to

realize that although the Russians are not 10 feet tall, nor do they all have superior intellects, they have in 45 years achieved a remarkable current position and an even greater potential in industry, science and art. They have recognized a simple fact, well understood in the United States since the day of Horace Mann, that a nation cannot progress unless its people are adequately educated. It is in the field of education rather than in diplomacy or industry that Soviet Russia is giving us a race.

2. What is even more important is for Americans to realize that blaming Eisenhower or Kennedy will not solve any problems. The Russians have a political system which makes it possible for a decision to be made. Within the margins of realism, Russian foreign policy has been consistent and constant since about 1920.

The United States from the time of George Washington to Theodore Roosevelt had a fairly consistent and constant foreign policy:


1. No entangling alliances.
2. Freedom of the Seas.
3. Protective Tariff.
4. Monroe Doctrine.
5. Open Door Policy.

Then we became involved and our policy became uncertain and confused. Since Woodrow Wilson, the United States has been used by friend and foe and it is time to bring ourselves out of this situation by returning to a fixed and continuous policy.

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7/6/62

The Washington Post and Times Herald A17
The Washington Daily News
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New York Post
The New York Times
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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Letters To The Editor.

Cuban Freedom Fighter Backs Report Of Bungling By CIA

Editor, Pittsburgh Press:

I have read the magnificent article by Henry J. Taylor in the Nov. 21 Press on the editorial page about the secret but "hot" war between the Cuban freedom fighters and the CIA.

We, the Cubans, who have fought Castro's tyranny during three long years, know of the "deals" with this U. S. Government department and, as Mr. Taylor says in his accurate article, sometimes we are more afraid of them than of Castro's agents.

The frustrated Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961, is the



principal reason of this mistrust in the CIA by our side.

I was in Cuba in those unforgettable days waiting for weapons that never came just because at the last moment they changed their plans and left the Cuban powerful underground without any help and notice of the coming invasion.

The balance of this particular action of the CIA: more than 300,000 persons in jail, almost 100 shot before the Communist-firing squads and the destruction of practically all underground groups.

Now we the Cubans who want to liberate our country are only dealing with our members inside Cuba and we will continue doing this until the Cuban people will arise in arms against Castro's dictatorship.

RAFAEL TORRES;
Delegate Chairman,
Cuban Student Directorate
In Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 The Pittsburgh Press

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Date: 11/27/62
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Editor: W. W. Mortimer
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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

No U.S. Air Cover Pledge, Exile Says

By DOM BONAFEDE

Chief Latin America Correspondent

The controversy over whether the United States had pledged air support to the Cuban invasion brigade during the April 1961 Bay of Pigs operation flamed anew Friday.

In remarks made in the Washington office of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the military chief of Brigade 2056, Jose Perez San Roman, said his forces had never been promised aerial cover by the United States.

However, San Roman's statement runs counter to accounts given by other members of the invasion force and impressions gained by officials of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, then a coalition of anti-Castro political groups under which the brigade fought.

The failure of the invasion has frequently been attributed to the refusal of President Kennedy to give the go-ahead sign for air support.

"We had our own planes, but they were knocked out," San Roman said Friday.

Pressed by reporters whether he had received any indication that air cover for the invasion would be provided by the United States, he repeated, "No, we had our own."

Yet in a diary kept by one of the few invaders who escaped capture, Manuel Penabaz noted that on April 14, 1961, three days before the assault, San Roman briefed the entire brigade.

"We were told we would have an air umbrella over us at all times so as to guarantee that the sky would always be ours," Penabaz wrote.

On April 19 he wrote:

"Our situation on the beach was made even more desperate by the fact that all the .50-caliber machinegun ammunition had been exhausted. In headquarters, Jose San Roman, Oliva Ferrer (G-3 of the brigade), Morales (G-1), Andreu and Manuel Artime (highest civilian representative in the invasion), were trying desperately to get air support. The reply came over the radio in English:

"Don't worry. They will be here soon. Keep fighting."

"San Roman, indignant with rage, shouted into the radio in English, 'You are a s.o.b.'"

A rank-and-file member of the brigade told The Herald: "Our impression was that there would be air support. If there was not a written promise, there was at least an oral promise."

Carlos Hevia, who was then a member of the Front, commented:

"Our impression was that the United States would provide air cover."

He said that commitments were made only between U.S. officials and Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, president of the Front.

Hevia, an Annapolis graduate, added that prior to the invasion while he was touring the brigade's training camp at Retalhuleu, Guatemala, he noted there was no anti-aircraft practice.

"Apparently they were preparing for a fight in which they thought they would control the air," Hevia said.

Following their release from Castro's prisons and their return to the U.S. shortly before Christmas, several brigade members reported that the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise was in the area and ready to go into action if called.

Visiting the attorney general with San Roman were Eneido Oliva, Manuel Artime, Ramon J. Ferrer, Enrique Ruiz-Williams and Roberto A. Perez San Roman.

The resistance fighters gave Kennedy a medallion with a crest of the brigade on it in gratitude for his role in ransoming the invasion force.

During an hour and a half visit Kennedy personally escorted them to the offices of two of his aides who helped direct the ransom operation, Nicolas Katzenbach and Louis Oberdorfer.

Later, the brigade leaders and Kennedy had lunch in his office of sandwiches, soup and pie.

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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

Date: 1/12/63

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CUBAN PRISONER EXCHANGE

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(CUBA)

MIAMI--THE MIAMI HERALD SAID TONIGHT IN A COPYRIGHTED INTERVIEW WITH U.S. ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY THAT "NO U.S. AIR COVER WAS EVER PLANNED OR PROMISED" TO THE INVADERS WHO STORMED CUBA'S BAY OF PIGS IN APRIL, 1961.

DAVID KRASLOW, CHIEF OF THE HERALD'S WASHINGTON BUREAU, SAID THE INTERVIEW FOR THE KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS "BROKE THE LONG SILENCE ON ONE OF THE MOST EMBARRASSING EPISODES IN AMERICAN HISTORY."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL "MAJOR MISTAKES" IN THE PLANNING OF THE INVASION.

HE SAID PERHAPS 10 TIMES THE 1,500 INVADERS WERE NEEDED FOR A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION.

THE PENTAGON AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BOTH OF WHICH APPROVED THE INVASION PLAN, VIRTUALLY IGNORED CASTRO'S ARSENAL, KENNEDY SAID.

"IT WASN'T GIVEN ENOUGH THOUGHT," HE SAID. "WE UNDERESTIMATED WHAT (CASTRO'S) T33 JET TRAINERS CARRYING ROCKETS COULD DO."

KENNEDY ALSO RAPPED SEVERAL NATIONAL MAGAZINE ARTICLES PURPORTING TO TELL THE "INSIDE STORY" OF THE ILL-FATED INVASION. HE IMPLIED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD USED CONSTRAINT BECAUSE OF THE 1,113 CAPTURED INVADERS WHO REMAINED IN CASTRO'S JAILS FOR 20 MONTHS.

NOW THAT THE PRISONERS ARE SAFE IN THE UNITED STATES, THE ADMINISTRATION APPARENTLY FEELS IT CAN REPLY TO WHAT IT REGARDS AS GROSSLY DISTORTED ACCOUNTS OF THE INVASION.

KENNEDY SAID SEVERAL MAGAZINES HAD CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. HAD PROMISED AIR COVER TO THE INVADERS.

"THERE WAS NEVER ANY PLAN TO HAVE U.S. AIR COVER," THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID. "THERE WASN'T EVEN A PROMISE. NOT EVEN UNDER EISENHOWER WAS AMERICAN AIR COVER IN THE PICTURE."

"FROM THE BEGINNING THE PRESIDENT SAID NO AMERICAN FORCES WOULD TAKE PART IN THE OPERATION," KENNEDY SAID.

"IT CANNOT SIMPLY BE SAID THAT THE INVASION FAILED BECAUSE OF ANY SINGLE FACTOR. THERE WERE SEVERAL MAJOR MISTAKES. IT WAS JUST A BAD PLAN," THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID.

"VICTORY WAS NEVER CLOSE," HE ADDED. KENNEDY SAID A "GREAT DEAL" MORE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION WERE NEEDED.

"ALL 1,500 MEN FOUGHT BRAVELY," HE SAID, "BUT PEP SAN ROMAN (THE BRIGADE COMMANDER WHO RECENTLY VISITED KENNEDY IN WASHINGTON) SAYS THEY MIGHT HAVE SUCCEEDED IF THEY HAD 15,000 MEN INSTEAD OF

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1,500."

ONE OF THE MAJOR ERRORS, KENNEDY SAID, WAS THE BITTERLY IRONIC UNDERESTIMATION OF THE THREE OR FOUR T33 JET TRAINERS THAT EASILY OUTFOUGHT THE ANTIQUATED B26 BOMBERS PILOTED BY REFUGEES.

THE ROCKET CARRYING JETS WERE GIVEN TO FULGENCIO BATISTA BY THE UNITED STATES.

"WE UNDERESTIMATED WHAT A T33 CARRYING ROCKETS COULD DO," KENNEDY SAID. "THEY CAUSED A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE."

THE INVADERS GOT "ALL THE AIR COVER THE PLAN CALLED FOR," HE SAID. BUT THE SECOND OF TWO PLANNED ADVANCE RAIDS TO KNOCK OUT CASTRO'S AIR FORCE WAS POSTPONED, HE SAID.

THE FIRST RAID, ON SATURDAY, APRIL 15, "DIDN'T DO ANYWHERE NEAR THE DAMAGE HOPED FOR," HE SAID.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID THE FIRST RAID CAUSED AN INTERNATIONAL FUROR, AND THE PLANNERS, WITH THE SURPRISE ELEMENT LOST, POSTPONED THE SECOND. WHEN TWO B26S LIMPED BACK TO MIAMI FROM THE FIRST RAID, THE U.S. COVERED THE STRIKE BY SAYING THEY WERE PILOTED BY CUBAN AIR FORCE MEN DEFECTING FROM CASTRO.

HE SAID THE SECOND RAID FINALLY WENT OFF ON APRIL 17, THE DAY OF THE INVASION. "BUT IT DID NOT ACCOMPLISH MUCH."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONFIRMED THAT THE INVADING FORCE, PINNED DOWN APPEALED TO U.S. NAVY SHIPS IN THE AREA FOR HELP. HE SAID THE SHIPS COULD NOT GIVE ASSISTANCE.

"THE DECISION WAS MADE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE GROUND RULES," KENNEDY SAID. "THERE HAD BEEN A FIRM UNDERSTANDING, ACCEPTED BY ALL, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO U.S. FORCES IN THE INVASION. WE STAYED WITH THAT."

HE SAID THE U.S. DID NOT ALLOW ITS OWN FORCES TO ENTER THE PICTURE BECAUSE OF THE BERLIN SITUATION.

"IF IT WAS JUST THE CUBAN PROBLEM ALONE, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO DIFFICULTY. WE WOULD HAVE ENDED IT RIGHT THERE," KENNEDY SAID.

KENNEDY SAID THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION HAD STARTED THE INVASION PLANS, BUT WHEN HIS BROTHER BECAME PRESIDENT "THERE WAS JUST A GENERAL CONCEPT. THE LOGISTICS AND THE DETAILS WERE WORKED OUT AFTER THE PRESIDENT TOOK OFFICE."

"THE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS FAILURE AND THAT'S AS IT SHOULD BE," KENNEDY SAID.

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STORY DISPUTED BY GOLDWATER A-5

Senator Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, today challenged Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's statement that no United States air cover was planned or promised for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April of 1961.

"I myself talked with President Kennedy at his request only a few days following the abortive invasion attempt," said Senator Goldwater. "And I certainly got the impression then that an air cover had been part of the original invasion plans."

"I am sure the entire American public has understood that the air cover was definitely in the invasion plans until the President was persuaded — by some still unidentified advisers — to cancel it. At the time of the invasion, stories printed in almost all American newspapers told of United States planes actually being in the air, ready for use, if the command should come. There were reports of an aircraft carrier standing off the invasion coast at the time of the landing."

"I suggest it is proper to inquire into this latest example of 'news management' by the New Frontier. Has this practice of the administration now been extended to the rewriting of history in an image acceptable to the men presently in charge of the national Government?"

"If there was never any plan to provide air cover for the Bay of Pigs invasion, why was this never brought to light before? Why did every Cuban exile leader with whom I spoke tell me that the United States had definitely promised to give such help? Why has the Government permitted the American people to labor for 21 months under the wrong impression?"

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Pigs Bay Story Errs, Robert Kennedy Says

David Kraslow of the Miami Herald Washington Bureau obtained the first official statement on the role of the United States in the Cuban invasion. The following account stems from an exclusive interview Kraslow had with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

By David Kraslow

Copyright, 1963, Knight Newspapers, Inc.

No United States air cover was ever planned or promised for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April, 1961, Robert Kennedy says.

Nor was the inability to control the skies the only thing that doomed the U.S.-backed Cuban refugee brigade.

There were several "major mistakes." Perhaps 10 times as many men were required for a successful operation.

Kennedy insisted repeatedly that responsibility for the failure rests with the President. But it seems clear that the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, both of whom approved the invasion

plan, virtually ignored what proved to be a crucial element in Premier Fidel Castro's arsenal.

These and other disclosures by the Attorney General, made in an interview requested by the Knight newspapers, broke the Kennedy Administration's long silence on one of the most embarrassing episodes in American history.

It must be presumed that Robert Kennedy had the approval of the President to

speaking for the record to acknowledge officially this Government's role in the attempt to liberate Cuba, and to explain finally what went wrong.

For some 20 months, while the Cuban refugees who were crushed at the Bay of Pigs languished in Castro's prisons, the President chose restraint rather than retort.

Now, largely because the ransomed prisoners are free in the United States, the Kennedy Administration feels it can reply to what it regards as grossly inaccurate accounts—published and spoken—of the Bay of Pigs disaster.

Autopsy Performed

Few people can match Robert Kennedy's knowledge of the affair. At the direction of the President, he and three others performed the autopsy. The report of their investigation led to shakeups in the CIA and the Pentagon.

During the interview, Kennedy referred critically to several national magazine articles that purported to tell the inside story.

One widely held belief is that the President reneged at the last moment on promised U.S. air cover for the invaders and that this guaranteed failure.

"There never was any plan to have U.S. air cover," Kennedy said. "There never was any promise. Not even under Mr. Eisenhower was American air cover in the picture."

Regun Under Ike

(The recruitment and training of Cuban refugees for an invasion of their homeland was begun in the Eisenhower Administration. A force was already in being when President Kennedy took office in January, 1961.)

"From the beginning the President said no American forces would take part in the operation. It was made absolutely clear that under no condition, under no condition whatsoever, would Americans be used in the invasion."

"And it simply cannot be said that the invasion failed because of any single factor. There were several major mistakes. It was just a bad plan. Victory was never close."

"A great deal more manpower and material was needed. Pepe San Roman (Jose A. Perez San Roman, the brigade commander who visited the Attorney General in Washington recently) says they might have succeeded if they had 15,000 men instead of 1500."

"And all 1500 fought bravely," Kennedy emphasized. "The investigation showed that they all fought with such determination and courage that

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itted to freeing them. These
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ission to free their country."

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The bitterly ironic, and vital,
le played by three or four
33 jet trainers at the Bay

Pigs relates to one of the
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in plan.

Ironic because these were
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ncio Batista and inherited
Castro when the Batista
game collapsed.

Vital because the T-33s eas-
y mastered the only air
ver which Kennedy said
ad been planned for the in-
aders — antiquated World
ar II B-26 bombers piloted
y refugees.

The T-33 is a training de-
ice. But armed with rockets
proved to be a highly effec-
ive instrument of war at the
ay of Pigs.

"We underestimated what a
33 carrying rockets could
o," Kennedy said. "It wasn't
iven sufficient thought. They
used us a great deal of trou-
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resent in Vicinity

One possible explanation for
ie apparent misconception on
ie question of U. S. air cover
as to do with the presence
f American warships, includ-
ig an aircraft carrier, in the
icinity of the Bay of Pigs.

If the ships transporting the
ivaders from Nicaragua were
otted by Cuban planes be-
ore they reached the target
rea, they had orders to turn
ack.

If the ships were attacked
n the high seas on their way
ack to Central America,
Kennedy said, the American
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ion.

Kennedy said the invaders
got all the air cover the
lan called for." But the sec-
nd of two planned advance
aids by B-26s intended to
nock out Castro's air force
n the ground was post-
oned, he said.

The first raid, on Saturday
April 15, was not very suc-
cessful, he said. It didn't do
nywhere near the damage
he planners had hoped for.

Story Distributed

(When the raiders landed
heir B-26s in south Florida
after that day a "cover" story

was distributed through the
Immigration Service in which
the pilots said they had just
defected from Castro's air
force.)

Not only was the element
of surprise now gone insofar
as the second strike was con-
cerned, but the repercus-
sions from the first raid were
loud and immediate.

"The President received
one call (Robert Kennedy
would not identify the caller
but said it was not United
Nations Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson) informing him that
the first raid was causing us
serious problems at the U. N.
and elsewhere," the Attorney
General said.

"It was suggested that the
second raid be postponed.
That raid was to take place
early Monday morning (April
17—the day of the invasion).

Oo. Objections

"The President said that if
those who had the responsi-
bility for the plan had strong ob-
jections to postponing the
raid, they should let him
know. No strong objections
were registered.

"The raid actually was made
later on Monday, after the in-
vasion was underway. It did
not accomplish much.

Kennedy confirmed that the
invading force appealed to the
U. S. warships for help when
they were pinned down on the
beach. He declined to say
whether the appeals were re-
layed to the President.

"The decision was made
that there would be no change
in the ground rules," Kennedy
said. "There had been a firm
understanding always, accept-
ed by everyone, that there
would be no U. S. forces in the
invasion under any condition.
We stayed with that."

Why, he was asked, since

the prestige of the United
States was committed, did the
President not also commit
American forces from the be-
ginning to insure success for
the operation?

In Critical Stage

"If it was just the Cuban
problem alone," Kennedy

said, "there would have been
no difficulty. We would have
ended it right there.

"But the Berlin issue was in
a critical stage at the time.
And there were difficulties in
Viet Nam and Laos, among
other places. We just could
not commit our forces in
Cuba. Even in retrospect, I
think this was the wise deci-
sion."

Kennedy said no invasion
plan had been completed dur-
ing Mr. Eisenhower's term.
"There was just a general con-
cept," he said. "The logistics
and the details were worked
out after the President took
office.

"The President has taken
responsibility for the failure
and that's as it should be. He
approved the plan. But it's
not true that he sat down with
two or three civilians and
worked out this plan at the
White House.

"The plan that was used
was fully cleared by the CIA
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It was war-gamed at the Pen-
tagon in whatever manner
they do these things.

Accepted Advice

"The President inherited
people with major reputations
and he accepted their advice.

"There was not sufficient
air cover at the beach. That
was a mistake. There were not
enough men and equipment.
That was a mistake. Underes-

timating the T-33s—that was
a serious mistake. The plan-
ning was inadequate, just in-
adequate."

Kennedy might just as well
have said that the entire plan
was a mistake.

The strategy behind the in-
vasion, Kennedy explained,
was to establish a firm enough

beachhead so that a Cuban
government-in-exile could
function on Cuban soil. Ken-
nedy did not say so, but pre-
sumably the United States
later would have formally
recognized that exiles govern-
ment.

Kennedy also said that no
Americans were killed in the
invasion. (Reports circulated
after the ransom prisoners
arrived in Miami that two
Americans who had helped
train the brigade died at the
Bay of Pigs.)

This is not the whole story.
Kennedy backed off from ex-
ploring various details.


He pondered a request for
additional information for sev-
eral moments. "I don't think
so," he said finally. "It
wouldn't serve the national in-
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UPI-39

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY SAID TODAY "THERE WAS NEVER ANY PLAN" TO PROVIDE U.S. AIR SUPPORT FOR THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

"THE AIR COVER AT THE BEACHES WAS DEFINITELY INADEQUATE BUT NOT BECAUSE OF SOME LAST-MINUTE DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT," THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID.

IN A COPYRIGHTED INTERVIEW WITH U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, KENNEDY SAID THE PLANS FOR THE INVASION WERE DRAWN UP BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BUT HE SAID THE PRESIDENT GAVE THE FINAL GO-AHEAD AND TOOK FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE.

KENNEDY SAID AMERICAN FORCES WERE IN THE AREA, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT "AMERICAN MANPOWER, AMERICAN AIRPOWER AND AMERICAN SHIPS" WOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THE INVASION.

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Robert Kennedy Breaks Silence On Cuba Fiasco

David Kraslow of our Washington Bureau obtained the first official statement of the U.S. role in the Cuban invasion. His report is based on the official "autopsy" of the Bay of Pigs invasion tragedy. The following account stems from an exclusive interview Kraslow had with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. The attorney general conducted the coroner's inquest into the Cuban invasion fiasco on behalf of his brother, the President.

By DAVID KRASLOW

Of Our Washington Bureau

(Copyright, 1961, Knight Newspapers, Inc.)

WASHINGTON — No U.S. air cover was ever planned or promised for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961, Robert Kennedy says.

Nor was the inability to control the skies the only thing which doomed the U.S.-backed Cuban refugee brigade.

There were several "major mistakes." Perhaps 10 times as many men were required for a successful operation.

Kennedy insisted repeatedly that responsibility for the failure rests with the President. But it seems clear that the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, both of whom approved the invasion plan, virtually ignored what proved to be a crucial element in Fidel Castro's arsenal.

These and other disclosures by the attorney general, made in an interview requested by The Knight Newspapers, broke the Kennedy administration's long silence on one of the most embarrassing episodes in American history.

Comments Spoken for the Record

It must be presumed that Robert Kennedy had the approval of the President to speak for the record, to officially acknowledge this government's role in the attempt to liberate Cuba, to explain what went wrong.

For some 20 months, while the Cuban refugees who

Truth Behind Cuban Invasion

were crushed at the Bay of Pigs languished in Castro's prisons, the President chose restraint rather than retort.

Now, largely because the ransomed prisoners are free in the U.S., the Kennedy administration feels it can reply to what it regards as grossly inaccurate accounts — published and spoken — of the Bay of Pigs disaster.

Few people can match Robert Kennedy's knowledge of the affair. At the direction of the President, he and three others performed the autopsy. The report of their investigation led to shakeups in the CIA and the Pentagon.

During the interview, Kennedy referred critically to several national magazine articles which purported to tell the inside story of the Bay of Pigs.

One widely held belief is that the President reneged at the last moment on promised U.S. cover for the invaders, and that this guaranteed failure.

"There never was any plan to have U.S. air cover," Kennedy said. "There wasn't any promise. Not even under Eisenhower was American air cover in the picture."

(The recruitment and training of Cuban refugees for an invasion of their homeland was begun in the Eisenhower administration. A force was already in being when President Kennedy took office in January 1961.)

"From the beginning the President said no American forces would take part in the operation. It was made absolutely clear that under no condition, under no condi-

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on whatsoever would Americans be used in the invasion," the attorney general said.

* * *

"And it simply cannot be said that the invasion failed because of any single factor. There were several major mistakes. It was just a bad plan. Victory was never close.

"A great deal more manpower and material was needed. Pepe San Roman, Jose A. Perez San Roman, a brigade commander who visited the attorney general in Washington recently, says they might have succeeded if they had had 15,000 men instead of 1,500.

"And all 1,500 fought bravely," Kennedy emphasized. The investigation showed that they all fought with such determination and courage at this is how I became so committed to freeing them. These were not mercenaries. They are brave volunteers on a mission to free their country."

The bitterly ironic, and vital role played by three or four T33 jet trainers at the Bay of Pigs relates to one of the "major" errors in the American plan.

It was ironic because these were American planes, given to the former Cuban Dictator Fulgencio Batista and inherited by Castro when the Batista regime collapsed.

It was vital because the T33s easily mastered the only cover which Kennedy said had been planned for the invasion.

The T33 is a training plane, not armed with rockets, it proved to be a highly effective instrument of war at the Bay of Pigs.

"We underestimated what the T33 carrying rockets could do," Kennedy said. "It wasn't sufficient thought. They used us a great deal of trouble."

One possible explanation for the apparent misconception on a question of U.S. air cover is to do with the presence of American warships, including aircraft carrier, in the vicinity of the Bay of Pigs.

If the ships transporting the invaders from Nicaragua were spotted by Cuban planes before they reached the target area, they had orders to turn back.

If the ships were attacked on the high seas on their way back to Central America, Kennedy said, the American forces in the area were under orders to give them protection.

Kennedy said the invaders "got all the air cover the plan called for." But the second of two planned advance raids by B26s intended to knock out Castro's air force on the ground was postponed, he said.

* * *

THE FIRST RAID, on Saturday April 15, was not "very successful," he said. It didn't do anywhere near the damage the planners had hoped for.

(When the raiders landed their B26s in South Florida later that day, a "cover" story was distributed through the Immigration Service in which the pilots said they had just defected from Castro's air force.)

Not only was the element of surprise now gone insofar as the second strike was concerned, but the repercussions from the first raid were loud and immediate.

"The President received one call (Robert Kennedy would not identify the caller, but said it was not UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson) informing him that the first raid was causing us serious problems at the U.N. and elsewhere," the attorney general said.

"It was suggested that the second raid be postponed. That raid was to take place early Monday morning (April 17 — the day of the invasion).

* * *

"THE PRESIDENT said that if those who had the responsibility for the plan had strong objections to postponing the raid, they should let him know. No strong objections were registered.

"The raid actually was made later on Monday, after the invasion was under way. It did not accomplish much."

Kennedy confirmed that the invading force appealed to the U.S. warships for help when they were planned down on the beach. He declined to say whether the appeals were relayed to the President.

"The decision was made that there would be no change in the ground rules," Kennedy said. "There had been a firm understanding always, accepted by everyone, that there would be no U.S. forces in the invasion under any condition. We stayed with that."

Why, he was asked, since the prestige of the U.S. was committed, did the President not also commit American forces from the beginning to insure success for the operation?

"If it was just the Cuban problem alone," Kennedy said, "there would have been no difficulty. We would have ended it right there."

* * *

"BUT THE BERLIN issue was in a critical stage at the time. And there were difficulties in Viet Nam and Laos, among other places. We just could not commit our forces in Cuba. Even in retrospect, I think this was the wise decision."

Kennedy said no invasion plan had been completed during Eisenhower's term. "There was just a general concept," he said. "The logistics and the details were worked out after the President took office."

"The President has taken responsibility for the failure and that's as it should be. He approved the plan. But it's not true that he sat down with two or three civilians and worked out this plan at the White House."

"The plan that was used was fully cleared by the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was war-gamed at the Pentagon in whatever manner they do these things."

"The President inherited people with major reputations and he accepted their advice."

"There was not sufficient air cover at the beach. That was a mistake. There were not enough men and equipment. That was a mistake. Underestimating the T33s — that was a serious mistake. The planning was inadequate, just inadequate."

* * *

THE STRATEGY behind the invasion, Kennedy explained, was to establish a firm enough beachhead so that a Cuban government-in-exile could function on Cuban soil. Kennedy did not say, but presumably the United States later would have formally recognized that exiled government.

Kennedy also said that no Americans were killed in the invasion (Reports circulated after the ransom of prisoners arrived in Miami that two Americans who had helped train the brigade died at the Bay of Pigs.)

This is not the whole story. Kennedy backed off from exploring various details.

He pondered a request for additional information for several moments. "I don't think so," he said finally. "It wouldn't serve the national interest."

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UPI-108

(GOLDWATER)

WASHINGTON--SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., CHARGED TODAY THAT ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO REWRITE HISTORY IN THE "LATEST EXAMPLE OF 'NEWS MANAGEMENT' BY THE NEW FRONTIER."

GOLDWATER WAS REFERRING TO A NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW (KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS) IN WHICH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAID NO U.S. AIR COVER WAS EVER PLANNED OR PROMISED FOR THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT IN 1961.

THE ARIZONA REPUBLICAN SAID THE STATEMENT RAN COUNTER TO EVERYTHING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE FOR 21 MONTHS.

"I SUGGEST IT IS PROPER TO INQUIRE INTO THIS LATEST EXAMPLE OF 'NEWS MANAGEMENT' BY THE NEW FRONTIER," GOLDWATER TOLD THE SENATE. "HAS THIS PRACTICE OF THE ADMINISTRATION NOW BEEN EXTENDED TO THE REWRITING OF HISTORY IN AN IMAGE ACCEPTABLE TO THE MEN PRESENTLY IN CHARGE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT?"

GOLDWATER SAID HE TALKED WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST SHORTLY AFTER THE INVASION FIASCO AND "I CERTAINLY GOT THE IMPRESSION THEN THAT AN AIR COVER HAD BEEN PART OF THE ORIGINAL INVASION PLANS." ALSO, HE TOLD THE SENATE, "I AM SURE THE ENTIRE AMERICAN PUBLIC HAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AIR COVER WAS DEFINITELY IN THE INVASION PLANS UNTIL THE PRESIDENT WAS PERSUADED--BY SOME STILL UNIDENTIFIED ADVISERS--TO CANCEL IT."

IF NO SUCH COVER WAS EVER PLANNED, "WHY WAS THIS NEVER BROUGHT TO LIGHT BEFORE?" THE ARIZONA SENATOR ASKED. "WHY HAS THE GOVERNMENT PERMITTED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO LABOR FOR 21 MONTHS UNDER THE WRONG IMPRESSION?"

GOLDWATER ALSO TOOK ISSUE WITH A SPEECH IN WHICH VICE PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON SAID THE "RATTLESNAKE IN CUBA" HAS BEEN DE-FANGED. "I SUGGEST IT IS A HIGHLY OPTIMISTIC VIEW AND ONE WHICH THE UNITED STATES CANNOT AFFORD TO ADOPT AS A MATTER OF POLICY," GOLDWATER SAID. "CASTRO'S CUBA IS STILL A MENACE TO FREEDOM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE."

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Miss Gandy _____

10 Times as Many Troops Needed

Bay of Pigs 'Autopsy' Reveals U.S. Never Planned Air Cover

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, and date.)

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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

Date: 1/21/63

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

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"Bay of Pigs" Postmor-

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Submitting Office: Miami

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Bobby Is Rewriting History With New Invasion Story

By HAL HENDRIX

Miami News Latin America Editor

Who is trying to kid whom in Washington these days?

In the current issue of U.S. News & World Report magazine, U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy states in a copyrighted interview that the United States never promised any air support for the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion.



HENDRIX

story the Kennedy Administration spokesmen, such as the brother of the President, seem to forget that all these people exist and have vivid memories of their abandonment at the last hour on Playa Giron.

Inasmuch as Attorney General Kennedy has taken at least two of the brigade leaders — Manuel Artime and Jose A. Perez San Roman — under his wing with promises of help in the future, it is not too surprising that they have shown a willingness to go along quietly with the New Frontier alterations on what transpired during the sudden death of the invasion.

But judging from the increasing rumbles among the brigade's rank and file, future leadership of the brigade by Artime and San Roman now is very much in

question. There is much talk among the loyal freedom fighters that they have been "sold down the river."

There also is new bitterness being directed at the Revolutionary Council, which has been openly backed by the Kennedy Administration, for allowing the attorney general's "no-promised support" statements to go unchallenged.

It is pointed out by embittered Cuban exiles and U.S. officials alike that if both the New Frontier and the Revolutionary Council really knew at the time the invasion was launched that there would be no support for the relatively small landing force, why then did the U.S. and the Council dump the invaders on the beach in the first place?

Also, in view of Robert Kennedy's statements, if no U.S. support were planned, why did the U.S. have two carriers sitting off shore with jet fighters ready to take to the air? Why did U.S. Navy "frogmen" participate in pre-landing operations? Why were the liberated prisoners briefed on last month's freedom airlift to say nothing of the U.S. role in the tragic invasion? Why?

Many courageous members of the brigade, top officials of the Cuban Revolutionary Council — in whose name the invasion was launched — fliers in the Cuban exile air force and a fairly sizable number of U.S. officials involved in the planning and training phase of the invasion, share a completely different recollection of the events and pledges leading up to the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961.

In their rewriting of his-

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

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The MIAMI NEWS

Miami, Florida

105-89923-A
NOT RECORDED
184 FEB 4 1963

Date: 1/22/63

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

FPM - CUBA
(MM 105-1742)

Character:

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Classification:

Submitting Office: Miami

56 FEB 4 1963

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DATE 7-16-96 BY SP13JMR/H

Cuban Exile Insists U. S. Pledged Air Aid

MIAMI, Fla., Jan. 22 (AP). — A leader in the exile organization that mounted the 1961 Cuban invasion insists that the anti-Castro brigade was promised full air cover.

Manuel Antonio de Varona, of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, said he was obliged to "break silence" because of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's statement yesterday that no United States air cover was planned.

The Attorney General said President Kennedy couldn't have issued last-minute orders canceling air cover, as many administration critics have maintained, because there never were any plans for the United States to provide air support.

Senator Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, also disputed the Attorney General in Washington. Senator Goldwater said he talked with the President just after the invasion and "I certainly got the impression then that an air cover had been part of the original invasion plans."

Mr. Varona, a former Cuban Prime Minister who headed the leading Cuban democratic revolutionary front at the time of the invasion, said in a statement:

"The colonel, designated by the Government of the United States as head of the camp where the Cubans trained assured me in February, 1961, when I expressed concern over

the reduced number of troops, that the Cuban patriots would have 'full air control' during the invasion.

"The brave expeditionaries never had the promised air coverage."

"Neither was I informed of the date nor of the plans for invasion, which in any case would not have had my approval in view of the conditions under which it took place."

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
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The Worker _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
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Mr. Tolson
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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

But The Trips Aren't Necessary**Bay Of Pigs, Revisited**

THERE was never any promise of a United States air cover for the Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961. It couldn't have succeeded, anyway, with a force of only 1,500 Cuban invaders, even though the whole operation was "war-planned at the Pentagon."

This is the story behind the ill-fated event of nearly two years ago as it was told to our David Kraslow by Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy.

It purports to clear the air of charges that President Kennedy, perhaps influenced by United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, withheld from the Cubans the aid they needed to establish a beachhead.

It refutes the notion that U.S. armed might stood at the ready, where it was meant to stand, but never was called. That such standby aid did exist has been alleged by Bay of Pigs veterans, including one who is quoted in the current edition of a newsletter published by the Republican Congressional Committee.

According to Manuel Penabaz, "We were promised the support of the armed forces of the United States. Over you will

be air cover,' we were told, 'and back of you the Navy and land forces of the United States and other free nations of the Americas.'"

The source of publication is partisan and therefore suspect. Yet it is no less partisan than the attorney general, who wants to set the record straight.

In our opinion there were too few troops and there was inadequate air cover. Even so, you cannot "invade" by air alone. The full story someday may say that this undermanned force was mounted because intelligence erroneously believed there would be wholesale uprisings within Cuba in support of the invading force. In no other manner could 1,500 men take on 300,000.

Yet there's no profit and some harm in continuing to cry over spilt milk.

It has always been perfectly clear who organized, supported and directed the invasion. Taking continued blame for the fiasco has only the virtue of reiterating one's responsibility for a success which it is hoped may be yet to come.

The Bay of Pigs is behind us, and it is a sorry recollection that cannot be rationalized. What is before us?

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state)

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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

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Date: 1/22/63
Edition:
Author:
Editor: GEORGE BROWN
Title:
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(MM 105-1742)
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Submitting Office: Miami


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UPI-208

ADD 2 CUBA, WASHINGTON

SEN. MILWARD SIMPSON, R-WYO., COMPLAINING THAT THE ATTORNEY
 GENERAL'S COMMENTS HAVE JUST ADDED "CONFUSION" TO THE BAY OF PIGS
 INCIDENT, SAID THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD TELL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
 "HOW THE MILITARY, TECHNICAL AND INTELLIGENCE POWERS OF THE UNITED
 STATES COULD BE THWARTED BY THE DICTATOR OF AN ISLAND NO LARGER THAN
 THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI."

DECLARING THAT "IT BEHOOVES THE ADMINISTRATION TO PROVIDE THESE
 ANSWERS THROUGH A SOURCE HIGHER THAN BROTHER BOBBY," SIMPSON CALLED
 FOR "A FULL BLOWN SENATORIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ENTIRE SORDID
 EPISODE AND A RESOLUTION DECLARING THE MONROE DOCTRINE AN INTEGRAL
 PART OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY."

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Bay of Pigs, in Part

TO DAVID KRASLOW, of the Knight Newspapers Washington Bureau, Attorney General Robert Kennedy undid himself of a part of the Bay of Pigs story. Mr. Kennedy is one of those who conducted the post mortem on that disaster.

He didn't tell it all, to be sure. When Kraslow pressed him for certain details, the Attorney General—having pondered the request—said, "I don't think so. It wouldn't serve the national interest."

But what the interview did produce leaves America with ample to nervously wonder about. Our government was in on the planning. Yet a worse planned, more ill conceived military operation would be hard to imagine.

It wasn't simply lack of air cover, which Mr. Kennedy says we never promised. The disaster was produced by a series of miscalculations—not the least of which was the puny size of the invasion force put ashore at the Bay of Pigs.

The unanswered question is what men holding roles where they could participate in decisions permitted the affair to proceed. Either they had no conception of military operations and weapons, or they let the expedition go ahead despite patently predestined doom.

In either case it is something fit to shatter faith and engender fear. If our decision makers were that inept, what sort of a plight have we been in—and are we still in it?

The fault pretty clearly lay in the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, but at what level? And if not at the top, then why didn't the top perceive the improbability of a scheme devised somewhere down in the planning echelon?

There is still a lot to be told, and much to make America ask questions about how greatly it has been deceived. That it has been to some extent was left beyond doubt by Mr. Kennedy.

He told, let it not be forgotten, how a "cover" story was set up and given the Immigration Service for circulation after planes manned by invader-force pilots landed in Florida en route home from an unsuccessful pre-invasion raid.

It was that they were flown by pilots defecting from Castro's air force. If that story was planted, how many others have been planted? We know more than we did before Mr. Kennedy gave his Kraslow interview, but we still are obviously well short of the whole truth.

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Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
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Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan ☒ _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
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Miss Holmes _____
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6A Detroit Free Press
Detroit, Mich.

Date: 1/22/63
Edition: Metro Final
Author: Lee Mills
Editor:
Title:

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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Air Cover Promised, Cuban Says

By DOM BONAFEDE

Chief Latin America Correspondent

Antonio de Varona, No. 2 man of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, maintained Monday that U.S. military officials assured him prior to the April 17, 1961, Cuban invasion that the anti-Castro brigade would have "full air support."

Varona said he was obliged to "break silence" concerning the ill-fated venture because of statements made by Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

In an exclusive interview with David Kraslow, of The Herald's Washington Bureau, Kennedy said no U.S. air power was ever planned or promised for the Bay of Pigs operation.

The administration of President Kennedy had assumed responsibility for the failure of the invasion, but had not issued public statements concerning the operation until the attorney general's interview.

Previously, President Kennedy had been criticized by leading magazines and newspapers as having withdrawn promised air support for the invaders.

In reply to Attorney General Kennedy, Varona said in a released statement:

"In so far as I was coordinator of the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front—the organization which called upon the Cubans to prepare for war—it is my inescapable duty to make known certain facts in order that truth may prevail.

"With no other purpose than that of avoiding erroneous interpretations, I assume full responsibility in stating the following: The colonel designated by the government of the United States as head of the camp where the Cubans trained assured me in February 1961, when I expressed concern over the reduced number of troops, that the Cuban patriots would have 'full air control' during the invasion."

Varona added that the colonel "promised" him that he would be invited to participate in the invasion plans and that he would be allowed to land with the liberation brigade.

"It is unnecessary for me to repeat that the brave expeditionaries never had the promised air coverage, and that neither was I informed of the date nor of the plans for invasion, which in any case would not have had my approval in view of the conditions under which it took place," Varona said.

As a member of the Revolutionary Front, Varona and other leaders of the anti-Castro organization, including Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, president, were secretly taken by U.S. agents from New York to closely guarded quarters at the Opa-locka base. They were kept there while the invasion was going on, unaware of the defeat being inflicted on the brigade.

They presumed that once the invaders secured a beachhead they would be flown into Cuba to set up a provisional government. With the failure of the operation, this plan, of course, was discarded.

Both Varona and Miro Cardona had sons among the invaders.

In his statement, Varona indicated he would not again make public utterances concerning the invasion, "which some day will require the full investigation which always precedes the just recording of historians."

He further implied that the exile movement is embarked on a plan of military action against the regime of Fidel Castro.

"Our present task is to coordinate the indispensable armed action to defeat the Communist forces which enslave Cuba and threaten the entire hemisphere," he concluded.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

Date: 1/22/62
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:
FIM - CUBA
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UPI-148

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SENATE REPUBLICANS MOVED TODAY TO CONDUCT THEIR OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION FIASCO IN THE INTEREST OF GETTING THE "ENTIRE STORY" HISTORICALLY ACCURATE.

SENATE GOP LEADER EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, ILL. SAID HE PROPOSED MAKING SUCH A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY ON HIS OWN AND HEARD "NO DISSENT" WHEN IT WAS DISCUSSED AT A GOP POLICY MEETING TODAY.

THE GOP LEADER SAID HIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT PROMPTED BY SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., WHO EARLIER TOLD THE SENATE THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION SHOULD MAKE PUBLIC ALL OFFICIAL REPORTS ON THE ILL-FATED CUBAN INVASION. GOLDWATER SAID THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD END ITS EFFORTS TO "TAMPER WITH HISTORY."

GOLDWATER AND DIRKSEN BOTH WERE REACTING TO A PUBLISHED INTERVIEW WITH ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, WHO CONTENDED THAT AN AIR STRIKE WHICH NEVER CAME OFF IN THE INVASION WAS NEVER PART OF THE INVASION PLANS.

DIRKSEN TOLD NEWSMEN HE FELT THE HISTORICAL RECORD WAS OF "SUCH IMPORTANCE THAT IT CANNOT BE LEFT IN DOUBT." HE SAID HE ALREADY HAD MADE SOME PHONE CALLS TO "PEOPLE WHO SHOULD KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT IT" AND PLANNED TO TALK TO OTHERS--PROBABLY INCLUDING SOME OF THE CUBAN INVADERS WHO HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM PRISON BY CASTRO AND ARE NOW IN THIS COUNTRY.

"THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE OUGHT TO KNOW THE FACTS--ALL THE FACTS," DIRKSEN SAID.

HE SAID HE PLANS TO MAKE AN "EXPLORATION" OF HIS OWN, TAKE IT UP WITH THE GOP POLICY COMMITTEE STAFF, AND THEN DECIDE WHETHER THE MATTER SHOULD BE PUT UP TO A SENATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE FOR MORE FORMAL INVESTIGATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE LATTER MIGHT BE CONDUCTED BY THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF WHICH HE IS A MEMBER.

DIRKSEN SAID HE SAW NOTHING UNUSUAL IN A POLITICAL PARTY GROUP CONDUCTING ITS OWN INQUIRY. HE SAID HE IS INTERESTED IN "PROTECTING THE RECORD OF U.S. HISTORY."

AS TO INTERVIEWING THE RELEASED CUBAN PRISONERS, DIRKSEN SAID: "I MAY GO AND SEE SOME--OR GET SOME OF THEM UP HERE." HE SAID FINDING THE NEEDED FUNDS TO DO THIS WOULD BE LIKE "ROLLING OFF A LOG."

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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DAVID LAWRENCE

U.S. and the Bay of Pigs Fiasco

Question of Military Competence Or Civilian Interference is Raised

The American people are entitled to know whether the chiefs of their armed services are incompetent or whether, in strictly military operations, they are being interfered with by civilians in the Government.

A congressional investigation of just what happened before the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba took place in April, 1961, is more than ever necessary now, because of what is being disclosed as the "true story" of the fiasco. For unless the responsibility of the United States Chiefs of Staff during military operations is clearly fixed, the capacity of the United States to prevent or resist armed attacks in this hemisphere may be open to question.

More than 300,000 men of our armed services were mobilized last October inside the United States for a possible invasion of Cuba in order to get rid of the Soviet missile bases there. But there is no way to judge whether the military chiefs even then had the full authority to act and just what restrictions were placed upon them which could have affected the success of that expedition.

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who because he is a brother of the President is regarded as the administration's authoritative spokesman in many matters outside his own department, has just given two interviews on the Cuban fiasco—one to the Knight Newspapers and the other to United States News & World Report.

The two interviews dovetail, though they do not cover all of the same points. The Attorney General told David Kraslow, Washington correspondent of the Knight Newspapers, that there had been no invasion plan contemplated during Mr. Eisenhower's term. He said: "There was just a general concept. The logistics and the details were worked out after the President (Kennedy) took office."

Added interest has developed now in this whole subject, because many of the Cuban officers of the invasion force, who were recently ransomed have been telling Americans that the United States had assured them of air cover. Attorney General Kennedy makes quite a point of the fact that "no United States air cover" was ever promised. Technically, this is correct. But the United States was fully cognizant of the air support the Cubans were supposed to have. Yet this was inadequate. Attorney General Kennedy said in his interview in United States News & World Report:

"The first point is that there was not United States air cover and none was withdrawn. In fact, the President didn't withdraw any air cover for the landing forces. —United States or otherwise."

"What happened was this: One air attack had been made on Saturday on Cuban airports. There was a flurry at the United Nations and elsewhere and, as a result, United States participation in the matter was coming to the surface. This surfacing was contrary to the pre-invasion plan. There was supposed to be another attack on the airports on Monday morning."

"The President was called about whether another attack which had been planned should take place. As there was this stir about the matter, he gave instructions that it should not take place at that time unless those having the responsibility felt that it was so important it had to take place, in which case they should call him and discuss it further. And that's what was postponed. If it wasn't air cover of the beaches or landings. And, in fact, the attack on the airports took place later that day."

The air cover provided was from a base in Central America. What part the United States government played in organizing it is not disclosed.

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In the middle of a military operation, however, you can't make a long-distance call to the White House and discuss the next move. The anti-Castro forces were sure air cover was coming from somewhere.

The Attorney General was asked who did the planning. He declared that "the plan that finally went into effect was approved by our military — the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency." He added that, while the Joint Chiefs "approved" the plan, "the responsibility for the planning lay primarily with the CIA," and that, since the President had to give final approval to the plan, he had accepted the blame.

In both interviews, the Attorney General said that United States air power was to have been used only if the ships transporting the Cuban invasion force had been detected by Castro before they reached the target area and were attacked on the high seas on their way back to Central America. This is the explanation given for the presence of United States warships, including an aircraft carrier, in the vicinity of the Bay of Pigs on the day of the invasion. Yet it is asserted that before the invasion the President had "made it clear" that United States armed forces, including air power, would not be used.

In the interview in the Knight newspapers, the Attorney General said, "The plan that was used was fully cleared by the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

But what does "cleared" mean? Do the Joint Chiefs take responsibility for any such plan as was employed? Listing the major "mistakes," Mr. Kennedy added: "There was not sufficient air cover at the beach. That was a mistake. There were not enough men and equipment. That was a mistake. Underestimating the T-33s (Castro's airplanes) — that was a serious mistake. The planning was inadequate, just inadequate."

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Holmes ☒
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CLIP

But who did all this planning, and why wasn't someone in the United States Air Force able to say in advance whether the T-33s had the capacity to carry rockets? These were the United States planes originally given to the Batista regime in Cuba.

The important "details" have never been divulged, as there has been a constant cover-up. But if Congress now fails to make a searching inquiry, with testimony available to the public, another military fiasco could occur, especially if the same "military planners" are still in command at the Pentagon or elsewhere.

(Copyright, 1963)

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Washington Post and Times Herald

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New York Herald Tribune
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New York Daily News
New York Post
The New York Times
The Worker
The New Leader
The Wall Street Journal
The National Observer
Date

JAN 22 1963

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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Air Support Promised, Exiles Say

Refugees Claim They Witnessed U.S. Pledges

● **Rewriting History?**
Page 4.

● **Bobby's New Story.**
Page 10A.

By **HAL HENDRIX**
Miami News Latin America Editor

Denial by U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy that the United States promised air support for the Bay of Pigs invasion stirred up a hornet's nest of bitterness today among members of the Cuban exile air force who participated in the attack.

"We do not want to enter into a public debate with Mr. Kennedy," said a Cuban pilot, "but what happened at and over Playa Giron during the invasion is matter of history."

"It is our duty to the memory of the dead to set the facts straight as we saw it and lived it."

Kennedy, in a copyrighted interview published in the current issue of U.S. News & World Report, stated that there "never were any plans made for U.S. air cover" and that American forces were not used in the invasion.

Four members of the exile air force — Gonzalo Herreia, Julio Gonzales Rebull, Gustavo Villoldo and Alfredo

day they were among witnesses to pledges of air cover support from the United States.

The group also disclosed that four U. S. pilots flying two B-26 bombers of the invasion air force were shot down by Castro fighter planes near the invasion beach. They died about dawn April 19, 1961 — third day of the invasion.

The Americans killed were flying a mission voluntarily with the Cubans because of heavy losses suffered, the Cuban fliers explained. Names were not revealed.

The Cuban pilots added that the four U. S. airmen were a part of a contingent of about 150 U. S. military advisers that worked with the Cuban air force and Brigade 2506 before the invasion was launched.

Villoldo recalled that after the initial day of the invasion the B-26 flight crews held a meeting at operations headquarters at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, with chief U. S. advisers to the air force.

"We saw a teletype message there at Happy Valley (code name for the air base) which we assumed came from Washington, or someplace in the United States," Villoldo said.

"The message said that 06:45 on the 19th 'air cover requested granted . . . sky will be clear.'"

"It was shown to all the crews because there was a lot of doubt after the first flights. On the 17th the U. S. military advisers had assured us there would be air cover. We got none and we lost six planes that day."

Herreia, who flew the third plane in the formation with the two U. S. crews on the morning of April 19, said Cuban pilots had been briefed to use "Mad Dog Four" as a distress call to a U. S.

"The calls to the carrier were ignored," he said.

"One of the American pilots called the carrier to report he was being attacked by one of Castro's T-33 jets. He said he had one engine on fire and was out of ammunition."

"About 10 seconds later, the other American crew called the carrier with 'Mad Dog Four' 'May Day,' asking for help."

"His transmission was interrupted by an explosion of his airplane. Before we finished there the other American's plane fell into the sea in a ball of fire."

"By then I had about 37 hits on my plane and one engine out."

"I flew 720 miles back to Nicaragua on the deck, calling to the carrier for help every 15 minutes and getting no answer."

"We realized when the Americans were shot down we had been lied to again."

Gonzales Rebull recalled that a Cuban medic aboard the Houston ship when it was sunk, was picked out of the sea by a U. S. helicopter and flown to a carrier 15 miles off shore.

As another example of U. S. personnel involved in the operation Caballero said on April

19, two U. S. Air Force Globemaster transport planes landed at Puerto Cabezas with weapons and supplies.

Also, it was noted, the B-26 planes used by the Cuban exiles were formerly U. S. National Guard planes, delivered to the Cubans in Guatemala by Air National Guard pilots.

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UPI-132

(GOLDWATER)

WASHINGTON--SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., CALLED ON THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION TODAY TO MAKE PUBLIC ALL OFFICIAL REPORTS ON THE BAY OF PIGS DEBACLE AND END ITS EFFORTS TO "TAMPER WITH HISTORY."

GOLDWATER ALSO TOLD THE SENATE THAT CONGRESS "IS PERHAPS THE ONLY BODY THAT COULD PROPERLY WEIGH ALL THE EVIDENCE." THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, HE DECLARED, ARE ENTITLED TO A "FULL AIRING" OF THE ENTIRE CUBAN INVASION EFFORT.

IN RENEWING HIS ATTACK ON WHAT HE HAS DESCRIBED AS ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPTS TO DISTORT THE FACTS OF THE INVASION, GOLDWATER SAID:

"I CERTAINLY FEEL THAT IT IS LONG PAST THE TIME WHEN EVERY OFFICIAL REPORT BEARING ON THE INVASION ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC."

THE GOP CONSERVATIVE SAID ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY PRESENTED A "HIGHLY COLORED ACCOUNT" OF THE INVASION IN A RECENT EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW FOR KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS.

KENNEDY WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT AN AIR STRIKE THAT NEVER CAME OFF ACTUALLY WAS NEVER PART OF THE INVASION PLANS.

GOLDWATER ACCUSED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF A "MASSIVE READJUSTMENT OF FACTS CONCERNING THE INVASION ATTEMPT TO PLACE THE NEW FRONTIER IN A BETTER LIGHT."

HE QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WAS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S "PRE-EMINENT TASK TO TAMPER WITH HISTORY AND BRAINWASH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE INTO A BELIEF THAT THE NEW FRONTIER CAN DO NO WRONG?"

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UPI-41

(CUBA)

MIAMI--REFUGEE CUBAN EX-PREMIER MANUEL A. DE VARONA SAID LAST NIGHT A U.S. ARMY OFFICER ASSURED HIM BEFORE THE ILL-FATED 1961 INVASION OF CUBA THAT THE INVADER WOULD HAVE "FULL COMMAND OF THE AIR."

DE VARONA WAS COMMENTING ON ATTY. GEN. ROBERT KENNEDY'S STATEMENT IN AN INTERVIEW YESTERDAY THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NEVER PROMISED THE INVADERS AIR SUPPORT.

INVASION LEADER JOSE PEREZ SAN ROMAN, IN A STATEMENT PRIOR TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S, ALSO SAID THE CUBANS WHO SOUGHT TO OVERTHROW FIDEL CASTRO NEVER HAD RECEIVED ANY FIRM PROMISE OF AIR SUPPORT.

~~LEADER OF A DISSIDENT INVADER FACTION~~

~~FIDEL CASTRO NEVER HAD RECEIVED ANY FIRM PROMISE OF AIR SUPPORT.~~

MEMBERS OF A DISSIDENT INVADER FACTION LED BY ENRIQUE LLACA DEMANDED THAT A GRAND JURY BE EMPANELED TO FIX BLAME FOR THE FAILURE OF THE INVASION, WHICH THEY SAID WAS "COSTLY TO THE CAUSE OF DEMOCRACY."

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UPI-171

ADD 1 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-148)

SEN. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, D-ARK., CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SAID THE DIRKSEN INVESTIGATION "HAS A VERY STRONG PARTISAN AURA."


HE SAID THAT "ANY CONCLUSION WOULD BE CONSIDERED QUITE PARTISAN."

FULBRIGHT'S COMMITTEE HAS BEEN BRIEFED INTERMITTENTLY ON THE CUBA SITUATION, MOST RECENTLY BY SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK.

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UPI-252

(CUBA)

NEW YORK--FORMER PRESIDENT EISENHOWER SAID TONIGHT THE ILL-FATED PLAN TO INVADE CUBA AT THE BAG OF PIGS WAS NOT CONCEIVED DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT THAT, INSTEAD, A "GUERRILLA TYPE OF ACTION" WAS CONTEMPLATED.

EISENHOWER DISCUSSED THE CUBAN SITUATION AND NUMEROUS OTHER DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TOPICS DURING A TAPED ONE-HOUR INTERVIEW WITH NEWSMAN WALTER CRONKITE ON CBS-TELEVISION.

WHEN CRONKITE ASKED THE FORMER CHIEF EXECUTIVE IF THE CUBAN INVASION PLAN HAD BEEN MADE UNDER HIS ADMINISTRATION, EISENHOWER REPLIED:

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"NO, NO, NO...."

HE ADDED: "THERE WAS NO WAY. WE DIDN'T EVEN KNOW AT THAT TIME WHETHER WE COULD DO ANYTHING MORE, OR WHETHER THESE REFUGEES WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS AND STRONG TO DO MORE THAN GO INTO ME... EASTERN PART OF THE ISLAND, IN THE MOUNTAINS, AND START IN AND RETURN A COUNTER REVOLUTION...."

EISENHOWER NOTED THAT "WE MORE OR LESS WERE THINKING OF GUERRILLA TYPE OF ACTION UNTIL WE COULD GET ENOUGH FORCES TO DO MORE THAN THAT."

HE SAID THE PLANNING WAS TO FIND A LEADER FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE TO HELP THEM TO RISE UP AND OVERTHROW CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO BUT "HOW ARE YOU GOING TO FIND A MAN THAT WAS NOT A BATISTA MAN, AND NOT A CASTRO MAN, AND STILL BE A LEADER?"

HE POINTED OUT THAT BOTH CASTRO AND FORMER CUBAN DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA "HAD GOTTEN RID OF THEM (THE POTENTIAL LEADERS.)"

EISENHOWER SAID DESPITE THESE EFFORTS BY HIS ADMINISTRATION "THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL PLAN DEVELOPED BEFORE I LEFT."

ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CUBA, DESPITE THE RUSSIAN BACKDOWN ON THE MISSILE BASES, EISENHOWER WARNED THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST STILL MAINTAIN CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE OVER THE ISLAND.

"I UNDERSTAND," EISENHOWER SAID, "THERE ARE STILL SOME THOUSANDS OF RUSSIAN SOLDIERS IN CUBA, AND UNQUESTIONABLY, THEY MUST BE MANNING SOME KIND OF EQUIPMENT. THEY MUST BE TRAINING THESE PEOPLE, AND IT'S STILL A VERY DANGEROUS SPOT IN OUR HEMISPHERE."

ON OTHER SUBJECTS THE FORMER PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE NOT ONLY FEELS THE NATION'S PRESENT DEFENSES ARE "ADEQUATE" AND "COMPLETE" BUT THAT "I THINK... PERSONALLY... WE'RE SPENDING TOO MUCH MONEY ON IT."

HE CALLED PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S PLANNED \$99 BILLION (B) BUDGET "A RECKLESSNESS THAT'S COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED IN THESE TIMES."

EISENHOWER ADMITTED THAT IN 1958-59 HIS ADMINISTRATION DEVELOPED A \$12.5 BILLION (B) DEFICIT, BUT SAID "IT WAS NOT PLANNED. IT WAS NOT PART OF A DEFINITE POLICY OF GOVERNMENT."

HE SAID PART OF THE UNPLANNED DEFICIT WAS BECAUSE OF THE RECESSION WHICH DEVELOPED AT THAT TIME.

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HOWEVER, EISENHOWER ADDED: "MAYBE I'M OLD-FASHIONED, AND MAYBE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO THINK LIKE I THINK ARE OLD-FASHIONED, BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PROVE TO THE WORLD THAT WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT PAY OUR DEBTS AS WE GO ALONG--THAT WE ARE BUILDING UP A SITUATION THAT IS CERTAINLY GOING TO BE DIFFICULT FOR US, AND IS GOING TO BE A HUNDRED TIMES WORSE FOR OUR CHILDREN AND OUR GRANDCHILDREN, UNLESS WE STOP IT."

THE FORMER PRESIDENT SAID HE AGREED THAT "WE DO NEED, AT THIS MOMENT, A TAX CUT."

BUT HE SAID, "IF WE'RE GOING TO HAVE A TAX CUT, WE MUST HAVE SOME REDUCTION IN EXPENDITURES, SO THAT PEOPLE KNOW WE'RE SERIOUS ABOUT THIS THING."

EISENHOWER SAID HE FELT THE POLICIES OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WERE HELPING THE CHANCES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN MAKING A STRONG COMEBACK IN NEXT YEAR'S ELECTIONS.

"AS I SEE IT, OUR DOMESTIC POLICIES HAVE BEEN GUIDED BY PEOPLE WHO ARE THEORISTS, WHO HAVE IDEAS AND THEORIES OF THE ECONOMY THAT I THINK ARE COMPLETELY UNSOUND... AND I BELIEVE A GREAT MANY MORE PEOPLE... ARE BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THIS."

EISENHOWER SAID HE THOUGHT THE SPLIT BETWEEN PEKING AND MOSCOW WAS A GOOD THING, BUT THAT THE WESTERN WORLD SHOULD NOT BECOME COMPLACENT AND SAY "OH, NOW, WE HAVE GOT JUST WHAT WE WANT--THESE TWO BIG MONSTERS ARE FIGHTING EACH OTHER..."

INSTEAD, HE SAID, WE SHOULD, AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY, EXPLOIT THIS SPLIT AND TRY TO WIDEN IT.

THE FORMER PRESIDENT SAID HE FELT IT WOULD BE A "VERY GREAT TRAGEDY" SHOULD FRENCH PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE PREVENT BRITAIN'S ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET.

HE SAID DE GAULLE "REACHES HIS CONCLUSIONS APPARENTLY IN SORT OF A REMOTE CORNER OF HIS MIND, AND WHEN HE'S ONCE FORMED THEM, HE'S QUITE OBDDURATE IN HANGING ONTO THEM."

EISENHOWER ADDED THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW JUST WHY DE GAULLE WAS BLOCKING BRITAIN, BUT SAID "THERE'S NO TELLING WHAT HIS REAL MOTIVES ARE, BUT I HOPE THAT HE WILL TAKE A VERY LONG LOOK AT IT, BECAUSE ALL THE REST OF THE WHOLE WESTERN WORLD SEEMS TO SEE IN THIS DEVELOPMENT RIGHT NOW, OF GETTING BRITAIN INTO IT, MAYBE THE OPENING UP OF THE VISTA, UNTIL WE ARE ALL IN IT FINALLY, IN A GREAT FREE-WORLD COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY THE PRODUCTIVE NATIONS."

HOWEVER, EISENHOWER ADDED: "I DON'T THINK IT IS FAIR JUST TO ASCRIBE HIS ACTION JUST TO SHEER PERSONAL EGOTISM. I BELIEVE HE IS REALLY A BIGGER MAN THAN THAT, BUT I DO NOT THINK IT'S PROBABLY AN OVERWEENING SELF-CONFIDENCE THAT'S GUIDING HIM IN HIS BELIEF THAT HE CAN NOW BRING FRANCE UP TO GUIDING THE WHOLE WESTERN WORLD."

EISENHOWER DEPLORED ANY LEAK IN SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS AND NOTED THAT ON THE ONE OCCASION THIS HAPPENED WHEN HE WAS PRESIDENT A COLUMNIST QUOTED "EXACTLY" FROM A SECURITY COUNCIL PAPER.

"NOW, IN MY OPINION, WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THAT MAN AND TRIED OUR BEST TO PUT HIM PRISON..." HE SAID.

IN FACT, HE ADDED, BOTH THE COLUMNIST AND THE MAN WHO LEAKED THE DETAILS TO HIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED. HE DID NOT NAME NAMES OR GIVE FURTHER DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT.

HOWEVER, HE SAID THERE WAS ONE INSTANCE IN WHICH THE DEBATES WITHIN THE COUNCIL COULD BE MADE PUBLIC, AND THIS WAS WHEN THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF DECIDED TO DO SO.

"I THINK THAT...THE ONLY PERSON WHO HAS GOT ANY RIGHT TO EXPOSE THE THINKING OF THESE DIFFERENT PEOPLE (THE COUNCIL MEMBERS) WOULD BE THE PRESIDENT, HIMSELF, AND HE MIGHT WANT TO DO THIS FOR SOME REASON, AND IT MIGHT BE THE SORT OF OLD THEORY OF TRIAL BALLOONS," HE SAID.

HE ADDED: "YOU PUT UP AN IDEA AND SEE WHETHER IT WORKS, OR PEOPLE DON'T LIKE IT, BUT OTHERWISE, ANY ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OWES IT TO HIMSELF AND TO HIS COUNTRY AND TO THE PRESIDENT TO KEEP HIS MOUTH SHUT."

"NOW (THAT'S ALL THERE IS TO IT. I THINK THAT ANY ONE THAT GOES OUTSIDE THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF TO TELL THIS IS DOING A GREAT DISSERVICE TO THE UNITED STATES."

Dirksen to Take Look At Cuba Invasion Facts

By the Associated Press

The Senate Republican Policy Committee gave clearance yesterday for an independent investigation by Minority Leader Dirksen of Illinois of the 1961 Cuban invasion disaster.

Senator Dirksen said the committee gave its assent to an inquiry into whether Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy had "told the entire factual story" in a recent review of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Previously Senator Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, had told the Senate that the Attorney General was attempting to lay blame for the invasion failure on the administration of former President Eisenhower.

While Senator Dirksen's remarks were interpreted as indicating the policy group would go ahead immediately with an inquiry, he said later in an interview this was not true.

Instead, he said he personally will "take a look-see" at the situation and report back to the policy group within two weeks. He said the group then will decide what it wants to do about the information he has gathered.

The news that the policy group was underwriting such an investigation brought charges by Democrats that the minority was injecting politics into foreign policy matters.

Chairman Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said the action has a strong partisan aura.

Senator Morse, Democrat of Oregon, who conducted previous hearings into the invasion's

failure, said "It is regrettable that Republican leaders propose to play politics with American foreign policy by suggesting that the Senate Republican Policy Committee conduct an investigation of the unfortunate Bay of Pigs invasion."

Senator Keating, Republican of New York, a G. O. P. Policy Committee member, said he, too, believes that any inquiry "shouldn't be a political matter at all."


Senator Dirksen turned aside a question as to whether he was setting out to protect the Eisenhower administration's record. He said he was acting to "protect the record of the United States of America and for historical guidance."

Senator Dirksen did not spell out any specific complaints about Mr. Kennedy's review of what the Attorney General called invasion mistakes. Mr. Kennedy presented the official administration version of the affair for the first time yesterday in a series of interviews.

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UPI-106

ADD 2 PIGS BAY, WASHINGTON

"IT IS TRUE, PRESIDENT KENNEDY MANFULLY ACCEPTED ALL THE BLAME FOR THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO," GOLDWATER SAID. "BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT HE NEVER GAVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE A TRUE ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAD BEEN PLANNED AND WHAT ACTUALLY OCCURRED."

"NOW AFTER ALL THIS TIME, WE GET FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AN ACCOUNT WHICH DEFIES BELIEF AND RUNS COUNTER TO EVERYTHING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE AND CONTRADICTS THE UNDERSTANDING OF ALMOST EVERY MAN ENGAGED IN THE ABORTIVE INVASION ATTEMPT."

HE SAID NO ONE COULD BELIEVE THAT 1,500 MEN COULD SUCCEED IN AN INVASION OF CUBA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S RECENT STATEMENTS "CAST GRAVE DOUBTS ON THE ABILITY OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS."

GOLDWATER'S RESOLUTION SAID THE INVASION WAS "FOREDOOMED TO FAILURE" WITHOUT AIR PROTECTION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENTS HAVE LEFT THE PUBLIC IN "A STATE OF CONFUSION" AS TO THE TRUE FACTS.

THE RESOLUTION CALLED FOR EXPENDITURES OF UP TO \$100,000 FOR THE PROBE.

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
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UPI-100

(PIGS BAY)

WASHINGTON--SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., TODAY INTRODUCED
A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A "FULL AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION" OF THE
BAY OF PIGS CUBAN INVASION FIASCO.
GOLDWATER'S RESOLUTION CALLS FOR A PROBE BY THE SENATE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE HEADED BY SEN. RICHARD RUSSELL, D-GA.
IN A SENATE SPEECH, HE SAID SUCH AN INVESTIGATION WAS THE ONLY
MEANS IN WHICH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD BE FULLY INFORMED
ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INVASION IN APRIL OF 1961.
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UPI-102

ADD 1 PIGS BAY, WASHINGTON (UPI-100)

HE SAID A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION WAS MADE "MANDATORY" BY ATTORNEY GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NEVER PLANNED AIR COVER FOR THE BAND OF INVADERS.

GOLDWATER SUGGESTED THAT LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, AND ALLEN DULLES, FORMER HEAD OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BE CALLED TO TESTIFY.

SEN. WAYNE MORSE, D-ORE., CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICA, ROSE TO SAY THAT BEFORE ANY "PARTISAN" SPEECHES WERE MADE ON THE SUBJECT, SENATORS SHOULD READ SECRET TESTIMONY TAKEN BY THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. HE SAID STATEMENTS BY BOTH LEMNITZER AND DULLES WERE IN THE TRANSCRIPT.

GOLDWATER RETORTED HE HAD READ THAT TESTIMONY, BUT THAT IN HIS OPINION IT WAS "INCONCLUSIVE." MORSE ANSWERED HE WANTED A JURY OF THE SENATE TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WAS INCONCLUSIVE.

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(ADD 3 PIGS BAY, WASHINGTON
 RUSSELL TOLD NEWSMEN HE HAS AN OPEN MIND ON THE MATTER OF A BAY
 OF PIGS INQUIRY. HE SAID HE SEES NO PARTICULAR NEED FOR REHASHING
 WHAT HE CALLED "A VERY HUMILIATING EXPERIENCE IN OUR NATIONAL LIFE"
 BUT WOULD NOT OPPOSE AN INQUIRY IF IT WOULD SERVE THE NATIONAL
 INTEREST.

RUSSELL SAID HE HAS NOT READ THE RECENT ROBERT KENNEDY COMMENTS
 ALTHOUGH HE HAS DISCUSSED THE BAY OF PIGS INCIDENT WITH THE PRESIDENT
 AND OTHERS AND HAS LOOKED INTO IT IN CLOSED-DOOR HEARINGS OF THE
 SENATE'S SPECIAL CIA SUBCOMMITTEE.

"IT'S A LITTLE DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SEE WHAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 HAD TO DO WITH THE BAY OF PIGS," SAID RUSSELL, COMMENTING THAT THE
 PRESIDENT'S BROTHER HAD NO ROLE IN THE INCIDENT "IN HIS OFFICIAL
 CAPACITY."

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UPI-127

ADD 4 PIGS BAY, WASHINGTON
 QUESTIONED BY NEWSMEN ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR GOLDWATER'S
 PROPOSAL, CHAIRMAN RUSSELL SUGGESTED THAT GOLDWATER COULD ACHIEVE MUCH
 OF THE PURPOSE OF HIS INQUIRY BY QUESTIONING WITNESSES IN FORTHCOMING
 HEARINGS OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE NATION'S MILITARY
 POSTURE. GOLDWATER IS A COMMITTEE MEMBER.

RUSSELL SAID THE HEARINGS, STARTING AS SOON AS THE SENATE RULES
 FIGHT IS COMPLETED, WILL INCLUDE TESTIMONY BY DEFENSE SECRETARY
 MCNAMARA, JOHN A. MCCONE, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AND MEMBERS
 OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

RUSSELL SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE REGULAR HEARINGS WOULD NOT NORMALLY
 HEAR SUCH WITNESSES AS LEMNITZER, WHOM GOLDWATER HAD SUGGESTED.
 RUSSELL SAID HE WOULD CALL LEMNITZER IF THE COMMITTEE SO DIRECTED AND
 WOULD ASK THE COMMITTEE TO VOTE ON GOLDWATER'S PROPOSAL IF GOLDWATER
 FORMALLY PROPOSED HIS INQUIRY.

AS TO THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE BAY OF BIGS INCIDENT,
 RUSSELL SAID: "I DIDN'T SEE THAT IT SERVED ANY USEFUL PURPOSE TO
 RE-LAUNDER THIS LINEN--THOUGH I'LL CONFESS IT HAD NEVER SEEMED TO
 BE REAL CLEAN."

RUSSELL SAID HE BELIEVES HE HAD "A PRETTY CLEAR PICTURE" OF WHAT
 HAPPENED ON APRIL 16, 1961 FROM DISCUSSING IT THE NEXT DAY WITH THE
 PRESIDENT, FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN. MAXWELL TAYLOR, NOW CHAIRMAN OF THE
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND FROM FIVE HOURS OF TESTIMONY BEFORE THE
 CIA SUBCOMMITTEE.

THERE ARE, HE SAID, PROBABLY SOME DETAILS IN THE MATTER THAT HAVE
 NOT BEEN DEVELOPED BUT HE QUESTIONED WHETHER IT
 NOT BEEN DEVELOPED BUT HE QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WOULD SERVE ANY
 PURPOSE TO GO INTO THEM.

"I WOULDN'T LIKE TO SEE THE COMMITTEE GET OFF INTO KICKING A DEAD
 HORSE...SOLVING A POLITICAL SITUATION," RUSSELL SAID.

AS TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AIR COVER WAS PROMISED THE BAY OF
 PIGS INVASION FORCE, RUSSELL SAID: "I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY DOUBT
 THAT THE PEOPLE WHO MADE THE INVASION THOUGHT THEY HAD AIR COVER
 ARRANGED." OTHERWISE, HE SAID, THEY WOULDN'T HAVE COMMITTED 1,500 MEN
 TO SUCH A VENTURE.

THE ONLY QUESTION, RUSSELL SAID, IS WHETHER THE PROMISED AIR COVER
 WAS TO BE PROVIDED BY REGULAR U.S. FORCES OR WHETHER IT WAS "CIA AIR
 COVER" OF THE TYPE THAT SUPPLIED THE BOMBING RAID ON HAVANA BEFORE
 THE INVASION.

1/23--EG211PES

Goldwater Acts to Force Probe of Cuba Invasion

Senator Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, today introduced a resolution asking the Senate Armed Services Committee to make a full investigation of the controversy over whether this country ever promised an air cover for the Cuban refugees in the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.

The resolution followed two days of oratory by Republicans challenging the recent statement of Attorney General Robert Kennedy that air cover was not promised.

The Senate Republican Policy Committee gave clearance yesterday for an independent investigation by Minority Leader Dirksen of Illinois.

Senator Dirksen said the committee gave its assent to an inquiry into whether the Attorney General had "told the entire factual story" in a recent review of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Comment by Goldwater

Previously Senator Goldwater had told the Senate the Attorney General was attempting to lay blame for the invasion failure on the administration of former President Eisenhower.

While Senator Dirksen's remarks were interpreted as indicating the policy group would go ahead immediately with an inquiry, he said later in an interview this was not true.

Instead, he said he personally will "take a look-see" at the situation and report back to the policy group within two weeks. He said the group then will decide what it wants to do about the information he has gathered.

The news that the policy group was underwriting an

an investigation brought charges by Democrats that the minority was injecting politics into foreign policy matters.

Chairman Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee said the action has a strong partisan aura.

Senator Keating, Republican of New York, a G. O. P. Policy Committee member, said he, too, believes that any inquiry "shouldn't be a political matter at all."

Morse Cites Secret Files

Senator Morse, Democrat of Oregon, chairman of the Senate Latin American Subcommittee, today advised Republicans to read secret testimony in the files of the Foreign Relations Committee before they make "any more partisan speeches" about the Bay of Pigs invasion.

He said they would find there testimony of Gen. Lemnitzer and former CIA chief Allen Dulles.

Senator Goldwater replied that he has read the testimony and found it "the most inconclusive I have ever seen."

Senator Morse insisted

gives clear and unequivocal answers to the questions Senator Goldwater is raising.

Senator Dirksen turned aside a question as to whether he was setting out to protect the Eisenhower administration's record. He said he was acting to "protect the record of the United States of America and for historical guidance."

Senator Dirksen did not spell out any specific complaints about Mr. Kennedy's review of what the Attorney General called invasion mistakes. Mr. Kennedy presented the official administration version of the affair for the first time Monday in a series of interviews.

Tolson

Belmont

Mohr

Casper

Callahan

Conrad

DeLoach

Evans

Gale

Rosen

Sullivan

Tavel

Trotter

Tele Room

Holmes

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